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In its response to the Five-Year Parliamentary Review Committee's report on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act and the Security Offences Act, the Government of Canada made a commitment to provide Parliament with more information on the national security system.
This commitment stems from a recognition that effective legislative control and accountability over CSIS must be accompanied by increased public knowledge about its defensive and domestic role. This knowledge should help Canadians understand how the national security of Canada is being safeguarded by the Service, with due respect for individual rights and freedoms.
This first public report reflects the Government's commitment to have CSIS provide parliamentarians and the Canadian public with additional information on its work. Specifically, the report includes a discussion of Canada's security environment. The requirement to discuss the security environment was prescribed in On Course, a document released in February 1991 which conveyed the Government's response to the five-year review. The report also contributes to the evolution of public understanding of the Service's role. This evolutionary process was initiated following the 1987 report to the Solicitor General by an independent advisory team, headed by the former Clerk of the Privy Council, Gordon Osbaldeston. The Osbaldeston report highlighted the need for improved understanding of the "purposes and processes" of the Service, as well as the need to address many of the popular myths surrounding security intelligence work.
An enduring myth is that CSIS is a secret organization. The Service is an organization that, for reasons of national security, is obliged to maintain some secrets. While security sometimes requires secrecy for effectiveness, secrecy is not imposed for its own sake. This report therefore contributes to public knowledge of CSIS, within constraints imposed by operational necessity.
Much has happened in the world since On Course was released. The world itself is a different place, with the dramatic changes that have occurred in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. In some respects, it is a less dangerous place as a result of the shift in the precarious balance between the traditional post-war superpowers. But significant threats remain. Understanding what the changing environment means for the security interests of Canada represents the most significant challenge facing the Service today.
Against this background, the CSIS Public Report for 1991 contains an overview of the Service's operating environment. It also provides an explanation of how intelligence is produced for government decision makers. This information is intended to provide Canadians with a more complete picture of CSIS, as well as a greater understanding of the role it plays in protecting Canada's national security.
Security intelligence services worldwide are grappling with the implications of the unprecedented upheavals in the world order that occurred in 1991. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is no exception. The decades-long superpower confrontation has now been suspended and the Cold War equilibrium that governed how most nations related to each other no longer applies. Nevertheless, there are new and continuing sources of uncertainty and instability. These include:
Most of Canada's domestic security concerns are linked to international developments. Terrorist activities and the clandestine collection of information have never been fully contained by national boundaries. As never before in modern history, the borders of nation-states are now open, allowing freer movement of people, goods, information and money around the world.
In some fundamental ways, there is reason to breathe easier and look with increasing hope to the future. The diminution of the fears associated with the Cold War opens the way for more harmonious and co-operative solutions to regional and global problems on issues such as terrorism and the theft of destabilizing technology.
The world is characterized by the dominance of the major democratic powers and increasing global interdependence. The end of East-West conflict has given nations reason to hope for greater global harmony. This prospect is counterbalanced, however, by political, economic and social pressures within the newly emerging and newly freed countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and continuing social unrest in a number of other nation-states.
Canada still faces a world of considerable uncertainty and disorder marked by:
Following the attempted coup of last August, the former Soviet Union dissolved. Its successor states face ethnic and political instability. Concurrently, ethnic and nationalistic forces, largely suppressed since World War II, re-emerged in East and Central Europe. The bitter civil war in Yugoslavia underscores a hostile factionalism that could find resonance elsewhere.
Ethnic and nationalistic turmoil has a spill-over effect on Canadian emigre communities. Events in other countries engender sympathy and, in some cases, elicit direct financial and material support for politically motivated violence or armed struggle. Ethnic, religious and regional minorities all over the world are politically mobilized to promote self-defined interests. Communal and ethnic conflicts frequently escalate into civil war, provoke human rights abuse and result in mass reprisals. These conflicts generate most of the world's refugee movements as well as demands for international political backing, weapons and money. These conflicts have the capacity to export conflict through terrorism and intelligence activity focused on expatriate communities.
