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a CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication
April 1995
Unclassified
Editors Note:
In his second in a series on the Russian Federation, Mr. Conrad Namiesniowski, a Strategic Analyst with CSIS, examines those factors and forces now shaping a new Russian foreign policy. Although present internal conditions severely limit Russia's traditional foreign adventures, its relations with the so-called near abroad — the former Soviet republics — can have disastrous implications, as the recent carnage in Chechnya clearly showed. The former republics in central Asia are almost as worrisome: continued financial support from Russia is increasingly problematic, yet without it, prospects for their continued survival are equally in doubt. The author then widens his perspective to consider Russia's policies toward Europe, Asia, the Indian sub-continent, and of course, the United States. After the trauma of 1991, "Russia is regaining its feet and appears to be pursuing realpolitik"....
Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the COMMENTARY series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.
"We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow." — Lord Palmerston, 1848.
For almost 50 years the Cold War froze unresolved inter-state frontiers, the aspirations of self-determination and the development of such international concepts as the United Nations. And although it created political instruments to assist external relations, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (recently renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — OSCE), and provided for a modus vivendi rather than confrontation between the two blocs, it gave individual states little opportunity to pursue "principled" foreign policy.
The end of the Cold War removed most traditional restraints on states foreign policies. The new era has also introduced a certain understandable complacency in the West, prompted at the outset by expectations of a peace dividend and by an ongoing perception of a victory against communism.
This was not the case in the countries derived from the former Soviet Union. There, the end of the Cold War melted the restraints holding difficult historical ethnic enmities and xenophobia. In addition, the vacuum created in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union has caused these states to feel like vulnerable and expendable pawns in the overall geo-political game.
The tools of the Cold War that worked well in the past to inform the foreign policies of various countries appear to be failing. The UN and the OSCE are unable to provide timely and effective preventive crisis management or to defuse conflicts fuelled by ethnic nationalism and xenophobia. The USA is increasingly looking to its own interests.
As in the past, Russian foreign policy continues to be influenced by the actions of the USA, Western Europe (particularly Germany), Japan, China, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Three and a half years after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russia's neighbours in the "near abroad" must be added to this list. Still seeking its own identity, for Russia more so than for some other countries, the international mosaic has become diverse and uncertain.
From a Russian perspective the USA, although a superpower with global interests and capabilities, is seen as increasingly at odds with Western Europe, from which it is distancing itself. The diversity of European views has demonstrated the UE's inability to achieve consensual positions on issues such as Yugoslavia and Iraq. Moreover, Washington's intention unilaterally to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia and its push for expansion of NATO eastward have further strained the Atlantic connection and made Moscow suspicious. Republican gains in the House and the Senate and the potential for gridlock between Congress and the President (already perceived as weak in the sphere of foreign policy) does not augur well for the future. Moscow wonders to what degree Washington might now change its policies towards Russia.
Western Europe, chafing under Washington's leadership but unable to do without American support in an emergency, is at odds with both itself and the Atlantic Alliance. It is frustrated at its inability to manage the Bosnian conflict. The question of deeper fiscal security and political integration is probably as far away as it has ever been. Except for Germany, West European involvement with Russia has been moderate. There is no indication that the European Union (EU) will liberalize its market any time soon for Russian or CEE goods, and mutual suspicion still lingers.
The Conservative government in England is deeply divided over the merits of more integration. France, whose position of influence has been largely neutralized by German unification, still thinks of itself as la dirigeante of Europe. However, French nationalist candidates for the May election (from which group the new president is expected to emerge) are conscious that voters regard the EU with suspicion and are especially sceptical of broadening the membership to include CEE states.
Germany, the largest investor in Russia and regarded as the engine of Europe, is still struggling with its own integration and the development of a German-made foreign policy. The Germans are strong proponents of the EU, but even in Bonn there are growing reservations.
Members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) who have suffered most in the post-Yalta division, struggling with varied success in the transition to democracy and free market economies, are still unable to gain full acceptance in NATO, the EU or the Western European Union (WEU) — the defence organization of the EU. So far the West has offered only a Partnership for Peace Program (PFP) that includes all the republics of the former Soviet Union and a number of neutral European states in addition to the former WTO. Moscow, which controlled these states for more than 40 years, is not pleased with being sidelined, nor is it prepared to see Russian influence replaced by that of other powers in a region it considers of primary strategic interest.
