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The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) marked its tenth anniversary in 1994. The decade that has passed since the creation of Canada's civilian security intelligence service has witnessed some profound shifts in the international balance of powers. The Service has adapted to this changing environment.
CSIS is mandated to collect information on issues that affect public safety and the national security of Canadians, and to report and advise on its findings to Government.
Five years into the life of CSIS, a statutory review of the Service's performance recommended the release of an annual report on security intelligence matters which could be tabled in Parliament. The purpose of the report was to contribute to informed public discussion. Three such reports have been issued since 1992; this is the fourth.
As in previous years, the report accompanies an annual statement by the Solicitor General on national security issues facing Canada. In keeping with the government's 1991 commitment to produce the report, the practice of discussing the global threat environment is continued. The 1994 report departs from previous reports in that it addresses a new requirement arising from recent changes to the government's Expenditure Management System. In 1992 the Service reported on reductions in human resource requirements and on the shift of resources from counter espionage to counter terrorism that occurred in response to the changing, post Cold War global security environment. This year a resource outlook has been included for the first time. This outlook includes a three year forecast of overall expenditures and a description of the Service's major Security Screening, Counter terrorism and Counter intelligence Programs.
As we approach the mid point of the decade, Canadians face a challenging international environment. Positive aspects include a global economy that continues to grow, an improved framework for multilateral trade and the spread of democracy. The world in which Canada finds itself is also characterized by high levels of instability and conflict, a condition that shows signs of continuing indefinitely. Security issues include upheavals caused by civil war, "ethnic cleansing" and internal insurrection leading to mass migration; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and their delivery systems; increased economic competitiveness; evolving and uncertain international relationships; and the emergence of organized crime as a threat to national security. All these factors affect Canadian security.
A number of characteristics have emerged in this fragmented and destabilized global security intelligence environment. Apart from giving shape to the post Cold War era, these trends call for flexibility and adaptation by the agencies charged with ensuring the security of Western nations. Among those trends are the following:
Against this backdrop of tensions other trends are changing the security environment in which CSIS functions. Apart from increasingly intense international economic competition, the world is experiencing unprecedented movements of people. Canada, with its vast and open borders, and its reputation as an attractive destination for the world's underprivileged, is especially susceptible to certain problems associated with this phenomenon of global mass migration.
CSIS is mandated to respond to threats to the security of Canada which can be roughly grouped into two broad categories: public safety and national security. Ensuring public safety requires protecting Canadians against politically motivated violence. Advance warning of the potential for this kind of violence and its prevention is referred to as counter terrorism. With regard to the protection of our national security, the Service focuses on the intelligence activities of foreign states; this is known as counter-intelligence.
Public safety is the Service's principal concern, and CSIS accords the highest priority to monitoring individuals and groups which use serious violence to achieve their political goals.
Violence which may have its roots on the other side of the world has touched Canadians. As one of the few countries whose doors remain open to large numbers of immigrants and refugees, our diverse, pluralistic society is inherently vulnerable to the spillover of homeland conflicts.
These conflicts are brought to Canada by only a small proportion of immigrants and refugees; for CSIS, this small minority becomes the majority of its counter terrorism case load.
Most of the world's dangerous terrorist groups have a presence in Canada. Here, they seek to engage in a wide range of activities in support of terrorism by providing logistical support for terrorist operations within and outside Canada, fund raising, conducting surveillance and manipulating émigré communities, providing safe havens for terrorists, facilitating transit to and from the USA and other parts of the world, and engaging in immigrant smuggling and other illegal activities.
In its 10-year life, CSIS has achieved a number of successes against individuals in Canada and abroad who support terrorist causes or perpetrate terrorist acts. These successes have resulted from the establishment and development of strong liaison arrangements with foreign agencies and close working relationships with Canadian government departments.
Also central to the success of the Service's Counter terrorism Program is cooperation and liaison with police forces, especially the RCMP, the provision of advice to Canadian immigration authorities and the provision of threat assessments to appropriate government agencies and departments. One of the most effective ways of countering terrorism in Canada is to prevent the entry into Canada of individuals involved in terrorist activity. The Service plays an important role in this regard by providing advice to Citizenship and Immigration Canada on the admissibility of prospective immigrants.
