[Français]
[Welcome Page] [Main Menu] [About CSIS]
[Commentary Abstracts][Commentary Menu]
a CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication
October 1994
Unclassified
Editors Note:
One year after the historic "Declaration of Principles" was signed in Washington, current developments in the Middle East continue to dominate the headlines and of course, the hearts and minds of millions of inhabitants of that region. Once again, Dr. W. Millward, a Strategic Analyst in the Analysis and Production Branch of CSIS, provides a context for these recent events, and outlines three major hurdles still facing the peace process.
Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the COMMENTARY series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.
In the year since the "Gaza-Jericho First" accord—now more commonly known as "The Declaration of Principles" (DoP)—was signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 by the representatives of the government of Israel and the PLO, and sealed by a symbolic handshake between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and then Chairman (now President) Yasser Arafat, more dramatic developments have taken place both in the Middle East and internationally to reinforce the notion of reconciliation between historic enemies and propel them further into an irreversible commitment to peaceful co-existence. The Middle East peace process appeared to be gaining momentum in May and June. By mid-summer forward motion had virtually stalled, only to pick up again with a new round of agreements at the end of August.
The latest rounds of negotiations and agreements are believed by both sides to be a continuation of the framework for the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991. They are also considered an integral part of the broader multilateral Arab-Israeli peace process and are intended to connect ultimately (in 1996) with negotiations on a permanent settlement, which will lead to the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 242 of November 1967 and 338 of October 1973. Because the DoP was signed by the representatives of the USA and the Russian Federation, there is a clear sense in which it represents an international agreement. Hard-won agreements to make peace generate both euphoria and scepticism. The euphoria generally dissipates quickly, while the scepticism persists. Assessment of the DoP in the first year of its life shows both sentiments alive and well at the end, even if the euphoria may have crested.
In the euphoric aftermath of the DoP a kind of involuntary inertia set in which threatened to guarantee that predictions of slippage in the timing of its implementation would be realized. Although negotiations on an interim agreement for self-rule began immediately after the DoP was signed, early progress soon encountered the barrier of disagreement over border crossings, the actual size of the Jericho area, and security for Jewish settlements in Gaza. In this impasse the deadline of 13 December for the start of Israel's withdrawal of troops from the Gaza strip and Jericho, as mandated by the DoP, was missed. There followed a flurry of public pronouncements on both sides, led by the Israeli Prime Minister, who claimed that "there are no sacred dates", and countered by innumerable Arab and Palestinian voices to the effect that, on the contrary, psychologically they were very important.
A major hurdle was cleared on 9 February 1994 after three days of almost round-the-clock negotiations. The Cairo accord resolved many aspects of the three contentious issues above-mentioned. In Gaza it provided for corridors linking the Jewish settlements to Israel and joint, two-vehicle patrols along these corridors "led by the Israeli vehicle", while in Jericho the same patrols were to be led by the Palestinian vehicle. Palestinians also gained access to two religious sites on the Jordan River outside the town and the right of "safe passage" to an area along the Dead Sea where Palestinian projects are slated. The nub of the agreement was the thorny question of border crossings. Israel retained control of the border stations, including the appointment of a director-general with responsibility for the management and security of the border terminals, and the right to veto any person claiming entry to the Palestinian areas. One Israeli official was quoted as saying, "They got the symbols, we got control." (Globe and Mail, 10 February 1994). Bu the exact size of the district to be included in the Jericho region remained to be resolved in further negotiations, as well as the scope and power of the new Palestinian police force and its working relationship with Israeli forces.
While the politicians and their negotiating teams haggled, the sour mood they created was exploited by opponents of the process who hoped to see it fall and were quite prepared to give it an unfriendly push. The disruptive potential of the militant Kahane Chai and Kach movements in the West Bank was featured in a prescient article in The New York Times on 21 February 1994 (Joel Greenberg, "Jewish Militants Hope to Block Israel-PLO Plans"). Within a week one of these militants, an immigrant settler from Brooklyn, entered the mosque of Hebron and shot the Muslim worshippers at prayer, killing 29 of them. The fallout from this atrocity was predictable. Such disasters tend to polarize attitudes and opinions, and immobilize actions intended to promote compromise and reconciliation. Despite a public expression of regret and condolence from the Prime Minister for the pain and suffering inflicted by one aberrant Israeli, the peace talks were put on hold until the other side recovered from the shock and a decent interval of mourning could be observed.
Just as many Israelis were able to see the masssacre of Muslims in Hebron as grisly revenge for the shooting death of a pregnant Israeli settler near the West Bank city of Nablus a week earlier by the Palestinian Islamic resistance movement (Hamas), the perpetrators of that crime claimed to be acting in response to the killing of three of their children by Israeli occupation troops a month earlier. And so the spiral of violence and bloodshed continued as outraged Palestinians poured into the streets of the territories and more deaths resulted when Israeli troops fired on demonstrators.