Among the less developed states in Southwest Asia, Russia is trying to nurture the former Soviet relationship with India, fast becoming the dominant military state in the region and in Moscow's eyes, a natural counter to Pakistan. According to World Resources 1990-91, India will have the worlds largest population by 2025, 2.0 billion people, compared to China's 1.5 billion.
At least until the first quarter of the next century, all states, including the most developed, will continue to depend on oil as an energy resource. Most of the global oil reserves, including some in the former Soviet republics, remain in the hands of the less developed secular and fundamentalist Muslim states. The unity of purpose among Coalition partners in the Gulf War illustrated the importance of oil to the developed countries. This resource will continue to play an important part in the formulation of national policies in all industrial capitals including Moscow.
At present, reform continues, albeit in a haphazard fashion as the Russian Federation, lacking firm democratic structures, seeks its own identity. It lacks robust military strength (except for its nuclear weapons); it is trying to pursue responsible monetary policies so as not to jeopardize its standing with the IMF and the G-7; it is seeking to rule the country by a popularly elected president and legislature; a constitution has been adopted; it tolerates critical media and the appointment of a human rights commissioner for the first time (together they have brought uncensored reports of the Chechen crisis directly to the public).
On the negative side, the country is still divided by factionalism, ideology, rampant internal crime, a chaotic economy and political uncertainty. Not surprisingly, its record on good governance is less than impressive. Important decisions in security and foreign policy appear to be taken by a few members of an empowered élite within the Security Council and by an appointed government, with little reference to parliament.
The unexpected results of the December 1993 elections, which heralded the rise of increased nationalism, and the apparent changes in Russian foreign policies since, confirmed a majority view that factors such as Moscow's more active role in protecting Russians living in the "near abroad" , the degree of international respect for Russia and the protection of its resources were important enough to play a role in the formation of government policies.
In Russia, as in most states, the details of foreign policy are formulated by government élites, "power" ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security), think tanks and the executive, including the president. While parliamentary (Duma) committees on foreign affairs have been formed, the government retains control and the topic does not figure much in the Duma. As of old, the government appears able to control such issues by turning them on and off to suit a particular political purpose.
Because Russia carries much historical expansionist and imperial baggage, there is a natural tendency to seek parallels with the former Tsarist/Soviet foreign policy paradigm in judging Moscow's current foreign policies. However, at this juncture this practice is risky. While current conditions foreclose foreign adventures (e.g., a divided, disorganized and demoralized military unable to act effectively), they do not foreclose the pursuit of national interests. Russian perceptions of national interests are increasingly ambivalent. Moscow wants to be part of the international community, but if new borders were to be erected inside Europe making Russia an outcast, it may feel forced to build its own security alliance, mainly with the 12 member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Russian foreign policy may be compared to a series of concentric circles. In the inner circle, currently a priority concern for Moscow because of their instability, are the former Soviet republics, the so-called "near abroad". In successive circles are Western Europe (the EU, OSCE, NATO) and, as a separate sub-set, the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states; then China and Japan; then Southwest Asia; and in the outer most ring, other global issues. Relations with the USA are superimposed over all the issues.
In the past three years, Moscow's policies towards the "near abroad" have evolved as Russia's geo-political and economic interests have thrust these countries to centre stage among Moscow's foreign policy objectives. No two countries are the same, and they are not treated in the same way by Moscow, which seems to favour a mix of CIS treaties and bilateral agreements. One determining factor is the existence of Russian minorities in each of these countries. Russia could not absorb the numbers of such immigrants from the near abroad.
Current Russian interest in the near abroad — home to 25 million Russians — is not inspired by expansive imperialism as much as by a desire to protect vital national interests. Even as the USSR was breaking up, Yeltsin, depicted as the architect of the breakup, supported Gorbachev's Union Treaty of sovereign states which was to preserve the Soviet Union.
After the 1991 coup, Yeltsin was the main advocate of the Belovezhskaya agreement for a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the only possible means of preserving an integrated geographical region. In his book The Struggle for Russia, referring to the CIS, Yeltsin writes:
It was not a question of parts of the body of the former empire breaking off, although they had been conquered and annexed centuries ago. The cultural, social, economic, and political integration would sooner or later do its work, and these parts would still remain in a zone of common cooperation.