The 1991 Persian Gulf War is a reminder that the most serious threats to peace and security in the 1990s may have little to do with long familiar East-West international rivalries. That conflict and those in the Horn of Africa and the Asian subcontinent demonstrate how quickly even distant hostilities can create mass migration and refugee movements. Moreover, the Iraqi aggression was a stark reminder that continued proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and non-conventional weapons (nuclear, biological, chemical) is a deadly serious issue. This threat was dramatized by post-war revelations about the advanced state of Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program.
In 1991, as many as a dozen developing countries could have been characterized as emerging nuclear nations. Furthermore, close to that number of countries may have chemical weapons. Fully one half of these countries may also have offensive biological weapons. The sudden availability on the open market of portions of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military stock- pile have introduced a worrisome degree of destabilization in already troubled parts of the world. This destabilization is exacerbated by the potential exportation of Soviet nuclear scientists and their expertise from the former Soviet Union.
Public safety is the principal concern of the Service. High priority has been accorded to monitoring terrorist movements abroad. Of particular concern is international strife that has the potential to spill-over into Canada.
For several decades, state sponsorship has played a significant role in the operations of terrorist groups. Some of this support has now ceased with the result that some terrorist groups have been forced to curtail their activities. Other groups, however, continue their campaigns with fatal results in Europe, Latin America and on the Indian subcontinent.
After a decline in incidents through 1989 and 1990, international terrorist attacks rose by 20 percent in 1991 making terrorism a continuing, direct concern for Canada. The Provisional Irish Republican Army stepped up its campaign in Northern Ireland and on the British mainland. Basque terrorists were responsible for over 40 killings, a substantial increase over 1990. The Greek '17 November', the Turkish Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) and the Turkish terrorist organization, Dev Sol, also initiated active bombing campaigns during this period. In Germany, where the left-wing Red Army Faction remains an active terrorist threat, there has also been a resurgence of right-wing extremism resulting in more than 1,000 incidents of politically-motivated violence against immigrants and refugees.
Elsewhere, terrorist incidents carried out by Sikh extremists increased during 1991, with more than 5,300 people killed in the Punjab alone. Nationalistic conflicts also widened in Kashmir, Assam and Sri Lanka. The New Peoples Army and Muslim factions continued to battle in the Philippines; the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru and Sendero Luminoso of Peru conducted a number of dramatic and bloody attacks. Violence also remains endemic in Colombia.
Canada and Canadians are not generally known to be primary targets of particular terrorist groups. Some groups, however, have used this country as a base to acquire equipment and funding for terrorist movements in other parts of the world. Elements of Canada's diverse ethnic communities represent a resource that is attractive to supporters of homeland causes. Only a very small minority has ever been directly involved in supporting, organizing or participating in terrorist acts. However, it does not take many of these activists to represent a danger to public safety.
Economic interdependence is an increasingly significant security concern. Globalization of business and international diffusion of knowledge is shaping competition and will complicate economic security for all governments. Canada is among world leaders in several advanced technology fields and has many connections in international business, scientific and research circles. The sectors in which Canadian industry still enjoys a significant competitive advantage include aerospace, biotechnology, nuclear technology, telecommunications and informatics. These areas are the basis for Canadian participation in international high-technology markets. All of this represents a powerful incentive for covert foreign intelligence- gathering of Canadian ideas and technology.
For Canada, the threats to national security have become more complex. The Cold War, despite its menace, was at least predictable. For decades, both the actors and the methods of espionage remained unchanged. In the 1990s, uncertainty and upheaval are becoming prominent features of the international environment. Moreover, traditional patterns of intelligence activity in Canada, although diminished, have far from disappeared. Considerable capacity to undertake clandestine operations remains. Time will tell whether these patterns of activity will further diminish or continue.
A key task of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is to anticipate change and, in particular, change that may have adverse consequences for Canada. An era of ever more rapid and volatile readjustment at home and abroad requires that the Service, as a key player in Canada's intelligence community, adapt and focus clearly on present and future challenges to this country.