The Israeli-PLO negotiations on Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were already two and a half months behind schedule when the Hebron massacre occurred. The original DoP schedule called for the beginning of Israeli withdrawal on 13 December 1993 and the process to be completed by 13 April 1994. A failure to meet the first of these deadlines could have been compensated for by speeding up the withdrawal process to meet the completion deadline. After the trauma of Hebron, another month went by before serious negotiations were resumed. Early signs of imminent success in the autonomy negotiations were contained in an Israel-PLO protocol on economic relations signed in Paris on 29 April, covering monetary and import policies, taxation, labour, agriculture, tourism, pricing policy for fuel and insurance.
Since part of what was intended by the DoP was to put an end to the dispiriting spiral of violence, the incident at Hebron served to convince the Israelis of the need for an adventitious arrangement, not anticipated in the DoP, to protect the Palestinian population from any further attacks from Kiryat Arba settlers. A memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) was signed by the participant countries, Denmark, Italy and Norway, on 2 May 1994 in Copenhagen. On 8 May, an international observer force of 117 unarmed, white-uniformed Europeans took up their positions in Hebron to monitor the safety of Palestinians in the town, amid clouds of tear gas fired by Israeli troops at demonstrators demanding the removal of the settlers.
The long-awaited comprehensive agreement between the Israeli government and the PLO was finally signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994. It called for, inter alia:
Estimates of the Israel-PLO agreement of 4 May 1994 varied according to the preconceptions of those affected on all sides. For Palestinian radicals and hard-liners it confirmed their fears that what they would win would be mostly symbols, and very little substance. For Yasser Arafat and his advisers, the 250 pages of the agreement, including annexes, were "the best deal we could get". The broad logic of the self-rule accord from the Israeli perspective was that it would preserve Israel's security and safety, while affording Palestinians enough autonomy to bring about an improvement in their social and economic circumstances. This would convert more people on both sides to the principle of ceding territory for peace through negotiation, rather than perpetuating the status quo ante under the rule of the gun. For the Israeli radicals the agreement spelled out what they believed to be a program for the gradual establishment of a Palestinian state, the realization of their worst nightmare.
A recurrent theme in the commentary on this agreement emphasized the idea that the newly empowered self-rule authority had put itself in the position of being on trial, and subject to testing and evaluation, like a newly hired employee who would have to pass muster or be let go at the end of the first six months or a year. This perception prompted one analyst to observe that the PLO, alone among all modern anti-colonial movements, had capitulated to the colonial occupation before that occupation had been defeated and forced to leave (Edward Said, "Victors and Vanquished", al-Hayat, 18 July 1994, p. 15). Reality and the logic of power suggest that the PLO, as the dominant element of the new self-rule authority, is in fact on trial, and is going to be tested and evaluated by two employers: the victors who will want to be assured it can manage the task of policing the territories they evacuate and maintain order and security there, and by the Palestinians of these territories, who will want to know whether it can also provide the education, the infrastructure, the health care and, above all, the jobs that Gaza and the West Bank need.
The new self-rule authority has so far been able to pass the test of employer #1, although the evaluation criteria and marking scheme have had to be revised and spelled out in great detail as the testing period proceeded. This has occasioned much stress on the examinee, frequently voiced by the president himself. In early August, Yasser Arafat gave an interview to an Israeli newspaper in which he said: "I am in despair. The moment of truth has arrived, and alarm bells are ringing. I am finding it harder and harder to go on in this situation, and an explosion is liable to come. Every day we are treated to a new dose of humiliation, and each is worse than the last. Truly, I dont know how I will go on longer like this." The exhausted examinee may have thought he heard the bell signalling the end of the exam period, but there are four more years to go before the end of the interim stage when a final adjudication and report will be submitted. Arafat and aides will have to find new resources of endurance and acceptance unless they are prepared to withdraw prematurely. No substitutes or surrogates are allowed in this test.
Much more doubt appears to surround the ability of the new uthority to pass the test of providing good and efficient local government. Despite more than two years of detailed planning for the assumption of power, Palestinian leaders in Gaza and on the West Bank were acutely aware in May 1994 of the need to deliver to their constituents, and were worried about what failure would mean. Without quick and evident signs of improvement in their daily lives, or some kind of light ahead, the lack of general conviction about the worth of the settlement could lead many disillusioned Palestinians to resort again to the knife and the gun. The problem may lie in the definition of terms: how much improvement and light is sufficient?