In many respects Yeltsin was correct. In December 1991, the break-up of the Soviet empire into 15 individual states, some with no history of statehood, rendered the previous political, economic and social provisions inoperable, leading to immediate economic chaos in the new states. The break-up also liberated long-suppressed ethnic and cultural differences that soon led to conflict in some states and instant instability along the Russian periphery. To a certain extent, the ethnic questions overlapped into the Federation itself — Chechnya, North Ossetia and Ingushetia — making instability in the Russian Federation itself an issue.
Almost immediately, conflict erupted in three areas: the Transcaucasus, Bessarabia and Central Asia. In the Transcaucasus, covert warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, which had continued since 1988, erupted into open conflict. By 1992, civil war had also broken out in Georgia when popularly elected president Gamskhurdia was deposed. In Moldova, Bessarabia, confrontation erupted over the breakaway Dnestr region. In Tajikistan, Central Asia, conflict broke out between pro-Islamic rebels, democrats and the former communist government.
After three years of sovereignty, the independent republics of the former Soviet Union are finding out that nationhood is more complicated than casting off Moscow's dominion. The break-up has left each of them politically and economically unbalanced (because of economic specialization created by the former Soviet Union) with no readily available substitute system. The struggle with the unfamiliar concepts of democracy, rule of law, fair elections, rights of citizens to form political parties, and freedom of speech, press and religion has proven formidable for most of the new republics. The prospect of any of the CIS states being admitted to the EU is quite remote. Except for some UN and OSCE observers, peacekeeping operations in areas of conflict have been limited to Russian troops since, until recently, no other country was prepared to make a contribution. A current OSCE proposal to dispatch a multilateral peacekeeping force to Azerbaijan, agreed in principle, awaits Russian consent in detail.
The five Central Asian Muslim republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), abutting China and the "Golden Crescent" of narcotic drug production (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) are particularly disadvantaged. With no past record of independent statehood, clan societies, an absence of military forces of their own, and borders arbitrarily drawn to suit apparent Stalinist imperatives, they are the least prepared for independence. In July 1991, in the dying days of the USSR, all voted to support Gorbachev's new Union Treaty, hoping it would prevail in its revised form. Not surprisingly, the region was quick to join the CIS as new sovereign republics following the break-up of the USSR. Since then, they have been strong supporters of closer economic and, in some cases, military integration within the CIS.
Unlike Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan, the republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have commercially important deposits of minerals and hydrocarbon energy sources of global proportions that indicate potential for economic growth. These resources have prompted outside investor interests from Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, China, Japan, Germany and particularly the USA. However, few of these investors have the necessary capital, and those that do are deterred from major investment by exploration and transportation costs and the potential political instability of the region.
For Moscow, an important economic issue is the choice of options for the construction of pipelines to carry gas and oil (through Iran, Turkey or Russia) and for other transportation links that would by-pass Russia. Although Russia remains the dominant geopolitical power in the region, it is in no position to extend major economic aid to these republics.
Under the auspices of the 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security, a CIS peacekeeping force — basically Russian with token representation from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan — is deployed on the Tadjikistan-Afghanistan border. Partially mountainous, partially desert, Tadjikistan has a population of 5.1 million with Russian and Uzbeck minorities. The poorest of the Central Asian republics, it is now close to economic collapse. The newly re-elected ex-communist government relies on a CIS contingent of 25,000 Russian troops and Moscow's economic help for survival in its fight against the rival clans who form the opposition. Unless reconciliation can be agreed between the government hardliners and the pro-Islamic groups and democrats of the opposition (a goal Moscow supports) prospects for Tadjikistan's survival as an independent state are dim.
To date Russia has pursued its foreign policy interests in the Central Asian states carefully and has benefited from existing circumstances; e.g., all republics have a negative GDP growth rate and leaders who see few other options. The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, summed it up: "By surrendering part of our sovereignty, we gain without losing anything" (Almaty Panorama, 22 October 1994).
Aside from maintaining social and military stability in Central Asia, Moscow hopes to counter the inroads of such organizations as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which concerns itself with trade. ECO membership includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, as well as the five South Asian states. Moscow aims to do this by protecting the CIS southern border and creating conditions that enhance Russian involvement in resource exploration and transportation.
The strategically important Transcaucasus is currently the most unstable region on Russia's southwest border. The three states in the area — Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (all republics of the former Soviet Union) are consumed by inter-ethnic territorial conflict. This three-way confrontation has led to an economic collapse throughout the region and made it dependent on Russia for economic essentials. National leaders have imposed martial law in an effort to prevent total civic collapse and to cope with political extremism, drugs, crime and corruption. Moscow fears that if these conflicts are not controlled, they could spread to the Russian Caucasus.
