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a CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication
June 1994
Unclassified
Editors Note:
The relationship between "intelligence" and "policy" can elicit different answers, depending on how the question is posed: "How, traditionally, has the government made use of intelligence?" "How does it use intelligence now?" "How should it use intelligence?" Particularly since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies and their intelligence services have been carefully re- examining the question in all its forms.
We are pleased in this issue of Commentary to present the views of Mr. Blair Seaborn, whose distinguished career in Canada's public service included his tenure as Intelligence and Security Coordinator in the Privy Council Office.
Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the COMMENTARY series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.
Over the centuries, prudent decision-makers—be they commercial, military or political- economic—have attempted to keep themselves fully informed on the capabilities and intentions of those whose interests are similar to or conflict with their own. It is relatively easier to be informed about one's friends and allies; relatively harder where one's rivals are concerned. But both are needed to make decisions which best protect and further one's own interests.
The word "intelligence" has come to mean, among other things, the acquisition and analysis of information relating to rivals, potential adversaries and enemies. During World War II, there grew up an impressive amount of co-operation among the major Allied powers in the acquisition and analysis of intelligence on the Axis powers as part of the pursuit of the common goal of defeating the enemy. The extent and depth of this co-operation are almost certainly unique in the history of intelligence. Not surprisingly, the practices developed during the war continued into the post-war period, which so quickly became the period of the Cold War.
The post-World War II years were dominated by the geo-political pre-occupation with the Soviet and Chinese versions of communism and with the understandable perception that these were the primordial threats to the well-being and integrity of the West. Thus, for 40 years the intelligence activities of Canada and its allies were devoted, to a very large degree, to analyzing and understanding those threats. Similarly, the intelligence activities of the Soviet Union, China and their friends were directed first and foremost towards the capabilities and intentions of the USA, its allies and those they influenced.
The methods both sides used to acquire information about the capabilities and intentions of the other, particularly in the military area, became increasingly sophisticated in the technical sense, costly and often ruthless. Human intelligence techniques, popularly referred to as spying, became known to millions through the works of knowledgeable novelists; and even the arcane world of signals intelligence became widely understood despite the best security efforts of its practitioners.
Thus through its association with the East-West confrontation and the popularization of the cloak-and-dagger drama which accompanied it, the word intelligence tended to become associated in the public mind with that confrontation and with a variety of dubious practices. The Cold War is now over, right? So who needs intelligence, which costs us a lot of money, involves us all in sordid activities and only gets us into trouble?
Before leaping to any conclusions, we should try to understand what sort of world has replaced the one in which the Cold War was dominant.
The essentially bipolar international order which characterized that previous era had at least the virtues of relative predictability and simplicity of categorizing almost all players as friends or foes. The remarkably sudden collapse of the Warsaw Pact countries, and then of the Soviet Union itself, led to much glib talk about a New World Order. The hope was that a multipolar political, economic and military system would be far less threatening than what we had previously faced, and might lead us towards a more peaceful and rational international governance, with greatly reduced need for massive defence expenditures and enormous benefits flowing from the "peace dividend".
Alas, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have discovered that the New World Order is far less predictable and far less peaceful than we might have hoped. Ethnic violence has erupted in the former Yugoslavia and many parts of the former Soviet Union. The Middle East is still an explosive area despite some progress towards an Arab-Israeli accommodation. In part because the old spheres of influence became fuzzy as the Cold War disappeared, domestic violence in parts of Africa and Asia has involved us all. The international community, frequently through a more active United Nations presence, has moved in and attempted to restore order where previously the patron superpowers largely controlled their client proxies. The horror of potential superpower use of their nuclear arsenals has all but disappeared, but the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and other, has added to the sense of great instability in the world.
Lest this sound too pessimistic, we should recognize that since the fall of the Berlin Wall, a dozen or more nations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are now free, for better or worse, to make their own decisions rather than having them made by Moscow. There are obvious parallels in this respect with the multitude of former colonies in Africa and Asia whose governments now take decisions in light of what they perceive to be their best interests, rather than those of the old imperial powers. In both cases, the results can be somewhat chaotic, and we may consider some of the decisions unwise. But few would suggest we should or could revert to the days of imperial or superpower decision-making, however seductive the nostalgia for more predictable times may be. The world is safer than it was when the threat of nuclear war hung over us, even though it is more turbulent.