The primary mandate of CSIS is to collect and analyze information, and to provide its observations, in the form of security intelligence, to the Government. The process that produces these results is known as the security intelligence cycle.
This cycle begins with direction from government, which is a cornerstone of the relationship envisioned in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. The Act ensures that the Minister responsible, the Solicitor General of Canada, has full knowledge and power of direction over the policies, operations and management of CSIS. Policy guidelines for Service activities are established through Ministerial direction. Direction of this nature covers many areas of Service activity, including guidance in the use of investigative methods and techniques. It also ensures that the Solicitor General is the linchpin in the Service's legal and policy framework.
Regular direction from Government on intelligence priorities is one characteristic that distinguishes the Service from a police organization. While police agencies conduct criminal investigations free from political direction, government priorities are the starting point for security intelligence work.
Whereas police work typically involves preventing, detecting and solving crimes, the civilian security service gathers intelligence in order to anticipate threats. Nation-wide intelligence collection, analysis and reporting occur in order to alert governments, and the police, so they may take preventive action.
The 1984 legislation creating Canada's current national security system clearly delineates the distinction between security intelligence and police work. The CSIS Act describes the several mandates assigned to CSIS, and the Security Offences Act confirms the RCMP's responsibility for security-related law enforcement and protective security.
In July 1984, at the time of the transfer of security intelligence responsibilities from the RCMP to CSIS, Ministerial direction was issued describing the expected relationship between the two organizations. In 1986, the Solicitor General approved a Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and the RCMP, which has since been updated. It set out many of the requirements for effective co-operation, including the exchange of information and intelligence related to their respective responsibilities.
The threats to the security of Canada are re-evaluated each year in light of an annual assessment by the Service of such threats. This assessment is based on CSIS's review of the constantly-changing security environment. This review is done in consultation with government departments and other members of the security intelligence community. The assessment is then provided to the Government. Following Ministerial consideration, the Solicitor General provides direction to the Service.
This direction has set out public safety, the integrity of Canada's democratic process, security of government assets, economic security, and international peace and security as the Government's security intelligence priorities.
The Solicitor General has identified public safety as the highest priority. Economic security – the conditions necessary to sustain a competitive international position for Canada and to provide productive employment for Canadians – is also to be given priority.
Planning covers the entire intelligence process, from the threat assessment phase to the delivery of the final intelligence products. Plans are adjusted to determine how the Government's security intelligence requirements are to be met. In response to client needs and Ministerial direction, CSIS determines a co-ordinated strategic approach. In this way, resources are allocated for investigations on the basis of government-approved criteria.
During the Persian Gulf crisis, CSIS stepped up the Service's threat assessment program to provide the Government with substantial and timely intelligence on threats to the security of Canada. This response was necessitated by threats from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to unleash a wave of terrorist violence against countries involved in the coalition against Iraq.
In the planning of investigations, care is taken to ensure an appropriate balance between the degree of intrusiveness of an investigation and concern for the rights and freedoms of those being investigated. Low- level investigations, consisting primarily of the collection of open-source information, may be approved by mid-level Service managers. High-level investigations, which may call for the use of intrusive techniques, are subject to a rigorous process of challenge and controls, including a review by senior management committees chaired by the CSIS Director.
All investigative activities must, of course, abide by Ministerial direction. In addition, judicial authorization in the form of a Federal Court warrant must be obtained before certain intrusive techniques are used, according to Section 21 of the CSIS Act. A Federal Court judge must be satisfied, after examining a CSIS draft warrant and accompanying affidavit, that there are reasonable grounds to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Collection is the preliminary phase of the Service's advisory role to Government. The Service gets much of its information from open sources. These include newspapers, periodicals, academic journals, foreign and domestic broadcasts, official documents and other published material. Information from these sources is combined with information obtained from foreign governments, members of the public and technical interception of communications, if its use is justifiable.