The priority Russian interest in this area is to maintain the security and territorial integrity of the three militarily weak states and to keep the transportation routes open. This requires stopping the spread of further conflict.
Equally important to Moscow is the region's economic potential, especially the undeveloped oil and gas fields of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea. In September 1994, the Azerbaijan government negotiated a deal with six companies including Western BP and Turkish Petroleum, worth $7 billion to $9 billion. Although the agreement involves Russian Lukoil, pipeline routes are not specified. Russia opposes the deal, fearing that proposed new routes will bypass Russia. Moscow is arguing that exploration of the Caspian littoral should be jointly decided by the littoral states and that Soviet-era agreements should remain in force (The Estimate, 16-29 September 1994).
Russia's foreign policy in this region has traditionally had a military element differing only in detail from state to state. For almost two centuries the Russians and Armenians have regarded themselves as natural allies against the Turks, and that relationship did not fundamentally change after the break-up of the USSR.
Russian relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan have been marred by various excesses. As recently as April 1989, Soviet troops killed peaceful demonstrators in Tblisi (Georgia); in January 1990 the USSR imposed a state of emergency in Baku (Azerbaijan), killing 100 Azeris in the process. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan and Georgia were the last reluctant former Soviet republics to join the CIS, and did so only when all other options had run out.
In its bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, Moscow has taken full advantage of the political turmoil and conflict, both inter-ethnic and territorial, to achieve its objectives, sometimes resorting to crude methods of divide and rule. In the absence of offers of assistance from the West, Georgia's President Shevardnadze felt he had no option but to sign up for the CIS. Determined to keep control of the situation in Azerbaijan, Moscow is currently making it difficult for OSCE troops to participate in peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh. President Aliev of Azerbaijan, having watched Georgia become a ruined vassal state, is equally determined that a predominantly Russian peacekeeping force will not be responsible for pacifying Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Transcaucasus remains unstable and, with no mutually acceptable solutions for ethnic and territorial problems, long-term prospects for peace remain dim. Total economic collapse in Georgia and only marginally better economic conditions in the other two states require Russian economic assistance which Moscow can ill afford to provide.
The main focus in the region, which lies between CEE and Russia and is key to Moscow's vital interests, remains security and economic. For Ukraine, independence and territorial integrity are key.
Most Russians still find it difficult to accept Ukraine as a separate state (Russians re-present an ethnic minority of 12 million), while Ukrainians have an overwhelming preoccupation with Russia, which they consider a threat to Ukrainian independence as well as a protector. These divergent attitudes are the result of history — wars, pogroms and exploitation during almost 400 hundred years of union; common Slavic heritage; the economic potential of both nations; their deep economic integration and political co-operation over the past 70 years; their heterogenous populations; and the deployment of the largest armies in the region.
In proposing the Belovezhskaya agreement which created the CIS, Moscow hoped that significant elements of sovereignty, especially those pertaining to military forces and economic policy, would remain under joint or federal control. This ran counter to Kiev's objective of a loose commonwealth of completely independent states. Ukraine "nationalized" all former USSR conventional forces on its territory and swore them to allegiance. Overnight Ukraine inherited 700,000 troops and was the first of the new independent states to constitute an army. Moscow, reluctantly, had no choice but to abandon its original concept of CIS forces and follow suit.
Kiev's insistence on having its own armed forces and its wish to "control" the nuclear weapons on its territory marked the start of fractious relations with Moscow. The persistent differences include the Crimea, the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the provision of energy resources. Kiev's perception of Russian intransigence on these issues further convinced Ukrainian nationalists that Russia was their main threat.
Unable to compete economically in the West, Ukraine is taking steps under new President Kuchma to tie its economic future more closely to Russia. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are negotiating agreements on convertible currencies, a customs union and free trade. Kiev also took the decision to get rid of nuclear weapons and to fulfil all START-1 obligations, a move which gained Ukraine Western financial help.
The Ukrainian-Russian economic relationship is symbiotic. Ukraine depends for 80% of its gas and oil needs on Russia and Turkmenistan (where it had incurred great debts). Russian industry in turn depends on Ukraine for agricultural produce, mechanical engineering, instrument making and as a supply of pipes for the fuel industry. However, with its economy in ruins and unable to pay its debts, Ukraine remains hostage to Russia for energy supplies and runs the risk of losing out on any trade deal with Russia.
