CSIS/SCRS

Français [Français]

[Welcome Page] [Main Menu] [About CSIS]

[Commentary Abstracts][Commentary Menu]


COMMENTARY No. 38

a CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication


CRIME AND MIGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

January 1994

Unclassified

Editors Note:

The wave of immigration from the former Soviet Bloc westward since 1991 is a relatively unknown phenomenon in North America. However, as the authors point out, in 1992 alone "about six million people were displaced or prone to migrate from Eastern Europe". Where they go, how they get there, and the problems created by this unprecedented mobility form the themes of this issue of Commentary. The authors are Dr. Allan Kagedan, formerly a Strategic Analyst with the Service, and Dr. Opalski, Adjunct Professor at Carleton University, currently on a teaching assignment at the Sorbonne.


Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the COMMENTARY series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.


Under Soviet communism, migration from much of Eastern Europe was tightly restricted, and those fleeing Soviet control did so as political refugees. With the collapse of the USSR, this situation changed. Eastern Europeans are relatively free to exit their homelands, and many aspire to immigrate Westward to improve their economic conditions. The post-communist era has turned central European states such as Poland into a buffer zone between the impoverished East and the prosperous west.

However, West European countries generally do not admit immigrants; they prefer to treat newcomers as visitors, guest workers or refugees. Canada and the United States have immigration programs, but these are selective. Thus, both Western Europe and North America face legal and non-legal migration (non-legal migrants are those who seek to enter a foreign country by evading or abusing established laws, norms and procedures). Lacking the family ties, skills, knowledge or patience to take the legal route, a small percentage of would-be migrants all too easily turn to organized crime elements who are only too happy to oblige. But the criminals exact a price before, during and after the act of non-legal migration. The criminals, moreover, use the non-legal migration routes themselves to travel abroad and expand their criminal network.

Canada, although not on the direct path of Eastern European non-legal migrants, does receive its share. In 1992, 2,000 persons, including those from developing countries and the former Soviet Union, reached Gander, Newfoundland and applied for refugee status during Aeroflot and Cubana airlines refuelling stops. Some were assisted by smuggling rings. Although new visa requirements have largely closed this entry method, others remain.

In the first seven months of 1993, 260 individuals, mostly from Romania, entered Canada stowed-away on cargo ships with the help of European criminal smuggling rings. The number for 1992 was 382. In 1993, a Russian émigré businessperson said that Russian mafiosi fired bullets at him at his Toronto home; in a separate incident, four Russian émigrés were arrested after a high-rise building in suburban Toronto was riddled with bullets.

The Migration Push

The number of people driven by economic need or local conflicts who are migrating within and away from Eastern Europe is striking. Since 1986, an estimated 1.8 million people have transited Poland; of these, 1.3 million left in 1992 alone (Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 June 93, Politika, 29 May 93). Another migration-prone group are the two million refugees present in Russia, 400,000 of whom come from developing states, the rest from the newly independent post-Soviet republics. In Ukraine, the immediate migratory potential surpasses 100,000. Romanians and Bulgarians (mostly members of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria) are moving, as are 350,000 (10% of the total population) Albanians (Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 June 1993). Add to this the more than two million Yugoslavs displaced by the war (UNHCR, Refugees and Displaced Persons Within the Former Yugoslavia, 4 December 1992), and in sum, about six million people were displaced or prone to migrate out of Eastern Europe in 1992.

However, the level of interest in migration—which could turn active in light of further economic decline or civil strife—is much higher. In 1991, four million ex-Soviets visited Poland; in 1992, eight million; and the expected number for 1993 is 15-20 million (Gazeta Wyborcza 10 Jan. 93). These figures are rather conservative; some observers predict that 24 million ex-Soviets will visit this year. These figures illustrate the unprecedented mobility of former Soviet citizens and suggest the potential for future waves of migration.