The Cold War and the days of imperialism are over, and that is probably as good a reason as any to re-examine whether Canada still needs an intelligence capability, and if so, of what kind and for what purposes. Perhaps the best place to start is to understand what intelligence always was before the Cold War monopolized it.
Traditionally, intelligence was broken into categories. "Commercial intelligence" related to the capabilities and intentions of one's commercial rivals and competitors, often to the acquisition of confidential or proprietary information about their strategies, e.g., bid information, processes, finances or markets. "Military intelligence" could be either tactical—relating to the disposition of the enemy's troops and equipment in the field—or strategic, relating to longer-term capabilities in the light of total military strength and the capacity to maintain it. "Security intelligence" applied to threats both from within and without to the basic security of a state and to the integrity of the state system. "Criminal intelligence" applied to that which the police should know in order to counter and apprehend those engaged in organized crime, smuggling, extortion, terrorism and the like. "Foreign intelligence" was probably the broadest category, in that it related to the defence of a country and the conduct of its foreign affairs in the widest sense.
Two basic commandments should apply to all types of intelligence. The first is that intelligence assessment must be policy relevant. Intelligence does not exist for its own sake; it must be relevant to the concerns and problems on which decisions and policy must be made. To use foreign intelligence as an example, what is happening in Vanuatu is important to New Zealand, but not to Canada. What is happening in Sri Lanka, on the other hand, can be important to Canada, among other reasons, because of the potential impact on immigration and refugee claimants. Intelligence must also make a distinctive contribution to what decision-makers know from other sources; i.e., there must be "value-added". And of course to be useful it must be timely.
The second commandment is that intelligence assessment must be policy neutral. The hallmark of intelligence is that it is based on fact, knowledge and rigorous analysis to explain as objectively as possible what is happening and what is likely to happen in an area or situation which requires that decisions be taken or policy made. To fact, knowledge and analysis must be added judgement. The producer of intelligence analysis, moreover, must call the shots as he sees them, without regard for whether the judgements will support or challenge decision-makers' preconceptions and existing policy. To adjust the conclusions to what you think the user wants to hear is to nullify the value of intelligence. Intelligence is useful only to the extent that it provides objective value, support or re-assurance for proposed actions or policy, or alternatively gives warning that the proposed actions or policies are unlikely to achieve their objectives.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing is what intelligence ought to be in a democracy such as ours; it is not so in all cases elsewhere. There are other kinds of "intelligence" which have been used in extreme cases in conjunction with so-called "dirty tricks", for the manipulation, for one's own purposes, of events either at home or abroad. This is a bastardization of intelligence and in the end is self-defeating. The fact that it has been known to exist, however, points to the importance of locating the intelligence function within government such that it cannot easily be manipulated or subverted for policy reasons.
With these maxims in mind, let us examine why intelligence is important in the field of foreign affairs and defence, and how decision-makers should use it. One rather lengthy definition of foreign intelligence which has been used in Canada reads as follows:
In relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the foreign affairs of Canada, foreign intelligence is information and analysis relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of a foreign state. person, or organization. It includes data of a political, economic, military, security, technological or social nature, obtained from overt as well as covert sources. Its purposes are to protect Canada's interests, to facilitate the foreign and defence policy process, and to provide advantage in the pursuit of overall foreign and defence policy objectives
This definition says several important things. The first is that if you want to affect others in a way favourable to Canada's interests, or if the actions of others are likely to affect Canada, you'd better know what the other guy is up to. Not what he says he's up to, nor what he used to be up to; least of all what you'd like him to be up to; but what he is up to now and what he is likely to be up to in the near future. Good intelligence analysts, located at some step removed from the policy people, should be able to provide that assessment. If they do, the decision-maker will ignore their judgements at the peril of Canadian policy.
