[Français]
[Welcome Page] [Main Menu] [Previous Menu]
PART I: THE GLOBAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
PART II: CANADA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSE
PART III: NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
Immigration and Citizenship Screening
PART IV: RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service welcomes the tabling of its Public Report in the House of Commons as a focal point of the Service's efforts to explain to Canadians its role in matters of national security and public safety.
As a security intelligence agency with an investigative mandate, the Service is clearly constrained in what it can say about operational targets and trends. Nevertheless, the Service is committed to the Public Report as an essential part of its accountability in a democratic society. Misinformation about the nature of the Service's mandate and activities is one of the most persistent problems CSIS has to deal with; if left unchallenged, it can undermine Canadians' trust in the Service's ability to do its job.
In presenting the Service's Public Report to Parliament last year, the Solicitor General addressed shifts in the global security environment that affect the security of Canadians: threats that come from groups and individuals as much as from sovereign states and which readily cross international boundaries; an increase in the significance of economic intelligence; and the emergence of weapons proliferation and transnational organized crime as threats to national security.
This document provides Canadians with an update on those trends, as observed by the Service during 1995. In addition, in light of expressed concern over the persistence of unresolved conflicts and the rise of extremism as breeding grounds for terrorism, it was agreed at the Halifax Summit in June 1995 (Heads of State and Government of the seven most industrialized nations and Russia, the P-8) that Canada would host a follow-up meeting of the P-8 countries to discuss specific, cooperative measures to deter, prevent and investigate terrorist acts.
This meeting of ministers, law enforcement and intelligence officials took place in Ottawa on December 12, 1995; the proceedings were summarized in a Ministerial Declaration on countering terrorism. Accordingly, the 1995 Public Report discusses the implications of world-wide terrorism for Canada and the Service's counter-terrorism program.
The predominant threats to international security in the post-cold war era include the collapse of sovereign states from a variety of causes, communal violence which may culminate in ethnic cleansing or genocide, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the final communiqué from the Halifax Summit in June identified transnational criminal organizations as "a growing threat to the security of our nations".
The fallout from collapsed or failed states in Europe and Africa continues to place extraordinary demands on the international community for humanitarian rescue in the form of guarantees of security and investment in economic reconstruction. Various forms of ethnic conflict have also increased, straining the world's capacity for collective security and the absorption capacity of refugee-receiving countries.
As a contributor to UN-sponsored peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, as well as a refugee-receiving country, Canada is affected by developments in these and other international conflicts. Under the changing fortunes of a civil war or guerrilla insurgency, there are times when members of security forces or terrorist groups who have been involved in atrocities will seek refuge in Canada or any other host country.
The threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is no longer simply that of the clandestine collection programs of a few sovereign states whose aims and activities are generally known; the risk is that these weapons or their precursors will come into the possession of terrorist groups or cults.
In the world of espionage, the security gains of the past five years are substantial. As evidenced by the participation of Russia at the P-8 meetings, democratic countries are exploring the benefits of cooperation with former East Bloc countries in the fight against terrorism, transnational crime and proliferation. Intelligence communities in democratic and transitional countries are restructuring, in some cases under conditions of continuing political instability.
Restructuring may take the form of legislation to codify functions and authorities, or it may be reflected in public statements by senior government and security officials, outlining in general terms the current mandates and priorities of their intelligence services. In an intensely competitive global economy, one of those priorities is economic intelligence, which has become a common currency for post-cold war intelligence communities.
Traditional espionage has not disappeared; it has merely changed its form. As long as disparities in wealth and technology persist, there will be a market for economic, military and political intelligence. As long as there are perceived gaps in security, there will be a market for intelligence and technology on conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the delivery options for those weapons.
In September 1995 in the Hague, Canada and 27 countries agreed on a new proliferation control regime for conventional armaments and high-technology goods to replace the cold-war framework of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls). COCOM was designed to restrict the export of these items to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The "Wassenaar Arrangement", as it is known, includes Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries, and provides for a ban on the sale of sophisticated weapons to Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, as well as the need to restrict transfers to a country which is or has become a security concern.
The recognition by the G-7 and Russia that transnational crime is a threat to national security indicates this issue transcends the sum of individual crimes committed and has become a threat to systems — political, economic and social. The scope and gravity of the problem is forcing governments to counter it through the combined efforts of law enforcement and intelligence organizations domestically, and extensive international liaison and intelligence-sharing with many foreign states, not just traditional allies.