Documents for Sale

How do the non-legals migrate? Non-legal migrants often use false documents to board airplanes and pass immigration check points into Western Europe. The high demand has created a flourishing false-document industry in Eastern European countries.

For non-legal migrants from Asia and the Middle East who aim to reach the West, their first step is to penetrate the southern regions of Eastern Europe. Networks selling false visitor invitations to Russia and successor states, fake passports, visas and entire transit packages via the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the West now operate in Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and China. The document prices vary. For example, in the Afghan town of Mazar-i-Sharif, a Russian invitation costs $700 and a visa $500. An invitation from Azerbaijan is cheaper: $300 . In Moscow, Russian and old Soviet passports sell for about $500; false visas for Sweden, Denmark and Belgium cost an additional $300. American and Canadian visas are more expensive. In 1992, Polish black marketeers offered passports with entry visas to the USA and Canada for $5000-$7000. Last year, Polish authorities raided a document factory near Zakopane where passports were produced using sophisticated Western photocopiers. Several CIS criminal groups are believed to have direct access to passport-issuing authorities (Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 15 Jan.1993).

The documents trade in Eastern Europe has benefited from the plethora of newly minted states in the region which are beset by bureaucratic confusion and corruption. For instance, it is not uncommon for Russians to hold several passports—a Soviet passport, a Russian passport and perhaps the passport of the post-Soviet successor state they are living in. Border officials have trouble judging the legitimacy of all these documents. Furthermore, the passports are produced in an unsophisticated manner and are easily forged. Real passports are sold for hard currency by passport personnel. Russian authorities estimate that in 1992, 100,000 non-legal immigrants left the country for Western Europe with fake passports (Novoye Vremya, no. 9, 1993; New York Times, 15 Feb.1993).

Leaky borders...

Armed with false and falsely obtained documents, the non-legals begin their westward journey. The basic non-legal migration route begins in Russia or another former Soviet republic, and proceeds through Poland or the Baltic states to Germany and Scandinavia. A northern route goes from the Russian region of Karelia to Finland, where the population of non-legals is reported to be 50,000. According to the Swedish Coast Guard, hundreds of Middle Easterners, including 500 Kurds in January 1993 alone, are being smuggled into Sweden through Gotland Island. To reach Western Europe from Russia by land, smugglers charge from $1,500 to $4,000 per head; by sea costs $2,000. (Svenska Dagbladet, April 1992; Novove Vremya, no. 9, 1993; Speigel, no. 26, 1993).

Police have identified several immigrant smuggling rings that ply the east-to-west route. Two smuggling rings operating in Estonia under the guise of legitimate commercial ventures bring aliens out of Moscow and the Baltic states, and from there to Sweden and Denmark. They bribe border guards and then use Estonian vessels to ferry non-legal migrants across the Baltic sea (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 Jan. 1993).

A Polish crime syndicate conducts immigrant smuggling out of Swinouijcie, a port near the Polish-German border. In 1993 this centre attracted international attention in connection with a maritime disaster involving the Heweliusz, a ferry sailing between Poland and Sweden, which capsized during a storm. Non-legal immigrants, en route to Sweden in sealed containers, were among the victims of the disaster.

Russian and Ukrainian military personnel have used helicopters and naval vessels to smuggle non-legals to Poland and Scandinavia. The migrants are hidden at military bases in the Baltic region before they are shipped across the Baltic Sea (Dagens Nyheter, 11 Feb. 1993, Speigel, no. 27, 1993).

...and lax officials

Why are Russian, Ukrainian, Baltic and other Eastern European border guards so lax about letting non-legal migrants through their posts? For one thing, corruption is rampant in the border services. Indeed, Russian mafia groups are able not only to evade detection by Russian police, but have been largely successful in bribing German and Polish custom officers. Second, honest law enforcement officers are out-gunned by criminal gangs, and border guard units are understaffed and inadequately equipped (Speigel, no. 26, 1993; Mlada Franta Dnes, August 1993).