The Service produces assessments of persons arriving at ports of entry who may pose a threat to the security of Canada. CSIS also assists in determining the need for an interview, detention and any subsequent administrative action. Service reports form the basis of recommendations for referral to the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) or the Federal Court.
When the Service uncovers evidence that individuals in Canada are participating in or supporting terrorism, CSIS cooperates closely with the RCMP and other police forces of jurisdiction to press criminal charges. The Service also works with Citizenship and Immigration Canada to deport individuals so involved.
Counter terrorism threat assessments act as early warning tools by providing timely information to government clients about imminent or potential threats. They provide a service to those who require threat information so they can take preventative measures or enhance security procedures. These assessments focus on threats, or potential threats, to foreign missions and personnel in Canada, internationally protected persons, prominent visitors, Canadian officials travelling here and abroad, and special events involving Canada, such as the Commonwealth Games and the G7 Summit.
The Service obtains information through contact and interviews with Canadians, particularly within ethnic communities. These interviews are reciprocal opportunities: they give the Service an occasion to explain to community leaders and members its role; and they allow community leaders to articulate their views, raise concerns and identify emerging issues which may pose threats to the security of Canada and may require further investigation.
Canada's domestic environment gives rise to few issues that would incite politically motivated violence. In its recent review of the Heritage Front Affair, however, the SIRC fully endorsed the need for continued investigation of extreme right wing racist and neo nazi groups in Canada. The right wing extremist movement in Canada was damaged in 1994 as a result of the Service's investigation.
While public safety remains the Service's highest priority, Canada continues to face threats that can be grouped under the rubric of national security. In a turbulent and uncertain world, many states are engaging in intelligence activities to further their aims and policies. In Canada, these activities include political, military and economic espionage; procurement of the expertise, technology and materiel required to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems; and foreign interference, such as attempts by foreign intelligence services to monitor, influence or coerce émigré communities covertly. Foreign intelligence activities violate Canadian sovereignty and are inimical to our national security interests.
CSIS no longer actively investigates many of the countries that once were a concern. In fact, the Service is developing liaison relations with intelligence services of the former Warsaw Pact. While these relationships have the potential to provide Canada with information important to its own security, the primary purpose is to convince former adversaries that their legitimate security needs can be satisfied through liaison and cooperation, without the need to spy on Canada or Canadians.
In addition to these relationships, CSIS has liaison agreements with a number of other foreign services. Such agreements are essential to fulfil the Service's mandate and properly serve the interests of the government and the Canadian public.
CSIS has identified "undeclared" foreign intelligence officers operating in Canada. Their activities include monitoring their own citizens who may be temporarily residing in Canada, penetrating and coercing their respective Canadian ethnic communities and/or collecting military, economic and technical intelligence.
Approximately two dozen countries operate against Canadian interests within Canada or abroad. In some cases, those which operate here do so with fewer resources and a narrower focus than in previous years; however, others are still active. The most worrisome of these is the Russian military intelligence organization, the GRU, which has not diminished its efforts in Canada to collect militarily relevant information covertly.
Canada is a trading nation whose economic viability depends on its ability to compete in the international marketplace. Increasing global competition has caused many countries, some considered friendly, to make greater use of clandestine, coercive, deceptive or illegal means to enhance their competitiveness.
Foreign governments use their intelligence services and other surrogates, such as departments, agencies and state controlled companies, to conduct economic espionage. Canadian companies and research facilities have been subjected to a number of economic espionage attempts, including communications interception, recruitment of employees with access to proprietary information, unauthorized access to computer systems, illegal entry into premises where sensitive work is being conducted and diversion or interception of bid submissions. Sectors of the Canadian economy which have been targeted include aerospace, biotechnology, communications, nuclear, mining and metallurgy, and oil and gas.
The extent of the Service's involvement in countering economic espionage is clearly defined. CSIS does not investigate industrial espionage - the efforts mounted by some individual companies to acquire technology or know-how illicitly from their competitors. Such investigations are more properly left to the police. CSIS will enter into an investigation only when the Service believes that a foreign government may be involved.
Through its awareness program, CSIS has established an ongoing dialogue with the public and private sectors to identify threats posed to Canadian interests from economic espionage. The program, which is completely voluntary, has been well received by Canadian businesses. Since January 1992, more than 600 organizations have participated in the program, enabling the Service to obtain information of direct relevance to its mandate.