To date, most analysis of transnational criminal activity has focused on the criminal drug trade and its ramifications. Profits from this illegal trade are enormous, but there is disturbing evidence of other significant revenue sources for organized crime groups. Corruption, money laundering not tied to drug profits, the manipulation of financial systems and major fraud are becoming increasingly important as revenue sources for groups involved in transnational crime.
While all countries are at risk, some countries of the former Soviet bloc are particularly vulnerable because of the chaos following the collapse of their economies and the absence of even the most basic regulatory and administrative systems. This has created all kinds of opportunities for criminals to distort the transition to a market economy, defraud the government and corrupt the political system.
Years like 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Warsaw Pact effectively collapsed, or 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved, are rare. At almost any point in time, the evidence is mixed as to whether the global security environment is improving or not. Nonetheless, the December 1995 meeting of the P-8 countries, hosted in Ottawa by the Solicitor General, expressed concern over a number of trends. These included an upsurge in terrorism in various P-8 countries, an increase in hostage-taking and indiscriminate terrorist violence by religious extremists and apocalyptic groups, as well as continuing attacks on tourists and the export of regional conflicts. Here is a brief account of some recent, security-related incidents.
In Canada, the domestic security environment has appeared relatively calm, despite a number of contentious social issues which elude consensus and attract a very few people who would move the political agenda through violence.
Incidents that may have a potential for life-threatening violence include blockades and occupations by armed native activists in support of treaty claims.
Since the Quebec referendum of October 30, extremists on both sides have issued isolated threats, including death threats against political leaders.
The extreme right in North America comprises a number of different racist factions without a central leadership, a phenomenon they find to be a source of strength: prominent members of the extreme right establish the broad directions of the movement, and decisions on what actions to take rest with individuals or small cells. Tensions between racists and their adversaries have the potential for violence. During the past year, four pipe bombs were mailed, two to white supremacists, by a previously unknown group calling itself the Militant Direct Action Task Force.
The 1994 Heritage Front affair brought to national attention the activities of white supremacists in Canada. Exposure has not benefited the extreme right; this racist fringe has little credibility with the Canadian public, but continues international contacts with American and European extremists.
Although Canada has not been immune, compared to many other countries it has been spared much of the horror associated with modern terrorism. Like other democratic countries in the developed world, however, Canada is inherently vulnerable to acts of terrorism. Canada's long borders and coastlines have many points of entry. As a wealthy industrial society, Canada is a potential target for extremists and an attractive place to attempt to secure technology and raise funds in the name of causes in far-away lands. Many of the world's highest-profile terrorist groups have a presence in Canada, where they engage in a variety of ongoing activities in support of terrorism, such as:
The terrorist threat is global in nature and requires a comprehensive, global response. Canada plays a pivotal role in the international approach to the problem. Discussions on the threat presented by terrorism took place during the Economic Summit in Halifax in June 1995. As a result of this Summit, ministers from the G-7 countries and Russia attended a Ministerial Conference in Ottawa in December to discuss ways of combatting terrorism. Under the Chairmanship of the Solicitor General of Canada, the conference drew up the Ottawa Declaration, a series of measures which include:
Hosting the June Summit to a successful conclusion required the coordinated efforts of governments in Canada at the federal, provincial and regional levels, as well as by federal and municipal police agencies, the Armed Forces and the Coast Guard. An estimated 2,000 security personnel were involved in the three-day event.
International cooperation to counter terrorists takes many forms, some of which are listed in the previous section. In addition to its activity as a G-7 member, Canada promotes intelligence-sharing among other members of the international community by agreement with close allies, former adversaries and developing democracies.
In August 1995, Canada participated in a conference on terrorism in Buenos Aires together with the United States, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile. This conference, the first of its kind, was attended by senior officials and was viewed as preparatory to the April 1996 Organization of American States meeting in Lima, Peru, which is expected to draw delegates from 35 member countries. Canada also participated in the February 1996 conference on anti-terrorism in the Philippines.
At an operational level, Canadian investigators counter international terrorists by following up Canadian leads from major terrorist incidents abroad and by conducting joint operations with foreign agencies.
CSIS uses the full force of the CSIS Act, together with a coordinated approach among various government departments, police authorities and allied agencies, in efforts to ensure Canada does not become a focus of terrorist activity. Without such coordination and mutual assistance at the national and international levels, combined with the Service's own investigative and analytical efforts, the risk to Canadians' public safety would increase.