An example of information gathered from the public is the domestic inter- view program that was undertaken by the Service during the Persian Gulf War. Acting under Section 12 of the CSIS Act, CSIS interviewed approximately 200 Arab-Canadians across the country. The interviews were designed to obtain a general picture of the situation from those most likely to have useful insights or relevant information to add to what was publicly available.
One of the principles underlying the CSIS legislation reflects Parliament's determination in 1984 that Canada's security intelligence service would fulfill a defensive role. Any departure from this is explicitly covered in Section 16 of the CSIS Act, which provides for the Service to assist the departments of External Affairs and National Defence, upon their request, in the collection of information or intelligence. This information collection must relate to the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign state or certain groups of persons or corporations. Any such investigative assistance, however, must not be directed at Canadians and must only be undertaken in Canada.
CSIS maintains full-time security liaison officers at a number of Canadian diplomatic missions abroad. Their task is to undertake liaison with selected foreign police and security intelligence agencies. They also collect and analyze openly-available information on global trends which may have Canadian security implications, and, finally, they conduct security screening assessments of prospective immigrants.
CSIS exchanges security-related information with foreign security and intelligence organizations. The Service consults with External Affairs and International Trade Canada and seeks approval of the Solicitor General before entering into such an information exchange.
The Service uses a variety of collection methods to monitor individuals or groups whose activities are suspected of constituting a threat to national security. Through such monitoring, the Service is able to identify individuals with suspected connections to terrorism, persons operating in Canada on behalf of hostile intelligence services, as well as those attempting to enter Canada for espionage purposes. In addition to monitoring potential espionage and sabotage efforts, the Service is mandated to inform the Government of clandestine foreign attempts to influence Canadian domestic activities and democratic processes in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of Canada.
In the competitive global economy of the 1990s, acquiring scientific and technological information from other countries has become increasingly important for many nations. Sometimes, this is done by covert or unlawful means. As a result, CSIS has intensified its activities to detect espionage against Canadian scientific and technological interests, and is re-examining the Service's focus in this area.
Policy makers rely on security intelligence reports, or products, that are prepared by Service analysts following the information collection stage. Analysts in all operational programs use their knowledge of regional, national and global trends to assess the quality of all types of information gathered, and organize it into useful security intelligence.
Information collected by investigators is initially assessed at a regional office prior to its transmission to CSIS headquarters in Ottawa, where a second-phase analysis is undertaken from a national perspective. This investigative reporting is then combined with other information from consultations with governmental agencies, other intelligence agencies and open source information. Further analysis of the information is carried out within an intelligence analysis program dedicated to the preparation of CSIS intelligence reports. For example, during the Persian Gulf War, information gained from interviews, along with material gathered from publicly available sources was combined with information from secret sources to keep the Government up-to-date.
As part of the broader Canadian security intelligence analysis and assessment effort, CSIS also participates in the Intelligence Advisory Committee which reports to the Interdepartmental Committee on Security Intelligence. This committee is chaired by the Clerk of the Privy Council and consists of deputy-minister- level officials of government departments and agencies active in the security and intelligence field.
The CSIS Act designates the Government of Canada as the main consumer of CSIS intelligence. Under section 19 of the CSIS Act, the Service distributes a variety of reports, including threat assessments, for dissemination to government departments and other members of the security intelligence community. Threat assessments, provided daily to the Government intelligence community, were the means by which the Service kept the Government informed of potential threats during the Persian Gulf War.
The RCMP depends on threat assessments to determine the level of security required to protect foreign diplomatic missions and for the protection of Canadian VIPs. External Affairs and International Trade Canada uses these threat assessments to determine the proper level of protection required for Canadian missions and personnel overseas. Transport Canada uses them when considering security concerns for the travelling public.
Under the Government Security Policy, CSIS also undertakes risk assessments of Government departments and their operating programs at their request.