The issue of weapons proliferation (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems) has gained prominence in the global security debate. The increase in the offensive, non conventional military capabilities of developing countries poses a growing threat to international peace and stability. The acquisition of dual use materials, technology and expertise needed to advance weapons of mass destruction programs is a significant security issue.
Canada is a party to various international agreements which seek to deter proliferation activities through the restriction of trade in specific technologies and material. In an attempt to circumvent these national and international controls, countries of proliferation concern have turned to more elaborate and deceptive methods, such as the development of clandestine and illicit international trade networks, to acquire restricted technology and materials.
As Canada is an internationally recognized leader in many high technology sectors (such as the nuclear, chemical, electronics and aerospace sectors), it has been, and will remain, a lucrative target for clandestine and illicit procurement activity. Consequently, in conjunction with our partners in the international community, CSIS seeks to identify attempts by countries of proliferation concern to acquire Canadian technology and expertise.
The Security Screening Program is the Service's most visible function. In the course of performing screening enquiries, CSIS personnel come into daily contact with the general public. CSIS completed over 100,000 security assessments in the past year.
Security assessments fall into three categories: Government Screening; Foreign Screening; and Immigration and Citizenship Screening.
The Service acts as the investigative and security assessment agency for all government institutions except DND and the RCMP, who conduct their own field investigations. CSIS carries out security assessments when public servants or private sector employees require security clearances in order to have access to classified government information in the performance of their duties.
The Service responds to client department requests with an assessment that contains an appraisal of the loyalty and reliability of the individual. The decision whether or not to grant the security clearance is left to the department head. Anyone denied a clearance may appeal the decision to the SIRC.
Another component of Government Screening is the Airport Restricted Area Access Program (ARAAP), established in 1987 to improve security at major Canadian airports. The Service provides a screening assessment of persons requiring access to controlled areas in order to perform such duties as baggage handling and goods services.
The Service has reciprocal screening agreements with a number of foreign governments and agencies, all of which are approved by the Solicitor General after consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs. These requests for foreign screening typically fall within one of two categories: database checks and enquiries on Canadian residents wishing to take up residence in another country; or checks and occasional field enquiries on former and current Canadian residents who are being considered for classified access in another country. All persons affected by this procedure provide their agreement in advance.
With the large number of conflicts throughout the world, the importation of regional homeland issues into communities in Canada is of particular concern to all Canadians. The Service provides advice to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on prospective immigrants. Such advice relates directly to the security inadmissibility criteria contained in s.19(1) of the Immigration Act, with the final decision resting with the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.
In the past year CSIS decreased the time required for processing immigration requests. However, the Service must sometimes rely on the cooperation of foreign agencies to provide criminal and security checks; this can sometimes result in lengthy processing delays.
The 1993 amendments to the Immigration Act have had a significant impact on the security screening of prospective immigrants. The amendments have broadened the scope of s.19(1) of the Act by including the word terrorism, the notion of membership, and more significantly, the inclusion of past activity as grounds for inadmissibility. These amendments represent an attempt to bring s.19 into closer alignment with the definition of "threats to national security", as defined in s.2 of the CSIS Act.
The Service also provides Citizenship and Immigration Canada with security assessments on individuals applying for Canadian citizenship who are considered threats to the security of Canada as defined in s.2 of the CSIS Act.
In the classical model of intelligence gathering, information was often acquired and frequently hoarded for the sake of having it on hand. This model is no longer appropriate in the current intricate and rapidly changing environment; increasingly, the premium is on just in time delivery of perishable information to decision makers in government.
Intelligence analysts use their knowledge of regional, national and global trends to evaluate all types of information, including that from open sources. Based on their research, other analysts produce security intelligence in the form of assessed reports, studies or briefs on specific issues.
The Marketing and Client Liaison Unit enables the Service to obtain feedback from clients throughout government, and has allowed CSIS to refine its assessment process by focusing on topics of greater relevance and timeliness. In this way, the Service is better able to meet its statutory obligations. The Service is also responsible for responding to requests from other government departments and agencies for Threat and Risk Assessments under the Government Security Policy
The Service's intelligence assessments appear either as stand alone documents or in conjunction with assessments from other agencies in Canada's intelligence community. These latter documents are published collectively by the interdepartmental Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) under the auspices of the Privy Council Office. IAC consists of officials from government departments and agencies active in the security and intelligence fields.
The Service's analysis of intelligence occurs at two levels: operational and strategic.