Realpolitik is another reason for looking the other way. Why should a Polish border guard help Germany by keeping unwanted foreigners in Poland? Polish border guards often sympathize with the migrants and lack the motivation to "fish hapless non-legal migrants out the Oder river in order to protect the wealthy Germans" (Wprost, Oct. 1992).

A border guard who chooses to stand up to the mafia and stop clients from crossing the border risks life and limb. A Belorussian mafia group has offered a $1000 reward for "eliminating" unco-operative custom officers/border guards (Spiegel, no. 26. 1993).

At the Ukrainian-Polish border Ukrainian border officials (widely suspected of connections to the mafia) are known to extract special "fees" from cars/passengers crossing the border, depending on the size of the vehicle, ranging from $100 for a car to $800 for the large TIR-trucks. They also accept bribes from individual passengers and organized groups that wish to avoid official border checks. In Suwalki, a Polish town located close to the Polish-Lithuanian border, many local police and custom officials drive BMWs and typically build luxurious houses after two years on the job. They "tax" smugglers and take bribes for bringing people over the border. They also run several large warehouses supplying smugglers with cigarettes—the product dearest to smugglers (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitunq, 12 Jan. 1992; Nie, 15 July 1993).

Fallout: the criminal nexus

Porous Eastern European borders have exacerbated a number of social problems, including crime and prostitution. Poland has been especially hard-hit; 63% of Polish crimes are committed by ex-Soviets, including 100 Ukraine-based gangs (Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 Jan. and 16 June 1993).

Post-Soviet criminal gangs specialize in highway robbery—literally. Ukrainians, Russians, Lithuanians and Georgians who had immigrated illegally began by robbing ex-Soviet service men returning home from Germany. The thieves had obtained computer printouts listing the types and license plates of cars owned by the soldiers, and dates when their owners would end their tour of duty. Clearly, the mafia had good sources of information in the Russian military establishment in Germany (Spiegel, no. 25, 1993). In 1992/93 the scope of highway robberies widened to include TIR-trucks, especially vehicles transporting alcohol and cigarettes. In 1992 several hundred attacks were recorded. By 1993, Polish criminals realized how profitable this line of activity was and now commit 50% of the robberies themselves (Polityka, 29 May 1993).

Germany is a key target of gangs from the former USSR as well as Polish groups. According to Anatoli Olenikov, a high-ranking Russian official involved in fighting the mafia, about 300 Russian, Ukrainian and Caucasian gangs conduct drug trafficking, car theft, extortion, prostitution and robbery, and these groups have divided Germany into their own "zones of influence".

In Berlin, Russian mafia groups operate several import/export stores, restaurants, discos, travel agencies and arcades. Russian entrepreneurs in Berlin pay the Russian mafia between DM 1,000 and 20,000 monthly for "protection" (Spiegel, no. 25, 1993).

Prostitution is another Eastern European product, fuelled by economic hardship and illegal migration. Law enforcement officials expect Russian organized crime, already heavily involved in prostitution in Poland and Finland, to strengthen its control of prostitution in Western Europe. Already, one-quarter of prostitutes working in Germany are from Eastern Europe. The "sale" of East European women to Western strip clubs and brothels is a booming business (Svenska Dagladet, 5 April 1993; Time, 21 June 1993).

Attempts to control

Facing a human tide from the east, Western European countries are seeking closer co-operation with their eastern neighbours to bring it under control. But for the Eastern governments, co-operating with the West—which brings economic benefits—runs counter to the notion of getting rid of troublesome, poor people. Just like the Polish border guard who can see no reason to detain unwanted foreigners within Polish borders, why, a Polish official might ask, should Poland be asked to keep non-legals from the former Soviet Union or the developing world on its territory, when Germany is so much richer and able to cope with the flow?