To date, official Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine has been carefully crafted to avoid direct confrontation over sensitive issues like the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. Moscow, however, retains political, economic and military levers which Kiev in its weakened position is at pains to resist. There is no doubt the two countries need each other; the issue is what type of relationship will work best.
Moldova and Romania were a single country until 1940 when the former became a Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavia). In August 1991 Moldova proclaimed its independence. The Slav (mostly Russian and Ukrainian) Transdnester region of the new country, fearing amalgamation with Romania, proclaimed its own independence. Fighting broke out when the Moldovan government intervened militarily in 1992.
Six countries have security, ethnic and economic interests in the region: Moldova itself, Romania and Ukraine, who share borders, and Russia, Turkey and Bulgaria for ethnic and other reasons. The areas strategic location is known as the "gateway to the Balkans" and has often served as an invasion route. Russia's stated policy in Moldova is to protect the rights of ethnic Russians. However, the ethnic conflict there which has provided the opportunity for the use of Russian forces has also effectively foreclosed perceived Romanian ambitions, prevented Ukrainian involvement, and ensured Moldovan membership in the CIS with continued economic interdependence. It also pacified the region.
Russia has agreed to withdraw its military forces from Moldova and Transdnester once a political settlement has been reached which guarantees the protection of ethnic Russians. A tentative plan to this effect has been agreed to, whereby Russian forces will be withdrawn within three years simultaneously with a political agreement between Moldova and the Transdnester region. However, since the Moldovan and Transdnester positions are incompatible (federation and autonomy versus independence), a quick political agreement is unlikely. Moreover, the controversial commander of Russian forces in Moldova, General Lebed, has stated that a withdrawal would require 45 months from the time of decision (Janes Intelligence Review, September 1994).
Whether or not Russian forces are withdrawn from the area remains to be seen. For now, by ensuring peace, Moscow has gained influence in political and security matters in the region and, as in Kalinigrad, has maintained a military presence in a strategically important area.
Belarus was one of the founders and most fervent supporters of the CIS Belovezhskaya agreement, and relations between Slavic Belarus and Russia are close. In a country where the predominant language is Russian, where liberal citizenship laws are in force and where there is little concern for Belarus' culture, there is no ethnic conflict between the Belarusians, who form 80% of the population, and the other minorities.
There has been little Western interest in Belarus. Minsk was the first to give up its nuclear missiles and has observed the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction treaty. This may change, as Belarus is urging that the launch pads for nuclear missiles should not be destroyed for fear of "irreparable ecological losses" (Belarus Defence Minister, 26 Jan 95, Reuters).
Belarus, which borders Poland in the west, is important strategically to the Russians. It sits astride the Pripet Marshes which have always bisected any invasion forces whether eastward or westward bound. It is an important gateway to the Baltics and the Baltic Sea in the north, and to Ukraine in the south. Belarus provides the main east-west transport links between Russia and Europe as well as between the Baltics and the Black Sea.
Moscow is obviously content with the Belarus relationship. Russian policies in Belarus have been successful: supplying 90% of Belarus' energy needs and 70% of its raw materials, and accounting for 60% of Belarus' exports, Russia exercises effective economic control of its neighbour. It is doubtful Moscow would seek or want any closer involvement. It is leery of a monetary union, agreed to in principle with Minsk last August, as it implies buying out a collapsing economy and taking on an expense it cannot afford. A future unofficial merger is possible but it would be controlled by Moscow. The first steps in this direction were taken early this year when Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a series of agreements which acknowledge a customs union and which could effectively reunite their armies and dismantle their borders. Eastward expansion of NATO could also accelerate the merger process.
The status of the Baltics is not comparable to that of the other republics. There are also differences among Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia themselves. However, all three insisted on the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territories and refused to join the CIS, seeking instead integration into Western economic and security structures. The position of large Russian minorities, a contentious issue in Latvia and Estonia, is now being slowly resolved.
Two competing factors have driven Russian foreign policy in the Baltics: to maintain control over an important geo-strategic area commanding the Baltic approaches to Russia; and to assuage Western sensitivity to perceived Russian interference in the internal affairs of the three Baltic states, given the circumstances of their annexation in 1940 on the basis of secret Soviet and Third Reich agreements.