CSIS' primary responsibility is to forewarn and advise. Central to this task is the provision of information and analysis to government decision-makers. CSIS threat assessments provide urgent information to ministers and senior government officials concerning imminent or potential threats. CSIS also produces longer-term, interpretative assessments and forecasts based on emerging trends and patterns of socio-economic and geopolitical development.
CSIS assists Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) by participating in the process of vetting Canadian visitors' visas. The first line of defence against terrorist efforts to infiltrate Canada exists in countries and regions overseas where CSIS maintains liaison offices. Despite efforts made there to identify and intercept suspected terrorists, a limited number still manage to enter Canada. CSIS continues to take the initiative to launch formal judicial proceedings, in cooperation with CIC, to remove terrorists from Canada.
CSIS information led CIC in 1995 to refuse a number of applications from individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activity, effectively barring their entry into Canada. There also were instances in 1995 in which terrorists were removed. These efforts send a clear message that Canada is neither a safe-haven nor a refuge.
Owing to its violent, underworld nature, terrorism is frequently tied to criminal activity. In the course of its investigations, CSIS often obtains ancillary information regarding criminal matters, which the Service turns over to law enforcement agencies. Extensive and timely liaison with the appropriate police authorities has helped to apprehend criminals and avert loss of life.
Through its Counter-Terrorism program, CSIS has been able to deny the use of Canada as a safe-haven, refuge or as a site for terrorist activities. In this way, the safety of Canadians is protected.
Terrorists are not the only threat to Canada's security. While public safety remains the Service's highest priority, Canada continues to face threats from several states engaged in intelligence activities to further their aims and policies. These activities include political, military and economic espionage in Canada. They also include procurement of the expertise, technology and materiel required to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems; and foreign interference, such as attempts by foreign intelligence services to monitor, influence or coerce emigré communities covertly. Foreign intelligence activities violate Canadian sovereignty and are inimical to our national security interests.
CSIS no longer actively investigates many of the countries that once were a concern. In fact, the Service is developing liaison relations with several intelligence services of the former Warsaw Pact. While these relationships have the potential to provide Canada with information important to its own security, another purpose is to convince former adversaries that their legitimate security needs can be satisfied through liaison and cooperation, without the need to spy on Canada or Canadians.
In addition to these relationships, CSIS has liaison agreements with a number of other foreign services. Such agreements are essential to fulfil the Service's mandate and properly serve the interests of the government and the Canadian public.
CSIS has identified "undeclared" foreign intelligence officers operating in Canada. Their activities include monitoring their own citizens who are residing temporarily in Canada, penetrating and coercing their respective Canadian ethnic communities or collecting military, political, economic and technical intelligence.
Approximately two dozen countries operate against Canadian interests within Canada or abroad. In some cases, those which operate here do so with fewer resources and a narrower focus than in previous years; however, others are still active.
It has become apparent to the world community that transnational criminal activity has extensively penetrated some societies and can have an impact on their national interests. Such interests can include the preservation of democratic processes, the integrity of borders and the economic well-being of nations.
The successful pursuit of those involved in transnational criminal activity can be facilitated through the use of information derived from intelligence sources. Many governments, recognizing the need for strategic intelligence in this vital area, are using their security and intelligence services to fight transnational crime. CSIS has established relationships with many of these services and is in a position to receive information and intelligence pertaining to this threat.
The era when traditional global security relations overshadowed economic concerns and regional conflict has passed. Accelerating economic interdependence and international competition have emerged as major sources of tension and conflict among world powers. In this uncertain environment, developed countries eager to maintain their standards of living, and developing countries equally determined to improve their own, are under pressure to use whatever means they have to improve their productivity and ensure their economic security. One such means is economic espionage, which can be described as illegal, clandestine or coercive activity by a foreign government to gain unauthorized access to economic intelligence such as proprietary information or technology for economic advantage.
The Canadian government has transformed its national requirements for security intelligence to reflect this modified threat environment. Currently, the government has identified economic security as one of its priorities. CSIS has responded to these changing dynamics and to their impact on Canadian defence, foreign policy and economic interests.
The Service's economic espionage mandate is to investigate clandestine activities by or on behalf of foreign governments that are detrimental to Canada's economic and commercial interests. CSIS seeks to forewarn government when the otherwise level playing field of free market competition is deliberately tilted against Canadian interests.