Another important message from this definition is that the analysis from raw intelligence (or as analysis is sometimes called, assessed intelligence) is based on both overt and covert sources. It's not a matter of the New York Times versus what your spy tells you. The good intelligence analyst will draw on all sources, from academic journals to CNN to what the paid informant abroad has to say to what is likely to happen in a particular circumstance. It is estimated that 80% of the input to the assessed intelligence produced by the CIA comes from open sources . The trick in making use of a covert source of information is to recognize when it has added something to or when it corroborates what is known from open sources, and how much significance to attach to it.
A third message from the definition is that one's foreign affairs interests must he looked at very widely to protect and enhance the interests of Canada. It is no longer enough, if it ever was, to know whether we are likely to be attacked militarily by a foreign power, or where are our likeliest prospects for selling Canadian wheat. Things as diverse as international terrorism, the international drug trade, climate change, environmental degradation, world migration patterns and the spread of AIDS can be just as important to our vital national interests as the military potential of an unfriendly state. International drug cartels can be so powerful as to overwhelm national police and law enforcement in smaller countries, and lead to requests for Canadian peace-keeping expertise. Famine and civil disruption caused by environmental factors or civil war may put strong pressure on Canada to contribute massive humanitarian aid. The industrial and energy policies followed by China and other rapidly developing economies may have a direct impact not only on Canada's international trade prospects but also on our climate and well-being through changes in global-mean temperatures and the ozone layer. It is best to have adequate warning of events such as these, in order to have time to prepare a considered response. Good intelligence will give that lead time.
The distinctions among categories of intelligence, however described, are becoming increasingly blurred at the same time as the potential subject matter of foreign intelligence has broadened. The illicit international trade in drugs may be for Canada primarily of concern to the police, and therefore fall into the category of criminal intelligence. Yet it also will present problems for Canadian welfare agencies and public authorities who have a stake in enforcement; it will as well be a legitimate concern of foreign intelligence to the extent that it may destabilize régimes in countries where Canada has direct interests. It may also be of interest to security intelligence to the extent that the drug trade is connected to other forces, such as organized criminal gangs with links to foreign countries, which may threaten the stability and integrity of the structure of the state here at home.
To take another example, communal violence in foreign countries (one thinks of Hindu-Sikh clashes in India, Muslim extremists in the Middle East, Kurdish-Turkish violence) is of concern to foreign intelligence because of the potential to cause inter-state tension or intra-state instability. But communal violence is also of direct concern to security intelligence when the internecine strife is transplanted by immigrants or visitors from these countries and waged on Canadian soil.
Again, economic espionage, directed or facilitated by governments, or even commercial/industrial espionage, is of concern not just to the Canadian business community but to the country as a whole because of its potential to erode competitive advantages and to sap the economic strength. The essential lesson is that intelligence categories are no longer, if they ever were, water-tight compartments, and that much intelligence produced for one client is also of interest to others.
In Canada, intelligence production of different kinds is undertaken in various departments and agencies—the RCMP, CSIS, National Defence, Foreign Affairs—to enable them to fulfil more effectively their own mandates. The process of intelligence production is co-ordinated by the Privy Council Office, but whatever the particular structure chosen, the systematic sharing of intelligence among interested clients requires constant attention and some sort of clearing house. So does the production of broad intelligence reports for senior decision-makers, who must be aware of considerations beyond those related to their immediate responsibilities. To this end, the Privy Council Office has recently enhanced its own capacity for intelligence analysis in an interactive way with other intelligence producers. This location helps to ensure that the analysis function for the government as whole is not improperly influenced by the policy objectives of individual departments and agencies.
Each intelligence producer in Canada relies to a considerable extent on the exchange of information with counterparts in other countries. The exchange is necessary because so much of the activity intelligence addresses is international in nature. All participants benefit from sharing intelligence facts and comparing analyses, although it is wise to be on the alert for indications of national bias in shared assessments, bias which can shape conclusions in a way with which Canada may not agree.
A better understanding of what intelligence is, of the multiple purposes it serves and of the increasing complexity of the post-Cold War world lead to the conclusion that Canada now needs more and better intelligence capacity, not less or none at all. But there is another important point to make.
