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"Our orientation in national security is influenced considerably by the global security environment. Just as our national security system has undergone adjustment and reorientation over the last ten years, so must we be ready to adapt and reorient in the coming years."
The Hon. Herb Gray, Solicitor General, Statement on National Security, April 11, 1994
The issue of weapons proliferation has gained prominence in the global security debate. An increase in the number of countries possessing non-conventional military capabilities poses a growing threat to international peace and stability. The acquisition of dual-use materiel, technology and expertise needed to advance weapons of mass destruction is a significant security issue. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems present the greatest threat.
Canada is a party to various international agreements which seek to deter proliferation activities through the restriction of trade in specific technologies and materiel. In an attempt to circumvent these national and international controls, countries of proliferation concern have turned to more elaborate and deceptive methods, such as the development of clandestine and illicit international procurement networks, to acquire restricted technology and materiel.
As Canada is an internationally recognized leader in many high-technology sectors (such as the nuclear, chemical, electronics and aerospace sectors), it remains a frequent target for clandestine and illicit procurement activity.
"The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, continues to be worrisome. The increased availability of nuclear technology and the aspirations of some countries to acquire nuclear bomb-making capability are profoundly disturbing."
The Hon. Herb Gray, Solicitor General, Statement on National Security, April 11, 1994
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can threaten Canadian as well as international security in a number of ways.
An increase in the number of countries possessing a nuclear weapons capability will inevitably increase the chances of future nuclear conflict. Many of the new states lack the sophisticated command, control, and safety features of the traditional nuclear weapon states. This increases the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized use.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to unstable regions may directly affect Canadian forces involved in peacekeeping or "peace-making" missions. Chemical weapons and ballistic missiles have already been used in recent Third World conflicts to devastating effect; the use by Iraqi forces of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq is a well-publicized example. In the longer run, with the development of ballistic missiles of intercontinental range, some of these countries could target North America directly.
Finally, the witting or unwitting involvement of Canadian companies in clandestine acquisition efforts can violate export regulations and be a source of intense embarrassment to them and to Canada. In instances where enterprises in Canada have deliberately contravened export controls, criminal penalties and loss of revenue may result.
"The issue of weapons proliferation has returned to the centre of the global security debate. At least two dozen countries are believed to be building weapons of mass destruction or trying to acquire them."
W.P.D. Elcock, Director of CSIS, Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies Conference, October 28, 1994
Despite world-wide concern and the existence of international fora and conventions addressing the issue, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains a significant threat. In addition to the five declared nuclear weapon states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) and those former Soviet states that are divesting themselves of the nuclear weapons on their soil, a number of other countries are assumed to possess nuclear weapons or to be intent on acquiring them.
Eleven countries are generally reported to have undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities, and at least eight to have undeclared offensive biological weapons programs, according to a recent report of the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
Furthermore, besides the five declared nuclear powers, more than a dozen countries are developing ballistic missiles with ranges of between 300 and 600 or more kilometres. Of additional concern are he states which have in the past developed or are now believed to be developing simultaneously nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry, as well as ballistic missiles for their long-range delivery.
In some cases, countries of proliferation concern have been able to acquire the necessary capabilities with the approval or connivance of supplier states. In other cases, the offending countries have set up elaborate, clandestine networks to acquire necessary dual-use technology without the suppliers being aware of it.
But the acquisition of the technology or know-how to produce weapons of mass destruction does not necessarily require high intrigue or complex business arrangements. Visiting students, technicians, businessmen and scientists from countries of proliferation concern can be tasked to acquire technological data and materiel for military programs. These individuals are motivated by offers of rewards for success, by patriotism, or in some cases by coercion, including threats to family members back home.
In Canada, there have been examples of covert attempts to acquire technology applicable to the development and the production of weapons of mass destruction by countries of proliferation concern.
In one well-publicized case, immediately preceding the Gulf War, American and British officials foiled an attempt by an Iraqi front company to acquire trigger mechanisms for nuclear devices. A Canadian firm had also been approached by an Iraqi-based company with an order for trigger modules. The unusually high quantity requested and the undeclared end-use raised sufficient suspicions to cause the Canadian company not to proceed with the sale.
In another case, a foreign scientist attempted to acquire from Canadian institutions a species of fungus which can be used in the production of biological weapons.