Moscow effectively coupled human rights violations affecting the Russian minority to the troop withdrawals. It also dangled most-favoured-nation status, having first imposed prohibitive tariffs. Lithuania and Latvia depend on extensive trade with Russia. Estonia is less susceptible because of its links to Finland and other Nordics. By August 1994 all Russian troops had been withdrawn from the Baltics, the question of citizenship of the large Russian minorities was on the way to being resolved, while border and other issues have been put on the back burner. Once again, economic and ethnic realities have found common echo in Moscow.
The underlying determinants of Russian policy towards Europe are the need to procure economic assistance and to secure the removal of any Western military threat, particularly from Germany. During the Cold War, West Germany's eastward reach was neutralized by the existence of East Germany and the imperatives of unification. In the present context, the direction of the former Warsaw Treaty states' foreign policies, including their political, economic and military attitudes, are important to Moscow. It wants to avoid the creation of a broad coalition of states against Russia that would include the Central and East European (CEE) states, an area which Moscow believes is in its geo-strategic sphere.
The Russians have been pursuing a dual policy of endorsing the CFE Treaty while calling for adjustments in the north Caucasus and promulgating a concept of regional security under the auspices of the OSCE. While the latter concept has not been fully outlined, the proposal would, according to a 23 February 1994 article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, entail the formation of a neutral belt encompassing the Central and East European (CEE) states and the western republics of the former Soviet Union (the Baltics, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) within which, forces would be reduced to "non-aggressive defence" and states guaranteed sovereignty status. Not surprisingly, the West has resisted this concept of a "cordon sanitaire" geo-political space, acceptance of which would be tantamount to the extension of Russian political influence.
Moscow has been ambivalent towards the continuing presence of NATO in Europe, perceiving the Alliance a military threat, but also as a necessary offset to Germany. Formal calls for the dissolution of NATO have been muted, but Russian officials continue to object to NATO's eastward expansion.
Russia's participation in international peacekeeping in Yugoslavia beginning in 1992 has provided an opportunity to regain international prestige and influence and to underline the government's commitment to the prevention of aggression. Although initially cut off from the UN/NATO decision-making process, Moscow brokered ceasefires and gained Serbian support, thus managing, much to its own satisfaction, to inject itself into the policy-making process and to achieve "great power" status. Its promotion of Serb concerns about sanctions, however, betrayed a hankering for bipolar regional arrangements with which the Russians obviously felt more comfortable. But this initiative runs counter to UN peace-seeking efforts. Moscow's involvement in international peacekeeping set a precedent to seek UN support for its own "near abroad" peacekeeping operations.
The unsettled economic situation and the uncertain status of democratic institutions in Russia ill equip Moscow to pursue foreign policy objectives in Europe. Nonetheless, political instability, minority and border disputes in some countries (notably Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) could present the Russians with an entree for greater involvement. In the short to medium term, such involvement is unlikely, as Moscow's priority remains the "near abroad" and economic reform. The latter depends on Western economic and fiscal support which would be at risk if Russian foreign policy was seen to exceed accepted norms of international behaviour.
A major Russian policy objective has been to avoid exacerbating differences with China and Japan and to normalize as much as possible Moscow's relations with Beijing and Tokyo. On the face of it, these efforts have been more fruitful with respect to China, although a number of contentious issues such as Chinese immigration remain.
In September 1994, both sides issued a joint declaration aimed at the mutual non-targeting of nuclear missiles and signed an understanding on the demarcation of the western sector of the Russian-Chinese border. Together with the understanding of 1991, the present accord reportedly solves 99% of the border disputes.
Official relations between Russia and Japan remain cool due to the unresolved question of the Kurile Islands which the Soviet Union occupied at the end of World War II and which Japan claims. Nevertheless, the two governments have refused to play up the differences and last September, the first-ever joint Japanese-Russian rescue exercises were held in the Sea of Japan.
In the longer term, the Chinese relationship is seen as potentially more threatening than that with democratic Japan. Internal developments could rekindle Chinese nationalism and renew that country's appetite for northward expansion. In that scenario, Mongolia's neutrality and sovereignty could be significant factors for Russian security in Asia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 Feb. 94).
Russia has tried to maintain contact with the more important former Soviet clients such as India and Iran, primarily through arms sales and continued training support. Membership on the UN Security Council provides Moscow with "great power" status and ensures the significance of its co-operation, not least in relation to maintaining the framework for the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the control of the export of missiles, missile technology and conventional arms, which this position implies, runs counter to and negates the benefits which would otherwise flow from Russian national policies that endorse unrestricted arms exports. In the final analysis, however, this may not have much impact on the quasi-legitimate entrepreneurial arms trade.