The fact that there are already reports of disillusionment setting in among the Palestinians of Gaza and Jericho (Le Monde, 10 August 1994) suggests that some may have had unreasonably high and unrealistic expectations of a self-rule régime. Whoever governs these territories, a new set of rulers, or any set, will have to have remarkable talents to produce infrastructure, education, housing and jobs for more than a small fraction of the population in three years, let alone three months, even if the "donor countries" actually pay up the funds they promised. The nature of President Arafat's previous ideological orientation and life-long experience as a political organizer and military leader make it unlikely that much economic improvement will occur under his rule, (Alan Bock, Calgary Herald, 9 August 1994), unless he shows himself abnormally prone to take advice not just from his financial advisers, but the creative Palestinian entrepreneurs themselves.
Perhaps the single most supportive move the new self-rule authorities can take to encourage economic development and the entrepreneurial spirit is to ensure their temporary government stands firmly behind private property rights and sets up a fair legal system for adjudicating contract disputes. The law enforcement and legal environment presently in the autonomous enclaves is chaotic. The presidential guard, police, civil defence, national security forces, general intelligence and preventive security services all require clear legal definitions of their duties and jurisdictions so that each knows where its limits lie and citizens know where complaints can be made in case of abuse. President Arafat and his supporters may have to keep reminding themselves that they agreed to the DoP and Cairo accord, and that no matter what you call it or how you slice it, autonomy or self-rule does not add up to independence, with the right to exercise all the attributes of national sovereignty. But where they have the right, they must act decisively and dispel confusion.
The first and most important task facing Yasser Arafat and the PLO following the signing of the DoP and the Cairo accord was the establishment of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as the locus of legitimate administrative and ultimately legislative power in the territories ceded by Israel. The organization and leadership that spent more than three decades fighting for national liberation were now confronted with the tasks of running a political administration fairly and efficiently through competent public bodies and institutions. Building a quasi-governmental institution from the ground up required new attitudes, new funds and new qualified cadres not available inside the PLO membership. Many doubted the ability of Yasser Arafat and his aides to make the transition from hardened revolutionaries to democratic politicians, not just Israelis but other Arabs and even some Palestinians themselves. At the end of year-one of the DoP that doubt still exists in all three sectors and will continue to haunt President Arafat until the first round of elections is held before the end of the current year.
The slippage that delayed the signing of the Cairo accord also postponed the completion of an administrative council or PNA. A full slate of 25 appointees to this council was not ready by 4 May of this year when the accord was signed. Shortly afterwards Yasser Arafat began the ifficult process of convincing a number of prominent PLO and non-PLO Palestinians from inside and outside the territories to accept apppointment to the new self-governing authority. Initial hopes for the new body were that it should include 15 personalities from inside the territories and 10 from the diaspora, including 2 women from each category.
Key figures in the Palestinian movement in the territories, such as Faysal al-Husayni, Sa'ib Urayqat and Hanan Ashrawi, initially signalled their intention to decline the offer to be appointed to the PNA, either because they disagreed with parts of the Cairo accord, or disapproved of Yasser Arafat's autocratic leadership style. All three were finally persuaded to join, either by a pitch from Arafat himself not to abandon him "at this critical stage", or by strong urging from the Fatah organization rank and file on the West Bank. Dr. Ashrawi has since withdrawn from participation in the PNA and now devotes her time to monitoring its democratic and human rights performance.
The first unofficial meeting of the PNA took place in Tunis on 26-27 May, chaired by President Arafat, while a full slate of members was still being assembled. All appointees were cleared by the executive committee of the PLO and of course approved by Israel. It was decided to create 22 ministries or "portfolios" for the members who took a preliminary oath of office on 27 May. This first Palestinian self-rule government was characterized as a coalition of Fatah, independents, Yasser Abd-Rabbuh's Palestinian Democratic Federation Party (FIDA), and Samir Ghawsha's Palestine Popular Struggle Front. Three groups not included were the Islamist movements of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and the former communist Palestine People's Party.
The first PNA session in the Gaza-Jericho region met on 26 June at the government departments complex in Gaza City, before Arafat himself had made an appearance. The issues discussed were the central concerns of the new body; i.e., funding sources for the PNA and the status of aid from donor nations, in consultation with a World Bank team, and the situation on detainees and prisoners due for release by Israel. According to the Minister of Planning in the PNA, Dr. Nabil Sha'th, the self-rule body would be holding its next meeting on 3 July in Jericho and would convene weekly sessions in Jericho and Gaza alternately thereafter. All subsequent sessions of the PNA have been chaired by President Arafat or someone deputed by him.