CSIS conducts security assessments on demand for all federal government departments and agencies under Section 13 of the CSIS Act, with the exception of the RCMP and the Department of National Defence, who do their own. Security screening is also required for immigration and citizenship applications. This screening is conducted under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act following a request by Employment and Immigration Canada or Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada.
In preparing security assessments, CSIS must comply with the legislation and policy that specify what a security assessment must address. Section 2 of the CSIS Act defines a "security assessment" as an "appraisal of the loyalty to Canada and, so far as it relates thereto, the reliability of an individual." In addition, the Government Security Policy, a public document, sets out criteria to be taken into account when conducting security assessments. This policy integrates "threats to the security of Canada" with loyalty and related reliability criteria to effectively protect sensitive government assets and information.
CSIS investigators and analysts are responsible for providing enough information to the Government so that there can be full confidence in the loyalty of people having access to the classified assets of the Government of Canada. Investigators and analysts must discern if individuals being considered for security clearance could be susceptible to blackmail or otherwise persuaded to engage in activities that could compromise national security.
In the course of their duties, security screening investigators may talk to former employers, neighbors, and friends of individuals who have applied for government employment. The purpose of these inquiries is to collect information that enables the Service to provide security assessments to government departments on prospective employees for positions requiring access to classified information or assets. During the course of these inquiries, every effort is made to explain the purpose of the questions being posed. Participation in these interviews is voluntary.
In its 1987 report to the Solicitor General on the operations of CSIS, an independent advisory team, headed by the former Clerk of the Privy Council, Gordon Osbaldeston, recommended increasing security screening resources to deal with a backlog of screening requests. The Service acted upon this recommendation and gave high priority to addressing the backlogs in government, citizenship and immigration screening.
Initiatives by the Service to streamline processing, automate, and make alterations to policy and procedures have significantly reduced screening times. In April 1988, the Service processed Confidential (Level I) and Secret (Level II) government clearances in an average 280 calendar days. As of December 31, 1991, both Confidential and Secret security clearances were being processed in an average of 19 days. Processing for Top Secret clearances now takes only an average of 108 days. These figures surpassed the Service's objectives of 30 calendar days (Confidential), 30 (Secret) and 120 (Top Secret).
Significant delays in the processing of immigration applicants and the desire of the Government to increase numbers of qualified immigrants to Canada prompted a critical review of the immigration processing system.
The Service undertook this review with the co-operation of External Affairs and International Trade Canada and Employment and Immigration Canada.
As a result of this co-operative effort, an immigration streamlining project was introduced in 1991. Prior to the streamlining exercise, the Service was involved in a review of all applications processed by Employment and Immigration Canada. Under the new arrangement, this step has been significantly altered, eliminating the need for the Service to be involved in many cases.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was created in July 1984 by an Act of Parliament, following the McDonald Commission's four-year study of the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service. Both the McDonald Commission and its predecessor, the MacKenzie Commission, recognized the need to separate security intelligence work from police work and place it within the mandate of a civilian organization subject to tight control and accountability.
The CSIS Act lays down a system of controls and review that make the Service among the most open and accountable security intelligence organizations in the world. Nine pages of the 29-page CSIS Act are devoted to the review function.
The act contains two mechanisms to provide ongoing and independent review of the Service's performance of its duties and functions – the Inspector General and the Security Intelligence Review Committee. Both the Inspector General and the Security Intelligence Review Committee annually carry out extensive reviews of CSIS operations with a view to ensuring that the Service conducts itself within the framework of the CSIS Act, ministerial direction, and established policy and procedures.
The Inspector General, who is responsible to the Deputy Solicitor General, conducts an ongoing independent internal review of CSIS for the Solicitor General in accordance with Section 30 of the CSIS Act. This involves reviewing operational activities and monitoring compliance with Ministerial direction.
The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), under Section 38 of the CSIS Act, conducts an ongoing, independent external review of CSIS on behalf of Parliament and reports to Parliament annually. SIRC is composed of from three to five Privy Councillors who are not Members of Parliament or Senators.