In yet another case, an electrical engineer living in Canada provided assistance to a Third World country's nuclear bomb program. The engineer collected technical data in the United States and Canada and went to the Third World country to train young engineers. He was later involved in obtaining parts for high-speed inverters that power centrifuge motors, which can be used to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb.
Canada is a party to a number of international treaties forbidding the transfer of weapons of mass destruction such as the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In addition, Canada was one of the original signatories of the yet-to-be ratified Chemical Weapons Convention. Despite the strengthening of these regimes, non-signatory states and states ignoring their treaty commitments continue to undermine proliferation control regimes.
Canada has also joined several international supplier regimes and signed cooperation agreements aimed at deterring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by controlling the transfer of technology and materiel to countries of proliferation concern through the strengthening of national export control measures. These groups are also exploring ways of controlling the transfer of expertise in support of programs to advance weapons of mass destruction. They include the Australia Group (chemical & biological warfare), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also known as the "London Club" (nuclear weapons & dual-use technology), the Missile Technology Control Regime (missiles & unmanned aircraft capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, replacing the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls, also known as "COCOM", covering the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.
Despite all the efforts of concerned governments, the proliferation of the technology, materiel or know-how to produce weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems has been slowed but not stopped.
For its part, the Government of Canada has identified international peace and stability as one of its security intelligence priorities. CSIS has responded to the changing dynamics and to their impact on Canadian defence and foreign policy interests.
"This [proliferation] has been a source of increasing concern to the intelligence communities in the western world for the last decade. There has been a substantial increase in the number of countries that are known or suspected to have access to nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry.
We have been working very closely for the last decade, and increasingly so, with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence, both of whom have responsibilities and are actively involved in the area. We're providing the degree of intelligence we can in support of [these departments].
We're particularly targeted on trying to assess what technologies are available in Canada that have a dual use... and the access foreign intelligence services may... try to get covertly to that particular information. Our job is to try to assess that as best we can and advise the Government of Canada."
Ray Protti, former Director of CSIS, Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, May 3, 1994
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the diversion to military programs of dual-use technology acquired under the guise of civilian research/application constitute a growing international security threat and one to which CSIS devotes particular attention. While Canada has no weapons of mass destruction in its arsenal, it has dual-use technologies and expertise that are of interest to countries of proliferation concern.
CSIS' mandate is to advise government regarding activities that may constitute a threat to the security of Canada. In its efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, CSIS works closely with federal government departments and agencies such as Foreign Affairs and International Trade, National Defence, Revenue Canada, Customs, Excise and Taxation, the National Research Council and the Atomic Energy Control Board. These have either an enforcement role or the expertise to support a thorough and comprehensive assessment of the threat. As an example, the Canadian commitment to the objectives of the treaties and groups mentioned above is reflected in a variety of national export regulations administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
CSIS, through its mandated investigations in Canada and its international liaison network, seeks to identify attempts by countries of proliferation concern to acquire Canadian technology and expertise. The resulting analysis is shared with relevant government departments and agencies. This enables them to be kept abreast of events that may impact on Canadian defence and foreign policy interests.
CSIS established a national liaison and awareness program in January, 1992. The program seeks to develop an ongoing dialogue with both public and private organizations concerning the threat posed to Canadian interests by foreign government involvement in economic and defence-related espionage, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The purpose of the program is to increase awareness of the threat in order to enable CSIS to collect and assess information and to advise government accordingly.
The program is voluntary. It provides organizations with a better appreciation of the threat environment, and thus enables them to protect their interests. Upon request, an economic security and proliferation coordinator can provide an organization with a formal presentation. CSIS has regional and district offices across the country.
Based on CSIS' experience in investigating foreign government espionage activities in Canada, the presentation includes a review of the most common covert methods used by countries of proliferation concern as well as elements that businesses should consider in assessing potential commercial dealings.
Since its inception in 1992, CSIS' liaison and awareness program has met with a positive response from the Canadian public and private sectors. By the end of 1995, the program had made more than 1600 contacts within Canadian industry and government.
To avoid becoming involved in transactions that might result in the illicit diversion of a Canadian company's dual-use technology, the most important rule of self-defence is to know one's customer.
For comments/enquiries, please contact, National Coordinator, Economic Security and Proliferation Issues, c/o P.O. Box 9732, Postal Station T, Ottawa, Ontario, K1G 4G4. Telephone (613) 231-0100 or Fax (613) 231-0612.
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