A question for the future of the PNA is its relationship to the Palestine National Council (PNC), whose Speaker, Shaykh Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, had not been allowed by Israel to return, and the PLO Central Council (PCC), several of whose members had also been refused the right of return. It appears most likely that the PNA's authority and legitimacy will derive to a large extent initially from its approval by agreement with the Israelis, and its actions on the ground in the territories, until elections can be mounted and the popular will expressed. In the meantime the old diaspora bodies may be allowed quietly to dissolve. The future of a Palestinian governmental and administrative authority, whether in a framework of autonomy or as an independent polity, will depend for its legitimacy on the untrammeled use of the ballot box and other democratic procedures.
Implicit in the DoP and Cairo accords was the understanding that at some point the PLO and its leader would pull up stakes from their Tunis headquarters, where they had re-established themselves after being expelled from Beirut by Israel in 1982, and move in full to the Palestine autonomous regions of Gaza and Jericho. As Israel began the withdrawal or redeployment of its forces from these regions in May and June, members of the new Palestine police force made their entry and began work in their place. Yasser Arafat finally made his own appearance at Rafah in Gaza on Friday, 1 July to a tumultuous welcome from Palestinians gathered there to celebrate his much delayed return. The official return, originally planned for Saturday, wa pushed ahead one day in order to accommodate a request by Chief Israeli Rabbi Eliahu Bakshi-Doron to heed the feelings of observant Jews and make an effort not to arrive on the Jewish sabbath.
Much importance was attached to this event, most of it lost in the emotion and symbolism of the fanfare and ceremony. In an emotional speech to mark the occasion of his first time on Palestinian soil in nearly 30 years, Arafat recalled the martyrs of Hebron and then raised the taboo subject of a visit finally to Jerusalem, shortly thereafter, to pray at al-Aqsa mosque. He promised to continue the struggle and extend the autonomous territory of the Palestinian homeland, and signalled his intention to build a democratic state on all the West Bank and Gaza Strip. "There are many challenges but I am sure with co-operation and co-ordination with our neighbours the Israelis we will have the ability to protect the peace of the brave and to implement accurately and honestly what has been approved."
Various reasons were offered for the apparent delay in Arafat's decision to relocate in Gaza-Jericho. A primary Israeli concern must have been security considerations and Palestinian preparation for basic administrative tasks, including payment of police and civil service salaries. Palestinian spokesmen constantly mentioned their dismay at the failure of donor countries to honour their pledges to provide the funding necessary to get the self-rule authority up and running. A total of $2.4 billion had been promised for the fledgling administration over the five-year interim period, $675 million of it to be handed over this year. By using the issue of his return as a means of putting pressure on the international community to meet his financial requirements, Arafat succeeded in raising an additional $40 million, but not the $70 million he had hoped for. By the end of the DoP's first year, some $80 million had been turned over to Palestinian financial circles.
The significance of Arafat's return to Palestine was reflected in the wide variety of reaction it elicited. It was described by President Mubarak of Egypt as an historic event; by Shimon Peres as a positive development for both Israelis and Palestinians; by Ariel Sharon as a day of shame for Israel and by Hamas as painful because it took place with Israel's permission and supervision. A dissident Fatah group denounced the visit, which they said "was co-ordinated with the Zionist enemy", while a Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) communiqué from Damascus weighed in with the view that it took place "under the canopy of the Zionist occupation". It came as no surprise when a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) commentary labelled the return as a "Sadatist visit to Gaza" because it was co-ordinated with the Egyptian régime. As might have been predicted, an official Tehran comment condemned the visit because it transpired "with permission from the usurping régime and does not stem from Palestines national sovereignty". Local and regional opposition to the DoP is substantial and a potential threat to its ultimate success, but it is not likely to derail the process it envisions in the near term.
The Middle East peace process in its bilateral dimension took a long step forward on 25-26 July when King Hussein of Jordan and Israel's Prime Minister Rabin met in Washington at a joint session of Congress and at the White House to announce the end to the state of war between the two countries and declare their intention to move quickly toward a full peace agreement. The two leaders re-enacted the symbolic handshake that had transpired nearly 11 months earlier in the same place with Yasser Arafat, with the American president standing between them. This time the Israeli leader looked more as if his heart was in it.
Despite the fanfare and hoopla, there was a distinct sense of déjà-vu among old Middle East hands. The king had visited Washington on a private visit in June and signalled his intention at a news conference to proceed with direct bilateral negotiations with Israel regardless of wha happened on the Israeli-Syrian or Israeli-Lebanese tracks, thus breaking openly with the principle of Arab solidarity and co-ordination agreed to before the Madrid talks.