Germany has recently signed treaties with Romania, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics, according to which non-legal immigrants can be repatriated to these countries (to a maximum of 10,000 in the Polish case). In exchange, the East European countries will receive German financial help. For example, Poland will receive DM 120 million in 1993 and in the first six months of 1994. Sixty percent of this money is earmarked for tightening border controls, 30% for repatriating non-legal immigrants, and 10% for Polish police. According to German estimates, some 100,000 refugees entered Germany from Poland; Polish estimates are lower (30,000-40,000). Poland signed similar repatriation treaties with Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; negotiations are underway with Belarus and Bulgaria. Slovakia plans to sign readmission agreements with the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Hungary.

The Polish Ministry of Interior and Border Guard Units are pressing for the introduction of visas for visitors from CIS, Bulgaria and Romania. However, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is opposed, arguing that the new measures will not prevent the Russian mafia from operating in Poland. Many organized crime rings have access to genuine and fake travel documents and financial resources necessary to adjust to the changes.

A conference on organized crime held in Legionowo near Warsaw in June 1993 was attended by all East/Central European countries except Hungary and Bulgaria. The main obstacle to improved cooperation on fighting crime is the absence of bilateral agreements on co-operation, although the police forces of these countries called on their governments to sign such agreements.

In addition to bilateral agreements, post-communist states of Eastern Europe are trying to tighten their borders. Jan Ruml, the Czech Minister of the Interior, announced the establishment of border patrols involving 900-950 policemen to prevent non-legal migration across the Czech-Slovak border. Twenty border points will be established for foreigners (i.e. non-Czech and non-Slovaks). The Slovaks criticized the decision, claiming the Czechs are manipulating the non-legal migration issue as a means to fence themselves from Slovakia. The Poles and the Finns plan to take steps to improve border controls (Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 June 1993).

An EC conference on non-legal immigration held last June in Copenhagen called for "harmonization" of efforts aimed at preventing an influx of non-legals to the EC. Among the measures proposed is tougher control of foreigners on temporary residence permits and the surveillance of foreigners suspected of working illegally, or who have married EC nationals.

Conclusion

Turbulent political and economic conditions in Eastern Europe will mean enduring pressures for migration from the region—legal and non-legal. To be sure, the vast majority of people will opt to stay at home, and many who leave will return home for fear of the difficulty of adapting to a foreign country.

Western Europe lacks a consistent immigration policy, and its refugee program is under stress. Germany, which assisted more Yugoslav refugees than other West Europeans, is upset over the perceived lack of burden-sharing, and has now taken a harder line on refugee admission. But the pressures—economic and political—to exit Eastern Europe persist, prompting more non-legal movement.

Future Eastern European non-legal migration could easily strain relations within the EC. Although it is moving to reduce the internal significance of borders between members, there is yet no agreement on procedures should the European partners disagree on how seriously to combat the non-legal migrant phenomenon.

As West Europeans ponder how to stem the flow of non-legal migrants, Eastern European criminal organizations are modernizing their operations. Criminal groups are equipping themselves with state-of-the-art communications equipment, night-vision devices and advanced computers.

Because of the distance and money involved, and its regular immigration program that opens the door to foreigners, Canada will be more insulated from non-legal immigration and Eastern-European-based international crime than Western Europe. But Canada is a major immigrant-receiving country and a favourite destination for Eastern Europeans. Canada's attractiveness is heightened by the established communities of Eastern European immigrants living here. Additionally, Canada may be seen as a gateway to the United States. Unavoidably, Canada will continue to face the problem of non-legal immigration from Eastern Europe.


The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by writing to :

CSIS 
P.O.Box 9732
Postal Station T 
Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4G4 
FAX: (613) 842-1312

ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/38


[Welcome Page ] [Main Menu] [About CSIS]

[Commentary Abstracts][Commentary Menu]

Disclaimer: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service assumes no responsibility for the use of the information at this World Wide Web (WWW) site.

© CSIS/SCRS 1997
Canada wordmark