[Français]
[Welcome Page] [Main Menu] [About CSIS]
[Commentary Abstracts][Commentary Menu]
a CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication
March 1995
Unclassified
Editors Note:
Approximately one year ago, COMMENTARY (#44) dealt with the challenges facing a new, post-apartheid South Africa; the author, Mr. Duncan Edmonds, concluded with a prognosis of "cautious optimism". As South Africa approaches the first anniversary of the dramatic events that culminated in the election of the Mandela Government of National Unity, we once again welcome Mr. Edmonds' views in his "interim report". A co-author of this month's COMMENTARY is one of South Africa's most eminent journalists, Mr. Allister Sparks, the author of The Mind of South Africa (1990) and most recently, Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change, recently reviewed in The New York Times Book Review.
Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the COMMENTARY series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.
When one recalls the mood of apprehension and uncertainty against a backdrop of seemingly uncontrollable political violence, which prevailed during the run-up to the election, the comparative smoothness of the transition of power in South Africa has been astonishing — prompting one to consider the deep, binding forces in this society, despite the generations of racial oppression and resistance to it that gave South Africa its odious reputation.
Chief among these forces is the factor of mutual dependency. White and black South Africans may have been in a state of historic conflict, but in fact they cannot do without each other. White South Africa cannot survive a single day without the black population, which in effect constitutes the country's working class. Likewise, black South Africa is aware that without the capital and entrepreneurship white South Africa provides, its "liberated society" would quickly revert to the level of such economic wastelands as Mozambique and Angola. It was this mutual dependency which rendered apartheid unworkable: had it been possible, history's most relentless effort to bring about the physical and territorial separation of a nations population on the basis of race would surely have succeeded.
The transition process itself became crisis driven: each time the negotiations deadlocked and a crisis arose, the negotiating parties would stare into the abyss into which they would all plunge should the process fail, and that would spur them to seek a compromise and move forward. Thus at the very end, when disaster stared them in the face, even Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and General Constand Viljoen's right-wing Freedom Front abandoned their threats of armed resistance and joined in the election. The alternative was too ghastly to contemplate.
A pervasive awareness of this mutual dependency, then, is the glue that holds South Africa together behind all the rhetoric of conflict. It is likely to continue doing so through the considerable problems of reconciliation and reconstruction that lie ahead. This is not to minimize the seriousness of these problems; after the political revolution comes the longer and in many ways more difficult task of bringing about a socio-economic revolution to redress the imbalances of this skewed society. But daunting though these problems are, having survived the severest storm, South Africa will weather the rest.
The longer-term strategy of this second revolution is embodied in the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), a wide-ranging process of re-ordering the priorities of the national budget so as to redress the imbalances entrenched by apartheid within the existing national resources. The basic objectives of the RDP are to redistribute land, eliminate hunger and provide jobs, welfare, health care, education, electricity, water and housing to the underprivileged sectors of the community. The concept is to prioritize RDP projects in close consultation with the communities involved, which means co-ordinating all three levels of government. The scale and complexity of the program have made formulation slow, and further delays are likely, since the third tier of government will come into being only with local elections in October 1995. But the singular importance of the RDP is that the government is committed to implementing it with strict financial discipline. Learning the lessons of the rest of Africa, South Africa is determined to avoid falling into a debt trap and is resolved to fund the RDP from existing national resources. To some extent this makes it a zero-sum game: old priorities will be downgraded to fund the new ones. Inevitably this will lead to some sectors of the white community — e.g., heavily subsidized white farmers — losing privileges in order to uplift the black community. Coupled with land distribution ad affirmative action programs, this could produce some resentment within the white community and perhaps ignite some right-wing resistance — but again, we feel any such resistance will be containable.