Despite the claim of the Israeli Foreign Minister that this was a "breakthrough of the highest order, a turning point in the Middle East", seasoned observers and many in the Middle East general public were aware that the king had been meeting Israeli leaders secretly for many years and longed for the day when he could cut his own deal with them publicly without feeling restrained by the issue of Palestine. "Relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the leadership of Israel had long been a surrepititious romance, progressing by installments" (Gideon Rafael, International Herald Tribune, 3 August 1994).
King Hussein's move to establish full peace with Israel before more concrete results could be shown from the DoP and the Cairo accord was a calculated risk. Many Jordanians, especially those of Palestinian origin, reacted negatively to the news that public talks were held between Israel and Jordan across their border on 18 July. A spokesman for the Islamic Action Front, the second largest bloc in Jordan's parliament, was quoted as saying "What is taking place today, and what will follow is a source of great sorrow and sadness. It totally contradicts what we have been brought up on." (Reuter, 0284, 18 July 1994). The government banned public rallies and demonstrations of protest, but the peace talks were condemned by several mosque preachers in their Friday prayer sermons.
Careful reading of the Washington Declaration reveals that it is not just a declaration of intent to end a state of belligerency but a commitment to pursue peace. This commitment was reconfirmed orally by King Hussein in his remarks at the joint press conference in the East Room after the signing ceremony. While there are outstanding issues of territory to be recovered, and the whole thorny question of refugee resettlement, it looks very much as though Jordan is on record to keep the peace before the details of its differences with Israel have been negotiated, hardly a very wise strategy when working from a position of relative weakness. Jordan's objectives in the elaborate photo opportunity in Washington were perhaps directed more at gaining a sympathetic reception for the idea of Congressional debt forgiveness and the supply of future economic and military aid.
Although the above steps are clearly by themselves and in the aggregate tangible evidence of forward movement in the Middle East peace process, they represent only a beginning in a long journey which will require several years yet to complete. Many have asked whether the peace process that began its new life at Madrid in 1991 is now self-sustaining and irreversible, or will it need more support and nourishment from without and is it still vulnerable to collapse from the attacks of its foes?
The short answers are that the process overall is probably far enough along to carry on with its own momentum but will continue to need support and sustenance from its friends in order to achieve further progress and reach its ultimate objectives on schedule. A terrorist attack inside Israel or the autonomous Palestinian regions (PARs) could perhaps interrupt the process but not thwart it completely. The greatest danger it faces is that a majority perception will emerge in the autonomous territories that it has not delivered the substantive changes and benefits that many expected, but is slipping slowly towards chaos. A review of some of the major hurdles still facing the process shows how rocky the road will be.
Conventional wisdom on the Middle East peace process claims that all parties to the Madrid talks agree on the principle that what they are seeking is a just and comprehensive peace agreement for the whole region; i.e., between Israel and all her Arab neighbours, not just Palestinians, but Jordanians, Lebanese and Syrians too. Prgress on the Israel-Syrian track to date has been slight and stagnant. Face-to-face talks between the two sides have been suspended since February 1994. Israel is said to be seeking a secret back-channel for direct talks. In summer the two sides were having to make do with the go-between shuttle diplomacy of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. It is an axiom of this diplomacy that there will be no viable peace in the Middle East unless Syria is a full party to it.
The positions of the two states on their differences did not move significantly in 11 rounds of the Madrid formula. Syria wants to regain full control of the Golan Heights captured by Israel in the 1967 six day war and since settled by nearly 10,000 Israelis. It wants a commitment by Israel to return this territory, and withdraw from the land it occupies in south Lebanon, before it will discuss the kind of peace it is prepared to agree to. Israel concedes Syrian sovereignty on the Heights but will only consider a phased withdrawal therefrom over a period of years as the terms of the peace agreement with Syria are verified. As the main power-broker in Lebanon, with 35,000 troops dispersed around the country, Syria co-ordinates its moves on Arab-Israeli peace talks with Lebanon.
At the end of year-one of the DoP, the future of talks between Syria and Israel is uncertain. There has been no tangible progress in recent exchanges, but there is serious discussion of everything at issue through intermediaries. On 7 August Secretary Christopher spent five hours in discussions with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad but would not reveal the content. Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' insists that the issue of total (Israeli) withdrawal is not a matter for bargaining, but all other requirements are up for negotiation. In the meantime the Syrians regard it as the legitimate right of the Lebanese to offer resistance to Israeli occupation forces in south Lebanon. In the first week in August there was an improvement in the climate of Israeli-Syrian relations when the Israelis detected unusual co-operation from Syria in helping stop rocket attacks into northern Israel from the Hizballah militia in southern Lebanon.