SIRC reviews the Service's performance and investigates complaints with respect to any act performed by CSIS. The committee also investigates complaints from those denied security clearances in the cases of public service employment and the supply of goods and services to the Government of Canada. Furthermore, SIRC conducts investigations in relation to denials of certain classes of immigration and citizenship applications.
CSIS is also subject to the provisions of the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act. In addition to these statutory controls, the Service is administratively accountable to central agencies of government including the Treasury Board Secretariat, the Privy Council Office and the Office of the Auditor General. Finally, the Service is judicially accountable through rigorous controls on the acquisition of warrants. CSIS is subject to more review than any other federal department or agency of government. The rigour and breadth of this process is unique compared with the controls placed upon security intelligence services in other countries.
Intelligence collection and production is a people-intensive, knowledge- based endeavour. Therefore, its employees are the Service's most valuable resource. This is evident in the various programs of human resources management.
CSIS has an extensive training and development program. Employees can participate in both internal and external courses and seminars that allow them to develop new skills, acquire knowledge, and gain new perspectives. In the past year, the Service established a career management unit to support both employees' career planning and management's ability to ensure the availability of qualified employees, ready to move into management positions.
Although CSIS is a separate employer of the Government of Canada, its management improvement program mirrors the government-wide initiative for reform and renewal of the public service – Public Service 2000. CSIS is developing its human-resource programs around the following PS 2000 concepts:
CSIS is currently focusing on the development of a comprehensive career- streams program. This program will establish distinct functional avenues (i.e., administrative, operational, management) that will act as the basic structure for career progression in CSIS. It will create a comprehensive system of policies and practices to assist employees who are prepared to make the necessary commitment and investment to move from one job, occupational group or category to another. Such moves will take into consideration individual career goals, and organizational priorities and requirements.
A new classification system is also under development. This new system will be simpler, more efficient, and tailor-made to reflect the unique nature of the Service. It will allow for the evaluation of all positions within CSIS through common criteria. Developed in compliance with the Human Rights Act, the new classification system will address any pay imbalances that may exist within the present system. It will also help eliminate many of the gaps or artificial barriers that now exist between various occupational groups. Started in 1990, work on the development and implementation of the new system has progressed steadily. The system will be put in place during 1992.
CSIS is committed to employment equity. All Canadians, regardless of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, sex, age, disability, or religion, have the right of equality when applying for employment with CSIS. Employment equity also eliminates barriers that may interfere with the promotion and development of employees.
The Service recognizes that special measures are needed to enhance the employment opportunities for women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and persons who are, because of their race or colour, members of a visible minority in Canada. The Service maintains programs to accommodate the differences of these four groups and to ensure compliance with the Employment Equity Act and the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. A career-counselling program for members of the designated groups is in place. A pool also exists from which CSIS managers are encouraged to recruit disabled persons. In addition, a target- group inventory of employees and applicants to the Service has been established and is used to recommend suitable candidates to managers who are looking to fill vacancies.
CSIS has made steady progress in employment equity. In 1984, 36 percent of employees were women. That figure has increased to 43 percent today. Women, who were not represented in senior management in 1984, now account for 8.3 percent of this level. In the intelligence officer category, the percentage of women has nearly tripled since 1984, with representation climbing from seven percent to 20 percent. Furthermore, visible minorities, which accounted for 0.6 percent of CSIS employees in 1988, accounted for 2.45 percent of the Service population in 1991.
CSIS has also established an intelligence officer development program to assist women in advancing to the supervisory level in operational positions. An intelligence support developmental program exists to help those in support positions, the majority of whom are women, to move to different assignments in order to alleviate repetition and routine, and to provide developmental opportunities.
The Service has made efforts to ensure that its employees have the proper mix of skills and experience to enable the organization to adapt to the ever-changing environment of security intelligence work. In the past seven years, the Service has attracted a wide variety of new employees with professional skills and experience in diverse areas, including law, journalism, political science, human resource management, financial administration, staff relations, strategic planning, policy analysis, and information management. More than half of the Service's current employees have joined the organization since its inception in 1984. In each of the five years following transition, new employees have made up an average of eight percent of the CSIS complement. This is an indication of the strong emphasis the Service has placed on recruitment.