The glare of international publicity has largely faded from South Africa, yet the country itself has not diminished in importance. Indeed, the world needs to be reminded of the gigantic issues at stake here — not only for South Africa itself but for the beleaguered continent of Africa as well as the entire community of nations. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize winner, noted on the night the 1993 prize was awarded to Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, South Africa is a microcosm of the world, embodying all the global issues of white and black, of rich and poor, of developed and under-developed peoples. "Once we have got it right", Tutu said, "South Africa will be the paradigm for the rest of the world".
The first session of the new National Assembly in Cape Town symbolized and reinforced the spirit of optimism and reconciliation that has pervaded the country since the election last April. The 1994-95 budget, presented in June, obtained the confidence of the financial community, even as it introduced a one-time tax on the wealthy of some $1.2 billion (US) to offset the costs of the transition to democracy. The proposed expenditures of about $41 billion will result in a deficit of about $7 billion. The budget provided for a phased funding of $12 billion over five years for the RDP. These funds are targeted to come from a reorganization of existing departmental budgets, supplemented by overseas aid and investment. We will have to await the consequences of the 1995/6 budget, presented to parliament on 15 March.
The MPs unanimously passed three bills restructuring the intelligence services and providing mechanisms for parliamentary oversight. Thus for the first time in South African history the intelligence community is now regulated by statute. The bills provide for the establishment of a National Intelligence Agency, responsible for domestic intelligence, and a South African Secret Service, responsible for foreign intelligence gathering. The controversial Military Intelligence Unit, which was at the heart of security-force repression under the old régime, is to be dismantled with only an element required for genuine military intelligence purposes retained.
In line with this philosophy of transparency, the ANC announced it would introduce an Open Democracy Bill during the 1995 parliamentary session. Essentially, this will be a freedom of information act giving individual citizens, as well as the media, the right of access to all official documents — except for certain closely defined classified matters, mostly relating to national security — at all levels of government. A task force of specialists has been appointed to draft the legislation after consulting public bodies, including media organizations, and holding public seminars on the issue. Coupled with a clause in the new national constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press, this will give the South African media a degree of freedom unique on the African continent and equalled by only a handful of First World countries.
One controversial issue that arose early in the life of the new parliament was the tradition of locating the legislature in Cape Town, 1000 miles from the administrative capital in Pretoria. This was a compromise reached at the formation of the Union of South Africa following the Anglo-Boer War at the turn of the century, when one capital was allocated to the former British Cape Colony and another to Paul Kruger's defeated Transvaal Republic. Faced with all the costs and administrative inconvenience of shuttling back and forth between the two capitals, members of Mandela's new cabinet soon questioned whether the two-capital compromise was appropriate in the new South Africa. There was a strong move in favour of moving the legislature to Pretoria. President Mandela has now appointed a special commission to investigate the issue, and a decision on the capital is likely during 1995.
The new constitution, while it is an interim one with some imperfections, continues to reflect the remarkable spirit of negotiation in which it was developed. The elected National Assembly also sits once a week as a Constituent Assembly to draft the country's final constitution — a task it is likely to complete early in 1996. Although the ANC has stated that the constitution-making process must start anew and not be a matter of merely amending the existing constitution, the basic form of the interim constitution is likely to remain without any radical changes. The one thing that will change, however, is the provision for a compulsory coalition to form a Government of National Unity. With the mounting evidence of tension between Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, which nearly erupted with de Klerk's threatened resignation a few weeks ago, the countdown for the Government of National Unity has already begun. While it has been needed to stabilize a deeply divided population during the period of transition, sometime before the 1999 election it will come to an end. The National Party will have to pull out for its own survival, or it will lose its identity altogether. This will probably happen soon after the Constitutional Assembly has completed its work, some time next year. As for the other member of the Government of National Unity, Chief Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party, who recently staged a two-week walkout by their 48 members of parliament, they could leave at any time. When these events do happen it should not occasion any alarm, either in South Africa or abroad.