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is not likely to be stampeded into any premature moves on peace with Israel as a result of initiatives or progress on the other tracks. Syria's position has always been that a common and co-ordinated Arab stand in negotiations with Israel would achieve the greatest benefit for all, but particulary the smaller and more vulnerable parties. Because of its relative size and economic weight, Syria would always be able to play an influential regional role. Now that the Palestinians and Jordanians (long after the Egyptians) have broken the co-ordination rule, Syria can afford to wait and bide its time until it can reach the agreement it wants. Unlike Jordan, it appears that Syria would prefer to negotiate elements of the details before it concludes a handshake with Israel.
The problem now is how to get the dialogue off dead-center. It may be admitted that the Syrian leadership is trying to prepare the population for the idea of peace with Israel or it would not have allowed national TV stations to broadcast live the party in the rose garden of the White House, including the handshake between King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin on 25 July, nor permitted the showing of the Israeli Prime Minister's speech to the Congress including its Hebrew portion. It will take more than a few TV broadcasts to convince the Syrian population that its regional weight and role are acknowledged and protected. This role is an essential factor of stability in the region. Its strongest card is its potential for exercising constructive influence in Lebanon and persuading the Lebanese factions, especially Hizballah, not to oppose an ultimate resolution. Its influence in south Lebanon will continue to be needed even after an agreement.
There are risks for both sides if the Israeli-Syrian standoff continues indefinitely. In June Israel radio reported that Prime Minister Rabin had told the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Knesset that he was concerned about the Syrian arms buildup and the radiness of Russian President Yeltsin to continue to supply spare military parts to Damascus, and even furnish surface-to-surface SA-10 missiles as well, provided debt repayment continued on schedule. He is said to have added, "If there is no agreement in 2-3 years, I would recommend injecting large amounts of money into the Israel Defence Forces to allow them to prepare for the possibility of war" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 097 28 June 1994). A few days earlier he predicted that without some territorial compromise with Syria, "war would break out in three, five or eight years" (Agence France Presse, 0174 23 June 1994). Foreign Minister Peres has long believed that Israel will be required to implement a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights in the framework of an agreement with Syria, and that a breakthrough in the talks with Syria hinges on a change in the Israeli concept.
The risks for Syria are also obvious. President Assad would like to have the Golan back before he dies, and his health has been in question for some time. He can afford to wait, but not too long, or nature may run its course before the settlement is in place. Since Syria is a relatively closed society, and essentially a one-man show politically, there is bound to be some in-fighting on his demise, now that his chosen successor, his son Basil, has predeceased him. He may hesitate too because it is clear that an agreement of full peace with Israel, including open borders for trade and tourism and communications, will expose the population to the democratic alternatives they are presently lacking. There is also the danger that a peace agreement with Israel, which includes the provision that Syria restrain and disarm Hizballah, will cost Syria its normally cosy relationship with its regional ally and Hizballah's chief patron, the Islamic Republic of Iran.
For all these reasons there is some pressure on both sides to renew their direct contacts and urge their diplomats to find new linguistic formulas that save face but accomplish their mutual objectives. This will not happen soon, but there is likely to be more hope of positive movement on this front by the end of this year, especially with the dedicated efforts being shown by the Secretary of State to bridge the gap. If there is anything left of that phantom locution, the "joint Arab stand", as one could assume by the frequent invocations of the shibboleth of "comprehensive peace" (al-salam al-shamil), it may happen that the signing of an Israel-Jordan peace accord would coincide, or occur in fairly close proximity, with a breakthrough in the Israel-Syria talks. The peace may end up being "comprehensive", but it will be done piecemeal and separately, as Israel has always insisted. With the Arab world more divided and fractured than ever before, could it be otherwise?
In an interview on 22 July the Jordanian Minister of Information, Jawad al-Anani, responding to his interlocutor's question, made a classic understatement when he said "...the subject of Jerusalem, as you know, is much more sensitive and complicated than it appears". It has long been understood by Israelis and Palestinians that the toughest test of their desire to reach a peaceful accommodation with each other will be the city of Jerusalem. For this reason the parties to the Oslo Agreement (DoP) agreed to leave that subject, along with several others, to the final stage of their peace negotiations in two years time. Both sides have visceral attachments and claims on the city and its holy sites, claims which appear on the surface to be incompatible and irreconcilable. Unfortunately for them the issue will not lie still and keeps obtruding itself onstage prematurely.
Since it captured the eastern half of the city in the six day war of 1967, the Israeli position has been that united Jerusalem is the Jewish state's eternal capital, now and forever, and can never again be partitioned or subdivided. Its Arab-Palestinian population is now a minority even in the confines of the old eastern sector where most of them live. There can be only one sovereignty nd one civil administration in the city and that will be Israeli and Jewish, it being understood that the rights of religious minorities will be fully protected. The Palestinians for their part take the view that Jerusalem is the logical eventual capital of the self-governing authority they are in the process of constructing, with Israels tacit approval. It is the site of many Christian and Muslim shrines over which they and their ancestors have exercised supervision for centuries, and it is the locus or headquarters of many of their national organizations and embryo state institutions.