Every aspect of Russian foreign policy is affected to some degree by relations with the USA, which Moscow sees as the principal international economic force and the manager of funds essential for Russian reform and recovery. There is a belief in Moscow that Russia remains at the centre of American foreign policy (Russian Academy of Sciences paper 1993), reciprocating the importance of the USA in Russian calculations. Russian initiatives, e.g. in the "near abroad", take into consideration a tolerance level that is perceived to exist in the White House. To date Washington's policies on the "near abroad" have been low-key, as illustrated by President Clinton's remarks in July 1994: "The USA would support voluntary moves by former Soviet bloc nations to seek reunion with Russia in a larger eastern European federation" (The Citizen, 4 July 94).
Moscow and Washington also share a unique vision on a number of important issues such as strategic nuclear co-operation and non-proliferation. Other issues divide them: the ABM Treaty, fulfilment of the CFE disarmament treaty, aggressive exploitation of Russian and "near abroad" resources by foreign companies, and minority rights. Thus there is a dichotomy in the American-Russian relationship, where strategic rivalry seems to be yielding to strategic co-operation, but where largely non-strategic differences continue to defy bilateral efforts at resolution.
The use of force against Chechnya, which the American Administration first referred to as an internal affair and then viewed with concern in the face of the carnage wrought by Russian shelling, will strengthen the hand of the Republican Congress to distance the USA from Russia. Overall, this is not likely to affect the Administration's general policy of supporting stability in Russia, but it will make Moscow's objective of gaining status as an "equal partner" more difficult.
All borders between successor states and the former Soviet Union are contiguous, and some states face foreign powers that harbour long-standing grievances. "We are surrounded by the very diverse and very conflicting interests of other countries" (Yeltsin: The Struggle for Russia).
Many of the new states that have emerged lack government structures other than those which existed immediately before, and building new ones has proven difficult and fractious. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the new states are turning to Russia and falling back on previously established military and economic links to avoid internal collapse, even at the risk of losing some sovereignty.
In pursuing foreign policy goals of economic and military security within its perceived geo-strategic space, Russia is taking advantage of existing conditions. Moscow is encouraging trends towards economic and security interdependence that have developed in some of the "near abroad" countries. The interdependence goal at present, however, is not synonymous with integration, because taking control and assuming responsibility is beyond Moscow's current capabilities. The financial burden of subsidizing these republics was one of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union and helps to explain Moscow's reluctance to further Belarus integration. The export of Russian influence outside the CIS borders is also beyond its present means.
Russia is relying on the use of both economic and military security levers to achieve its goals in the "near abroad". This practice at times aggravates an already unstable situation, e.g. in Georgia, and is creating ambiguity in Europe and North America as to Russia's real intent. On the other hand, the proposal to consider the eastward expansion of NATO is affecting the relaxed mood that developed between Russia and the West following the disintegration of the USSR. An eastward expansion of NATO that would satisfy Moscow's concerns would require a different NATO and the acceptance of Russia as an equal partner, according to Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
Conflicting interests between a large regional power with a superpower nuclear capability and other competing powers are not surprising. There are legitimate Russian and Western security interests along Russia's periphery, and Moscow can be expected to protect its strategic interests as it defines them. By no means are all interests in conflict, as illustrated by Russian agreements with the EU and NATO. (Russia has signed on to the Partnership for Peace but has failed to agree to a program to flesh it out). In his address to the UN General Assembly in September, President Yeltsin left little doubt that Russia means to protect its interests in the "near abroad".
The brief period (1992-93) of idealistic optimism about Russian behaviour is over. As they are for any other country, Russia's interests are self-serving. This does not rule out Russian sharing of common global responsibilities for mutual benefit, such as nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, missile technology control, conventional arms control and disarmament, and peacekeeping. It does mean, however, that Russia is regaining its feet after the trauma of 1991 and appears to be pursuing realpolitik. Whether it will do so responsibly, in accordance with the norms of acceptable international behaviour as defined in the canon of documents from the UN Charter to the OSCE, will be an indicator of whether Moscow is again seeking dominance in the new republics which formerly constituted the Soviet Union. Were this to be the case, and were it to be successful, it would be yet another illustration of accomplishing national interests according to Sun Tsus concept: "subduing the enemy without fighting", by deterrence, coercive diplomacy, blackmail and deception.
The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by writing to :
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ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/56
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