Operational analysis is closely linked to the tactical analysis performed initially by investigators at regional offices, and subsequently from a national perspective, by operational branches at headquarters. Operational analysis involves combining tactically assessed intelligence with information from other sources, including government agencies and other intelligence services. The result is a finished evaluation which lends context to and weighs the significance of the original raw information.
Strategic analysis aims to develop comprehensive, policy relevant intelligence assessments, and can involve a wide range of vital Canadian interests and future policies. Strategic analysts are selected on the basis of their authoritative and detailed knowledge of specialist areas and their ability to anticipate and analyze issues of potential interest to policy makers.
The Service encourages better public understanding of the global security environment and national security issues. In 1994, 12 issues of the unclassified CSIS publication COMMENTARY, dealing with a range of security issues were released. Additionally, representatives of the Service participated in academic conferences and seminars and made periodic addresses to special or general interest groups. The Service also maintains a limited program whereby members of the academic community with expertise in areas of interest to CSIS are invited to spend varying periods of time with the Service as Strategic Analysts.
The Service's budget, including reductions resulting from the Program Review exercise, will decrease by 34.8% between 1993/94 and 1997/98. This reduction has already affected the number of staff and will continue to do so. Between 1992 and 1997, the Service's staff will be reduced by 739 or 26.8%.
As a result of Program Review, the Service's budget will be reduced by 5% in 1995-96, and by additional 5% in 1996-97, for a total 10% reduction of $17.2 million to the Service's base.
The charts on the following page illustrate the Service's human and dollar resource levels. A major portion of the reduction since 1993-94 relates to the completion of the construction for the National Headquarters building. This year for the first time, CSIS has broken out its one figure budget to a three figure budget in the 1995-96 Main Estimates. The Main Estimates now show salaries, construction capital and other operating expenses, reflecting the breakout on the chart.
To meet the reductions to the Service's budget, the Service has had to rely to a large degree on attrition and a limited, selective staffing process to fill essential operational positions. This has created vacancies in certain essential positions which must be staffed with people having the qualifications and specialized skills related to security intelligence. Therefore, despite reductions in some areas, the Service will continue to recruit high calibre university graduates to the Intelligence Officer component.
The latest Program Review cuts of $17.2 million compound these problems, and the Director is reviewing all areas of the Service for savings. Special emphasis will be placed on maintaining the operational integrity of the Service by reducing the administration areas to the extent possible and achieving technological efficiencies.
Following the Program Review exercise, CSIS has assessed the current level of risk as manageable. For the present, the Service's effectiveness in dealing with national security threats is not expected to be seriously impaired.
In terms of the security environment, unpredictability and instability persist, in contrast to the former relative equilibrium of bipolar rivalry. Over the past year, the security environment has remained volatile, as witnessed by the continual threat of international terrorism; examples include the bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires, two car bombings in London in July and the hijacking of an Air France jet in Algeria in December. The issues that give rise to these acts of terrorism find their supporters in Canada as well. Additionally, Canada continues to face intelligence threats from both traditional and emerging adversaries. CSIS has adjusted to these realities and is maintaining vigilance with respect to public safety and national security.
In response to the rapid pace of change and the end of the Cold War, the Service has re evaluated many traditional and long standing threats to national security. In some cases, a reduction of resources or the termination of major investigations has been possible; however, it is also clear that the task of counter intelligence is more complex in the absence of the overriding ideological struggle, which for so many years automatically identified friend from foe. Today, threats are far more varied -- emanating from all areas of the globe -- and, as a result, more difficult to identify and counter. Despite a diminishing threat from traditional adversaries, many foreign intelligence agencies remain active in Canada. Activities such as political, economic and military espionage, foreign interference and procurement related to the development of weapons of mass destruction remain at the forefront of our national security concerns.
Canada must be vigilant in its efforts to keep out terrorists and others of security concern. If we do not, we risk becoming a battleground for imported "homeland" conflicts which can lead to violence against Canadians or VIPs, and subsequent retaliation. Nor does Canada want to become a support base used by terrorists to hide and plot terrorist acts in relative safety, and to raise funds and purchase weapons and other materiel. Canada's commitment to fighting terrorism internationally requires accurate and prompt information on these support activities. Finally, Canada must not be allowed to become home to those who have perpetrated acts of terrorism elsewhere.
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