The most recent round of tension over these rival claims was precipitated by Arafat himself in a 10 May speech in a Johannesburg mosque in which he called for a jihad to liberate Jerusalem. Since the word bears several different levels of connotation, one of which is "military campaign" to promote Islam, Arafat was obliged to answer a chorus of outrage from his Israeli opposite numbers by explaining that he meant only the sense of a "peaceful struggle" to regain lost territorial and religious rights in the Holy City for all Palestinians. The uproar over the city and its future was kept alive by the return of the Palestinian police and PLO leadership to the autonomous enclaves, and Arafat's homecoming speech in Gaza in which he vowed to continue his efforts to regain a Palestinian homeland until he reached Jerusalem. This prompted the city's Likud mayor, Ehud Olmert, to declare that he would muster a million people to block Arafat's arrival in the city, including jumbo-jet loads of diaspora Jews from America and Canada. The issue was a matter of timing since the Israeli Prime Minister later admitted that Arafat is entitled to visit the city, like any other believer.
The issue of Jerusalem was catapulted into the spotlight again by the Washington Declaration of Israel and Jordan on 25 July. In that document the Israeli government acknowledged a special role for the Jordanian authorities in the administration and upkeep of the Muslim sacred sites in Jerusalem, a move considered inappropriate and provocative by the Palestinian side. Despite elaborate efforts to explain away the significance of this article in the Israel-Jordan declaration, Palestinian concerns have not been assuaged, and relations between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat are believed to be still cool. The future of the peace process is not threatened by this state of affairs but its successful continuation requires an extra effort on the part of the two leaders to mend fences in front of their publics.
Since the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel in the six-day war of 1967, the official policy of most, if not all, Israeli governments has been to encourage Jews to settle in these territories. Today there are an estimated 100,000 to 130,000 settlers in approximately 140 settlements dotted around the countryside among more than a million Palestinians. There are also 10,000 settlers on land in the Golan Heights which will revert to Syrian control once an Israel-Syrian accord is reached. Originally such settlements were widely considered an obstacle to peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours. Now that the idea of peace has been enshrined in written agreements between Israel and many of her Arab neighbours, the settlements are still widely regarded as an obstacle to the implementation of those agreements.
The Israeli lobby group Peace Now estimated that the cost of moving these settlers to new housing within Israel would be $100,000 per residential unit, amounting to $2.5 billion overall. A phased evacuation over five years—during which the permanent accord is supposed to be finalized—would cost $500 million per year, less than 1% of Israels GDP. Peace Now therefore recommended in March that the Israeli government move immediately to relocate settlements from regions being transferred to Palestinian rule, and make every effort to negotiate compensation for residential units in the territories which were transferred to Palestinian ownership. It believed then that if the government did not at quickly to deal with these settlements at the outset of the interim period, chances would be great for obstructions and crises in the peace process with the Palestinians—in view of bloody confrontations in the territories—and also for the continuation of the Labor Party's mandate after the next elections.
Meanwhile there is continuing concern in Palestinian circles that Israel is trying to push the Green Line eastward by expanding existing settlements, especially in proximity to Jerusalem, thereby creating a territorial continuity which it will argue cannot be redivided in a final border negotiation. Despite official denials of any planned expansion of settlements, PLO monitors of settlement activities claim the West Bank Civil Administration does in fact have a plan, currently in an initial implementation stage in the Ramallah area, for the confiscation of 2,100 dunams (1000m²) of Arab agricultural land to expand the settlements of Nahli'el and Dolev. Jerusalem Television Network recently announced it had obtained a Civil Administration document detailing the planned expansion activity in the settlements. (FBIS, 082 8 September 1994).
At the same time PLO official Farouk Kaddoumi is insisting that Israel is delaying the withdrawal of its troops from other parts of the occupied territories and this in turn discourages donor funds from being deposited, which delays the establishment of Palestinian authority in the area. Procrastination may well suit the Israeli side at this point since the next steps will commit it to removal of its security forces from Arab towns and villages in the West Bank, "... and nobody knows how it can do this and still protect the 100 or so Jewish settlements that spread like a rash over the area" (The Economist, 30 July 1994). In this impasse Israeli officials give their Palestinian counterparts the distinct impression of dragging their feet and shifting the burden of security to them, demanding proofs and guarantees as a condition of withdrawal. The Israeli government may now be regretting it did not move earlier to implement the exhortations of Peace Now on how to deal with the settlements issue.