CSIS does not investigate commercial industrial espionage — the practice of one private-sector company spying on another. If these activities are of a criminal nature, they may be investigated by law enforcement agencies.
Canada has world-class skills in many technology-intensive fields. Aerospace, biotechnology, chemical, communications, information technology, mining & metallurgy, nuclear, oil & gas and environmental technology are key industrial sectors in the Canadian economy. Canadian enterprises maintain and develop information and technology of economic significance, the protection of which is essential to their economic viability, and by extension, the economic well-being of Canada.
A number of Canadian companies operating in these sectors have been targeted by foreign governments to obtain economic or commercial advantage. The damage to Canadian interests takes the form of lost contracts, jobs and markets, and overall, a diminished competitive advantage. Information and technology that has been the target of economic espionage includes trade and pricing information, investment strategy, contract details, supplier lists, planning documents, research and development data, technical drawings and computer databases. Two incidents among many serve as examples:
The Service established a national Liaison and Awareness Program to deal with economic espionage and proliferation issues in January 1992. The program seeks to develop an ongoing dialogue with public and private organizations concerning the threat posed to Canadian interests by foreign government involvement in economic and defence-related espionage, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The program enables CSIS to collect and assess information that will assist in its investigation of economic espionage activities against Canada, and in the subsequent provision of advice to government.
The CSIS program now consists of more than 1600 contacts within Canadian industry and government. Thirty per cent have expressed a security concern, 76 per cent of which related to economic security.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological and their delivery systems) is a significant concern. In addition to the five declared nuclear weapons states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) and those former Soviet states which are divesting themselves of the nuclear weapons on their soil, a number of other countries are assumed to either possess nuclear weapons or be intent on acquiring them.
According to a recent report of the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, a total of 11 countries are "generally reported as having undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities", and at least eight are reported to have undeclared offensive biological weapons programs.
Furthermore, besides the five declared nuclear powers, more than a dozen countries are developing ballistic missiles with ranges of between 300 and 600 or more kilometres. Of additional concern are the states which have in the past developed, or are now believed to be developing nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry simultaneously, as well as ballistic missiles for their long-range delivery.
In Canada, there have been covert attempts to acquire technology applicable to the development and production of weapons of mass destruction by countries of proliferation concern. For example, in a well-publicized case immediately preceding the Gulf War, American and British officials foiled an attempt by an Iraqi front company to acquire trigger mechanisms for nuclear devices. A Canadian firm had also been approached by an Iraqi-based company with an order for trigger modules. The unusually high quantity requested and the undeclared end-use raised sufficient suspicions for the company not to proceed with the sale.
Canada is a party to a number of international treaties, such as the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, forbidding the transfer of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Canada was one of the original signatories of the yet to be ratified Chemical Weapons Convention. Despite the strengthening of these régimes, non-signatory states and states ignoring their treaty commitments continue to undermine proliferation control efforts.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the diversion to military programs of dual-use technology acquired under the guise of civilian research or application constitute growing international security threats to which CSIS devotes particular attention, especially to the transfer of expertise.
CSIS works closely with federal government departments and agencies such as Foreign Affairs and International Trade, National Defence, Revenue Canada Customs & Excise, the National Research Council and the Atomic Energy Control Board. These have either an enforcement role or the technical knowledge to support a thorough and comprehensive assessment of the proliferation threat.
Through its mandated investigations in Canada and its international liaison network, CSIS seeks to identify attempts by countries of proliferation concern to acquire Canadian technology and expertise. The resulting analyses are shared with relevant government departments and agencies, thus informing them of events that may affect Canadian foreign policy and defence interests.
The Security Screening Program is the Service's most visible function. In the course of performing screening enquiries, CSIS personnel come into daily contact with the general public. CSIS completes thousands of security assessments per year. Security assessments fall into three categories: Government Screening; Foreign Screening; Immigration and Citizenship Screening.
The Service acts as the investigative and security assessment agency for all government institutions except National Defence and the RCMP, who conduct their own field investigations. CSIS carries out security assessments when public servants or contracted employees require security clearances in order to have access to classified government information in the performance of their duties.