Apart from establishing an overall framework for government, the new constitution completely redrew the political boundaries of the country, dissolving four old provinces and ten so-called black tribal "homelands" to form nine new provinces (see map at end). The process of basically enlarging the municipal boundaries to embrace both white towns and their dormitory black "townships" is now largely completed, and the municipal elections, which will represent the final formal step in abandoning apartheid, are scheduled for October.
It is evident that, with such a massive rearrangement of the entire governmental process, the actual delivery capacity of government is quite limited, and at least another year will be required before the integration and relocation of thousands of officials and the implementation of new policies to improve racial equality, motivation and performance will be complete. Illustrative of the massive scale of this transformation of the country's public administration was the response a few months ago to the Public Service Commission's first major recruitment notice, under employment equity, for some 11,000 medium to senior positions, which resulted in more than one million applications. Until a reasonably efficient administrative system has been achieved, the implementation of many of the programs and policies of the RDP will continue to be delayed.
The provision of low-cost housing provides a good example of the problems the new government faces. President Mandela attaches great importance to his promise to build one million new houses before the 1999 election, and the policy is central to the RDP. Yet today there are very few houses being built for blacks in South Africa. The delivery of government subsidies and the general approval of housing plans have been stalled by the delays in dissolving the four provincial housing authorities which existed before the election, and their replacement by nine new provincially administered housing authorities. As the months go by and targets are not met, the problem is compounded by the reality that the total number of houses required is at least double Mandela's initial target. Now the situation has been aggravated by the death Joe Slovo, the Ministry of Housing who, despite suffering from terminal cancer, managed to do a remarkable job of developing consensus across the wide spectrum of players in the housing sector. The governments subsidy system is facing problems both of concept and delivery. It will be some months yet before his replacement, Mrs. Sankie Nkondo, has any significant impact.
The actual number of houses required is at least double Mandela's promise and there is considerable evidence that a multi-dimensional crisis regarding the delivery of housing will occur by the end of this year, unless the new minister can develop and implement some more imaginative and creative policies, including the development of entire new communities and the stimulation of greatly increased productivity in construction methods. However, there are some signs of hope. The banks, following the introduction of a government-sponsored indemnity program, are indicating a willingness to play a more constructive role in making funds available. Also, some of the larger builders are close to undertaking major projects in low-cost housing, and a number of big companies are preparing to build houses for their workers.
Housing also represents a dilemma for one of the most fundamental policy objectives of the RDP: the provision of thousands of jobs through the construction process. To achieve the housing targets, higher productivity and large-scale building will be required, but in some cases this is being thwarted by complex consultative and approval systems at the community level. Another difficulty has been the recent ANC intervention appointing "liaison officers" to represent the community at construction sites, who are sometimes instructing builders to use more workers than necessary in order to increase the velocity of funds in the local communities. In fact, the politicization of the construction industry in the townships illustrates one of a number of serious emerging issues which the government and the ANC must jointly address.
The ANC itself is exhibiting many of the classic problems of a successful revolutionary/liberation movement now struggling with the problems of governance. Many of its leaders are now in government, party funds are drying up and the conflicts between a mass political movement and the disciplines of governing are manifesting themselves. Leaders like Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC Secretary-General, are well aware of this. Ramaphosa told a five-day party congress last December that the movement suffered from a lack of sound management practices. "There are cliques, factions, tensions and squabbles and a lack of financial discipline which results in an enormous strain on resources," he said. "The climate of instability in many townships, the proliferation of weapons and the high level of unemployment have created the conditions for an increase in violent criminal activity. If these shortcomings are not addressed as a matter of urgency, the ANC will not be in a position to meet many of the challenges ahead."
The ANC is also discovering that many of its policies, effective during the liberation struggle, are now haunting it. Tactics such as encouraging hostility to the security services, encouraging non-payment of local costs in order to make the townships ungovernable, disrupting education and other issues are producing some very real negative consequences. Perhaps the most serious has been the evolution of a culture of entitlement, where many blacks now believe that having suffered under the yoke of apartheid, they are entitled to be given such things as a home and a job, with little emphasis on their own contribution.