This paper has had something to say about what constitutes good intelligence and what value it can provide for the decision-maker. It goes without saying that the best intelligence is of little value if the clients do not make use of it. Good analysts attuned to the interests and needs of their own country, and knowledgeable and wise about other countries, should always be preparing assessments in anticipation of need. The client for his part has the obligation to give the analyst clear and timely indications of those areas of decision and policy where he will want to have the most knowledgeable and balanced judgements in advance of the event. Making good use of intelligence does not come readily to all decision-makers; it is a learned practice and one which must be constantly encouraged.
To put it bluntly, the accuracy of the facts and the quality of the analyses are not in themselves enough. It is just as important that intelligence producers be skilled in disseminating and even marketing their product. In an age when we are all deluged with information, often presented in very imaginative and attractive forms, the intelligence producer must be able to capture and hold the interest of the potential consumer. This is particularly the case in Canada where there is not a strong tradition of making good use of intelligence. The demand must be created by format and means of communicating as well as by content. And once created it must be maintained in such a way that the content helps, even forces, decision-makers to think through the consequences of their policies and to re-examine the alternatives facing them.
The intelligence analyst must be under no illusion that the decision-makers, even when they are using intelligence effectively, will always act in ways which reflect their acceptance of the judgements of the analyst. Many other factors enter into the decision-making process: domestic considerations—political and economic—public opinion, budgetary constraints, commitments to allies, to name but a few. Provided he has met the high quality standards of good intelligence and has learned how to market his product with the decision-makers, the analyst has the right to expect, nevertheless, that what he has written will be carefully weighed along with the other factors before the decision is taken. If that happens, intelligence will have served its purpose.
If the foregoing description of what constitutes intelligence and its function is accepted, and if it is applied to the kind of world which seems to be emerging after the end of the Cold War, certain conclusions can be drawn as to what changes are likely or ought to occur in the intelligence world.
(1) The subject matter of intelligence will continue to change as we become more aware of the diverse factors in the world which can affect Canada for better or worse. Change will come from our greater awareness of what these factors are, and also from the fluidity of the world scene no longer dominated by the bipolar reality.
(2) The intelligence community will need greater versatility, and a greater mix of knowledge and analytical skills, to assess the changing factors. It will also have to draw on the knowledge of specialists outside the traditional intelligence network, from environmentalists to epidemiologists to ethnic experts. But the community and the clients it serves will also have to set priorities and to concentrate efforts on the high-priority areas. An intelligence community of the size Canada is likely to be able to afford cannot cover the whole waterfront.
(3) With the lessening of the broadly shared intelligence interests and pre-occupations which World War II and the Cold War generated and sustained, there is likely to be a reduction in the sharing of at least certain types of intelligence among traditional intelligence partners. These partners may, for example, become competitors for markets in the former Soviet Bloc. One cannot therefore expect a sharing of economic intelligence with competitors where previously it was shared as part of the joint effort to assess the economic strength of the common adversary.
(4) At the same time, temporary and limited intelligence-sharing will occur for specific purposes with new partners, including those who were former adversaries. It can be in the interest of both the USA and Russia, for example, to share intelligence with respect to the international drug trade or the proliferation of nuclear weaponry.
(5) The blurring of the distinctions between criminal and security and foreign intelligence, particularly now that so much crime has become "global", will require close collaboration between intelligence producers in various agencies and law enforcement authorities, both internally and internationally. This raises difficult problems both in the use of highly sensitive material in court, and in the matter of protecting sources.
(6) To prove its value to those in authority, the intelligence community will have to enhance further its analytical capacity, ensure the closest co-ordination of its several players, and market relevant product knowing that it is in keen competition with other sources of information. It will have to be demonstrably independent of the policy advisers. It will have to describe and analyze complex situations in a way which is readable and understandable to decision-makers, and in a way which forces them to re-examine certain possibilities before taking decisions.
If these conditions are met, there should be a good future for a respected intelligence community in Canada.
The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by writing to :
CSIS P.O.Box 9732 Postal Station T Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4G4 FAX: (613) 842-1312
ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/45
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