These new skills have complemented the professional intelligence experience of employees who joined CSIS from the former RCMP Security Service. Today, the combined skills and professional experience of all CSIS employees have set the Service on a solid footing for the 1990s and beyond.
In 1991, the Service's three-year official languages plan was approved by Treasury Board. Under that plan, the updated policies issued in July 1991 are in line with the broader scope of the 1988 Official Languages Act and better meet the needs of CSIS's specific mandate and structure.
Through the joint efforts of management and employees, the Service has made steady progress toward achieving institutional bilingualism. When CSIS was established, the work force was 85 percent anglophone and 15 percent francophone. In 1991, the overall participation rate of both language groups throughout the organization was 66 percent anglophone and 34 percent francophone.
The Service's bilingual capacity compares favourably with that of the federal Public Service as a whole. Currently, 84 percent of employees who are required to use both English and French on the job have the required bilingual skills, compared with 86 percent in the Public Service. In addition, CSIS managers are fully accountable for ensuring that communications with the public, and with employees, is undertaken in either English or French, in accordance with legislative and policy requirements.
Since its creation, CSIS has developed its infrastructure and has tailored its financial, information, technical, scientific and other corporate services to meet the requirements of its operational programs.
The Service has dedicated resources to the development of administrative and operational policies and central planning. Policy is developed and formulated in accordance with Service priorities and Ministerial direction from the Solicitor General. In the planning area, strategic, program and contingency planning enable the Service to anticipate, prepare for and effectively respond to the requirements of government clients and the exigencies of its operating environment.
Corporate Services oversees the study of management systems and the co-ordination of special projects dealing with important management issues and concerns. In addition, Corporate Services is responsible for the negotiation and production of all memoranda of understanding between CSIS and other federal and provincial government departments and agencies. Such agreements set down the principles for co-operative working arrangements, as provided for in the CSIS Act. All memoranda of understanding comply with Ministerial directives, require the approval of the Solicitor General of Canada, and are reviewed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
Corporate Services is also responsible for the Service's departmental security and oversees the administration and implementation of the CSIS personnel security program. This includes the issuing of security clearances to incoming employees, maintaining and upgrading security clearances of existing employees, administering an employee security awareness program, and conducting investigations. Also a physical security policy is administered to ensure that all CSIS properties meet the Service's own security standards as well as those of the Government of Canada.
The financial services area of CSIS is typical of those in other government departments and agencies. Primary financial responsibilities include managing a financial information system; obtaining resources; controlling budgets; developing financial policies and systems; providing financial advice; processing accounts for payment; and producing financial reports, including input into the Public Accounts.
In the audit area, Corporate Services carries out a systematic review and appraisal of all CSIS operations and activities to advise management on the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of internal policies, practices and controls.
One of the most important areas of Corporate Services activity, and one that directly affects all employees, is information management. To ensure that employees are able to access information efficiently, a CSIS unit is dedicated to managing information systems, telecommunications systems, electronic data processing security and training, as well as image and records management. This unit enhances CSIS's ability to deliver programs and services through the innovative application of information technology.
Corporate Services also encompass the planning, provision and servicing of all telecommunications links and EDP equipment within CSIS facilities across Canada.
The Service's library, known as the Information Centre, meets the reference information needs of researchers, analysts and intelligence officers, as well as the requirements of administration, technical and support services. It contains a broad spectrum of publicly available information, and classified documents produced by CSIS, other government departments and foreign intelligence services. Full reference and research services are offered in both official languages to headquarters employees and to regional employees through regional reference centres. In addition, 24-hour media monitoring and crisis management support services are provided. The Information Centre also provides around-the-clock telephone access for public inquiries at (613) 993-9620.
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