The most alarming manifestation of this culture can be found with the comotsis (comrage totsis), the popular name for the gangs of unemployed and often illiterate youths, victims of the school boycotts, who roam the townships and execute forays into the white suburbs of the major cities, particularly Johannesburg. These young men, of whom there are many thousands, engage in a life of crime and petty terrorism and pose a major threat to blacks and whites alike. Almost a wasted generation, the comotsis illustrate a tragic reminder of the price of dismantling apartheid, and make all the more urgent the need for rapid progress in implementing the programs of the RDP.
In a remarkably candid speech opening the 1995 parliamentary session a few weeks ago, Nelson Mandela sounded a series of stern reprimands against many of these attitudes and actions, and referred specifically to the destructive consequences of a culture of entitlement. While undoubtedly the president's words convey enormous moral force, the reality is that the clock is running in South Africa and specific actions and tangible evidence of progress, visible to the masses of the poor, will very soon be required to buttress the rhetoric.
Beyond these considerations, the long-term future of the ANC remains uncertain. In Nelson Mandela's own words, the ANC is a "broad church", an alliance of elements ranging from communists to capitalists, liberals to radical revolutionaries, brought together for the common purpose of liberating their country from apartheid. That done, can the alliance hold together? In the short to medium term the ANC will indeed remain united. Despite its factional nature, it is the only such liberation movement from any country that suggests a greater cohesion than most analysts realize. Having survived such a test, it seems unlikely that it will split now that it has attained power and has patronage to dispense. Moreover, the flexibility that has grown from its broad church character and its internal tolerance of quite robust dissent is a further safeguard against disintegration. However, it seems logical that in the longer run the class restratification that is bound to take place in the new South Africa must eventually lead to a political reformulation, particularly once the towering figure of Nelson Mandela is no longer there as a binding force. Just how this reformulation will take place is obviously a matter of speculation, but the following configuration is a possibility.
One element of the present ANC may merge with the younger leaders of the National Party to form an African equivalent of a European Christian Democratic Party, appealing to the economic aristocracy and the more affluent echelons of the emerging multi-racial middle class. Another element of the ANC may align itself with Cosatu (the trade union federation) and a transmuting Communist Party to form a Social Democratic Party that will appeal to the working class and the less affluent lawyers of the middle class. Finally, there is likely to be a party that will appeal to the large underclass, a party that will exploit the failed expectations and the alienation of these outsiders. This may be a natural constituency for the radical Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which may be joined by the Inkatha Freedom Party. Such an alliance may seem incongruous, but Inkathas traditionalism could strike a chord with the Africanist philosophy of the PAC. For the PAC, which did badly in the 1994 election, it could mean a strong support-base in South Africa's biggest tribe, the Zulus, while for Inkatha it could offer a way out of the tribal ghetto into which it has locked itself.
The overriding challenge is that the apartheid system has left South Africa with one of the world's widest gaps between rich and poor, which will not be sustainable in the long run. The gap must be narrowed as rapidly as possible. Complicating this is the fact that the country is suffering from the twin problems of massive unemployment and a population explosion. The unemployment rate among the economically active sector of the population is estimated at around 50%, and is clearly much higher in some of the black townships. The population, estimated at 40 million, is expected to swell to nearly 60 million in the next 15 years. This means that the economy, which grew by just under 3% in 1994, must grow significantly faster just to keep pace with the expanding population. The South African Institute for Race Relations reckons an economic growth rate of twice the population growth rate must be sustained if the pool of unemployed is to be reduced. Since policies aimed at the redistrbution of wealth tend to conflict with those needed to generate wealth, the government is going to have to walk a fine line between these two essential but contradictory requirements.