Despite the on-again off-again progress of the discussions aimed at implementing the DoP, by the end of year-one there could be little doubt that it was moving forward, even if slowly. At the end of August a new agreement was reached in Cairo to expand Palestinian powers in seven spheres of life to the rest of the West Bank by 12 September. The official transfer of powers in the fields of education and culture, health, taxation, tourism, youth and sports, social welfare, and international co-operation was given the imposing title of "early empowerment". Although it is in theory subject to Israeli veto, the transfer gives the Palestinian Authority the right to legislate in the fields of education and taxation for the first time. It will take time for full empowerment under the terms of this agreement to materialize, and slippage should be expected, but the direction of movement is clear. The Palestinians of these territories now control their own school system for the first time since June 1967.
Although there is evidence of forward movement, there is little sign of growing trust between the two leaderships. The next steps in the implementation process will be crucial, especially the timely withdrawal of Israeli forces from the remainder of the West Bank. The original concept was that a dynamic process would be one where each new step taken successfully would help build confidence and lead to the next, culminating finally in a broad and durable peace. Final status talks on the hard issues of Jerusalem, refugees, the settlements and borders are not supposed to begin for two more years, but will no doubt continue to force themselves onto the agenda one way or another. Ritual refusal to discuss any aspect of these matters will make it harder to build the trust and confidence the process requires to sustain momentum. Since that trust has not grown in proportion to the progress already made, the leaderships on both sides are politically weaker ad more vulnerable in their own constituencies.
In order to revive the legitimacy and credibility of the negotiating parties and help build mutual trust, elections for a democratic Palestinian legislative Council would appear to be the most urgent step forward. A good case has been made for the renewal of the Israeli government's mandate under the new electoral law, which would rid the Prime Minister of his coalition headaches and give him unprecedented executive freedom for the next four years (The Jerusalem Post, 27 July 1994), but that is the leaders call. The more obvious need is on the other side. Elections for a Council were originally scheduled for July, but have been delayed along with other parts of the DoP. Reports are now circulating that Palestinian officials are aiming at November or December, but these dates may also be unrealistic as long as no voter lists are available, no agreed electoral system is in place, and security/redeployment arrangements in the rest of the West Bank have still to be finalized.
The basic principle of "Gaza-Jericho first" implies a follow-up. That must come soon if the credibility of Arafat and the PLO is to be maintained, and donor financial aid resumed. Amid charges of dictatorial behaviour on the president's part, and arbitrary closure of various media forums, the quickest way to clear the air and set the new Palestinian self-governing authority on a more democratic footing is to hold broad-based elections as soon as possible. Elections for a National Council of 75-100 members with administrative and limited legislative powers, rather than a cabinet-style body of twenty-five or less, would go a long way toward making the president accountable, assuming he wins, and enable him to take the bold security measures against militant opponents of the DoP that Israel insists he take before it redeploys. The ballot-box will not be a panacea for all the problems confronting Israelis and Palestinians in their efforts to implement the basic features of the DoP, especially if it is not based on a generous interpretation of the principle of universal suffrage. But at this stage in a long and arduous journey to a viable peace it is clearly the most potentially therapeutic step to reinforce gains already registered and smooth the path to more progress.
In the thirteenth month of the DOP, the Middle East peace process continued to register further gains while confronting more serious attacks. In mid-October negotiating teams for Israel and Jordan were putting the finishing touches on a final peace agreement on all major controversial issues. Plans were being laid to hold a lavish signing ceremony on the border between Eilat and Aqalsa later in the month in the presence of a visiting President Bill Clinton. On the negative side talks between Israel and the Palestinians on extending autonomy to the rest of the West Bank proceeded very slowly and were punctuated by several terrorist incidents. The capture of an Israeli soldier by Hamas, who hoped to trade him for the release of Shoykh Yasin, but who died along with several others in a failed attempt to rescue him, coupled with a suicide bomb attack on a Tel Aviv bus which killed 20 people and injured more than double that number, served only to demonstrate again how fragile the whole peace enterprise still is. While the leaders on both sides reiterated their determination to press on with the process and not let the proponents of violence deflect it, many observers were left wondering how long the public on both sides could support this policy if such devastating attacks continued. By the end of the thirteenth month of life for the DOP there were clearly signs of hope for the future, balanced by palpable cause for concern.
The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by writing to :
CSIS P.O.Box 9732 Postal Station T Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4G4 FAX: (613) 842-1312
ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/49
[Welcome Page ] [Main Menu] [About CSIS]
[[Commentary Abstracts][Commentary Menu]
Disclaimer: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service assumes no responsibility for the use of the information at this World Wide Web (WWW) site.