The Service responds to client department requests with an assessment that contains an appraisal of the loyalty and reliability of the individual. The decision whether or not to grant the security clearance is left to the department head. A decision to deny or revoke a clearance may be reviewed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
Another component of Government Screening is the Airport Restricted Area Access Program, established in 1987 to improve security at major Canadian airports. The Service provides a screening assessment of persons requiring access to controlled areas in order to perform such duties as baggage handling and food services.
The Service has reciprocal screening agreements with a number of foreign governments and agencies, all of which are approved by the Solicitor General after consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. These requests for foreign screening typically fall within one of two categories: database checks and enquiries on Canadian residents wishing to take up residence in another country; or checks and occasional field enquiries on former and current Canadian residents who are being considered for classified access in another country. All persons affected by this procedure provide their agreement in advance.
With the large number of conflicts throughout the world, the importation of regional homeland issues into communities in Canada is of particular concern to all Canadians. The Service provides advice to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on prospective immigrants. Such advice relates directly to the security inadmissibility criteria contained in s.19(1) of the Immigration Act, with the final decision resting with the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.
The 1993 amendments to the Immigration Act have had a significant impact on the security screening of prospective immigrants. The amendments have broadened the scope of s.19(1) of the Act by including the word terrorism, the notion of membership, and more significantly, the inclusion of past activity as grounds for inadmissibility. These amendments brought s.19 into closer alignment with the definition of "threats to national security", as defined in s.2 of the CSIS Act.
The Service also provides Citizenship and Immigration Canada with advice on individuals applying for Canadian citizenship as to whether or not they may become involved in activities constituting threats to the security of Canada as defined in s.2 of the CSIS Act.
One of the primary values of intelligence-gathering is the timely delivery of perishable information to policy-makers in government.
Intelligence analysts use their knowledge of regional, national and global trends to evaluate all types of information, including that from open sources. Based on their research, they produce security intelligence in the form of assessed reports, studies or briefs on specific issues.
The Service's analysis of intelligence occurs at two levels: operational and strategic. Operational analysis is closely linked to the analysis performed initially by investigators at regional offices, and subsequently from a national perspective by operational branches at headquarters. Operational analysis involves combining tactically assessed intelligence with information from other sources, including government agencies and other intelligence services. The result is a finished evaluation which lends context to, and weighs the significance of, the original raw information.
Strategic analysis aims to develop comprehensive, policy-relevant intelligence assessments, and can involve a wide range of vital Canadian interests and future policies. Strategic analysts are selected on the basis of their authoritative and detailed knowledge of specialist areas and their ability to anticipate and analyze issues of potential interest to policy-makers.
The Service's intelligence assessments appear either as stand-alone documents or in conjunction with assessments from other agencies in Canada's intelligence community. These latter documents are published collectively by the interdepartmental Intelligence Advisory Committee under the auspices of the Privy Council Office.
A Government Liaison Unit enables the Service to obtain feedback from clients throughout government, and has allowed CSIS to refine its assessment process by focusing on topics of greater relevance and timeliness. In this way, the Service is better able to meet its statutory obligations.
Since 1991/92, the Service, like other departments and agencies, has been subject to the government's fiscal restraint program. This program has affected the number of staff and will continue to do so. Between 1992 and 1998, the Service's staff will be reduced by 739, or 26.8 per cent. The Service's budget, including reductions resulting from Program Review, will decrease by 36.4 per cent between 1993/94 and 1998/99. Excluding the capital costs of the National Headquarters, the reduction is 19.7 per cent. As a result of Program Review II, the Service's budget will be reduced by an additional $1.6 million in 1998/99.
The charts on the following page illustrate the Service's human and dollar resource levels. A major portion of the reduction since 1993/94 is due to the completion of the National Headquarters building.
The Service is able to meet its budget cuts primarily through staff reductions. These reductions have been accomplished through normal attrition and, having been identified as a "most affected" agency, the Service has been able to offer employees the Early Departure Incentive Program. Moreover, the Service has focused on reducing administrative overhead where possible, and developing technological innovations to realize efficiencies.
Special emphasis will continue to be placed on maintaining the operational integrity of the Service. Although there have been directed reductions in some areas, essential positions must continue to be staffed by people with the qualifications and specialized skills related to security intelligence. Therefore, the Service will continue to recruit high-calibre university graduates to become Intelligence Officers.
[Welcome Page] [Main Menu] [Previous Menu]
Disclaimer: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service assumes no responsibility for the use of the information at this World Wide Web (WWW) site.