It must be noted, however, that the statistical indicators do not take sufficient account of traditional economic activities in the black community, especially by women, or of a substantial amount of informal sector activity in the black townships. Some estimates put this informal sector activity as high as 30% of the employable population, reflecting a considerable entrepreneurial spirit within the black community. But even though this may make the figures less stark, the fact remains that everything in South Africa is going to depend on attaining and sustaining a substantial economic growth rate. Failure there will mean failure everywhere.
This points to the importance of foreign investment, the key to generating growth and opportunity. Foreign investment is beginning to flow, but not as fast as the government desires or the economy requires. While the major hotels in Johannesburg are full of foreign trade missions and touring investor groups, especially from the United States, a cautious attitude on the part of these visitors reflects their concerns about foreign exchange controls and a wish to let more time elapse to see whether there is indeed going to be a stable political environment over time. In today's competitive global economy, problems of exchange controls, excessive restrictions on the repatriation of funds and other investment impediments constitute disincentives to investors. The government is receiving strong advice from many overseas quarters, including the British prime minister, to remove the foreign exchange controls. As of 13 March, the government abandoned the two-tier Rand currency system. The effect will inevitably be significant devaluation of the commercial Rand from its current rate of 3.5 to the American dollar to around 3.8 or even 4. A relaxation of exchange control regulations will also almost certainly result in an outflow of domestic capital as South Africans seize the opportunity to move at least some of their money to safer havens abroad.
With the wait-and-see attitude of many foreign investors and the recognition that any rewards from projected investments in the industrial sector will not be forthcoming for several years, tourism is emerging as one of the government's priorities for stimulating rapid economic growth and providing jobs. In 1993, tourism was South Africa's fourth largest contributor of foreign exchange. The government has initiated a three-year plan to make tourism the largest generator of foreign exchange by 1997. According to government economists, roughly 2 jobs are created by every 30 tourists, and potentially as much as 20% of the country's workforce could be supported directly or indirectly by tourism.
The importance of foreign investment and the reliance on tourism underscore the essential role of the international community in fuelling the rapid growth of the economy. But the actual delivery of international aid is complex. For example, the Japanese, who represent the largest single donor to South Africa, are exhibiting increasing signs of disquietude at the failure of the government and the RDP to formulate and implement specific programs and policies to use their assistance effectively. The Americans have pledged some $600 million in direct aid over the next three years, and a substantially greater amount should follow in private American investment. Although a high-level group co-chaired by Vice-President Gore and Deputy President Mbeki has been established to monitor progress, South Africa is just beginning to realize that in order actually to secure much of this aid, it will need to cultivate much closer relations with the American Congress than are presently in place. President Mandelas highly successful visit to Washington and a close relationship with President Clinton and many elements of the Afro-American population are one thing; the actual delivery of aid from Congress, particularly after last November's elections, is quite another.
Canada continues to play a significant role, ranking high among the middle-level aid donors with a commitment of some $60 million over the next three years. Significant investments have already been made by a number of Canadian companies including Newbridge Networks Corp., SNC Lavalin, Cott Corp., Diverssey Corp., SR Telecom Inc., and Bombardier. The creative programs of CIDA INC., may soon lead to more Canadian private investment. Other nations and the international agencies, led by the World Bank, all have an important role to play.
But the real keys to rapid economic growth and development in South Africa are not in the hands of government, either foreign or domestic, but rather with the private sector and the plethora of community-based organizations. Even capital, although essential, is not the fundamental problem. There is enormous capital available within the country in the banking institutions and insurance funds, in the large conglomerates which dominate the economy, as well as a further substantial amount among the thousands of South African expatriates around the world who are anxious to contribute to the development of the "new" South Africa. The essential requirement will be the development of a dynamic sense of responsible, community-based entrepreneurship inside South Africa itself. Millions of jobs must be created, one at a time, consistent with the capacities and culture of the local people.
To achieve real progress towards the dream of the new South Africa, millions of individual blacks must indeed be empowered, as the ANC insists, but this will not be accomplished by government alone and not through a culture of entitlement. People must be empowered by their own self-development, relying on their own initiative and efforts. Here is where the private sector and foreign investors can play an enormously creative and fundamental role in the next few years. It remains to be seen whether the wisdom and leadership to overcome the risks and undoubted problems will be forthcoming from this sector.
As South Africa moves forward in coping with its formidable domestic problems, the opportunity to become the engine of growth for much of the continent will become more evident and realistic. In foreign policy the Mandela government is already exhibiting much constructive capacity, and reflects a very powerful positive message to the rest of Africa. Mandela made a significant contribution at the meetings of the Organization of African Unity, where he was highly critical of other African leaders for their role in the failure of many of their economies. Even here, though, cruel dilemmas are in play. Like the former Soviet Union, South Africa has a large and powerful arms industry, which in recent years many progressives have advocated converting to non-military uses to achieve a peace dividend. While it must be difficult for him, Mandela, no doubt reflecting the overriding need for economic growth, job creation and foreign exchange, has been quite adamant in not only continuing but actually expanding the export of arms.
The most positive news is that the violence which appeared to be endemic a year ago and was the dominant concern of many analysts has subsided substantially; not that it won't flare up again. The local elections in October will almost certainly see a resurgence of political violence, especially in the province of KwaZulu/Natal, where Chief Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party continue to play a disruptive game, stoking the fires of Zulu ethno-nationalism and using coercive methods through local chiefs to try to retain their weakening political grip on the province. Buthelezi himself has joined the national Cabinet, which seemed to draw him out of the provincial political arena, while in a major setback the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini, broke ranks with him after the April election. Since then, however, Buthelezi has managed to fight back, first by getting the IFP-controlled provincial government to form a House of Traditional Leaders, of which Buthelezi himself has now been elected chairman, and then, despite the King's defection, by retaining control of the amakhosi, or regional chiefs, who will continue to operate as his coercive agents on the ground in the rural areas of KwaZulu/Natal. So although Buthelezi has been weakened, he is by no means finished, and it seems inevitable that the power struggle in this troubled province will peak again during the local election. Although this will undoubtedly make headlines, and perhaps lead to renewed doomsday predictions, the trouble will be localized and of limited duration, and will not represent a serious threat to the stability of the country as a whole.
Reinforcing this belief is the fact that the threat of right-wing violence, which also looked so ominous last year, especially in its collaboration with Inkatha, has almost completely disappeared. After the failure of an attempt to establish a military bridgehead in the Bophuthatswana tribal homeland shortly before the April elections, retired General Constand Viljoen abandoned ideas of armed resistance and led his Freedom Front into the election and into the new National Assembly, where gradually their secessionist calls have moderated into quiet negotiations for some (as yet undefined) form of ethnic "self-determination" for the self-styled "Boer" Afrikaner. Now the main right-wing party, the Conservative Party, which boycotted the April elections, has announced it will participate in the October local elections. This means right-wing politics have become constitutionalized, and the few remaining extremist elements, such as the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, have been marginalized. With this the security forces have been established, and the prospect of their linking up with a broad right-wing resistance movement, supported by Inkatha, has disappeared.
The prospects for stability, with no more than containable local incidents of violence, are therefore good. But it is decidedly in the economic sphere that the real test or future prospects for the new South Africa will lie. On the basis of the overall performance during the critical first year, our previous prognosis of "cautious optimism" remains valid, although the defining adjective "cautious" must necessarily remain for the indefinite future.
[Return]
The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by writing to :
CSIS P.O.Box 9732 Postal Station T Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4G4 FAX: (613) 842-1312
ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/54
[Welcome Page ] [Main Menu] [About CSIS]
[Commentary Abstracts][Commentary Menu]
Disclaimer: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service assumes no responsibility for the use of the information at this World Wide Web (WWW) site.
