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a CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE publication
February 1992
Unclassified
Editors Note:
Commentary departs from its usual format in this issue to include reports from three of our Strategic Analysts in the Analysis and Production Branch of CSIS, who have recently travelled abroad. The first, by Dr. G.D. Smith, provides an account of "wide-ranging, off-the-record" discussions held in Great Britain last summer, centered on international co-operation against terrorist activities worldwide.
In November, Dr. Allan Kagedan attended a conference in Maryland which, as he puts it, provided "surprising insights on developments in Europe and on the state of mind of the American military and foreign policy establishment".
Perhaps most surprising was Dr. William Millward's journey to Tunis to attend an international seminar on the Middle East. As his plane took off from Rome, it was hijacked; we've chosen to include his account of the trip rather than the seminar.
Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the COMMENTARY series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.
This past summer, 55 delegates representing 16 countries met for several days at a secluded estate in south-west England. The gathering brought together people having diverse professional backgrounds engaged in assorted fields of activity: members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities, military officers, academic authorities, diplomats, civil servants, lawyers and journalists. They shared the common bond of positions of responsibility and, in keeping with the raison d'être of the meeting, a serious concern about the modern phenomenon of terrorism.
The elegant manor house provided an ideal setting for encouragement of wide-ranging, off-the-record discussion. 'Chatham House Rules', whereby nothing may be quoted or published without the express consent of the author, further stimulated a free flow of ideas, frank exchange of opinion and, occasionally, uninhibited disagreement. As a means of challenging entrenched views and stirring debate, internationally recognized authorities were invited to address individual agenda topics.
The meeting examined various terrorist threats and the options open to governments in selecting appropriate counter-terrorism policies and actions. Predicated on the theme of international co-operation against a continuing threat, the conference attempted to forecast likely dangers in the 1990s. Among the topics explored were:
Universal agreement was not reached on the various issues, which, per se, was a healthy outcome. But consensus was achieved for the large part—most delegates appeared satisfied that their opinions (and, consequently, their projected policy advice) lay within reasonably similar parameters.
A substantial decline in the number of international terrorist incidents began in 1989 and continued through 1990. Nonetheless, the majority speakers and delegates agreed the terrorist threat remains considerable. In the opinion of many, the 'new world order' may paradoxically reduce inter-state conflict at the expense of more terrorist violence—better understood in the context of predicted new sources of terrorism, below.
Terrorist groups were characterized as having become increasingly sophisticated in their abilities to use complicated weapons systems, as well as to exploit the media and public opinion. On the other hand, some scepticism was attached to suggestions that weapons of mass destruction may become increasingly attractive to terrorists, reflected in marginal agreement that future terrorist attacks would incur higher casualty rates. Much contention surrounded the hypothetical use of chemical/biological agents by terrorists, and, while believed to be a possibility, such an act was considered likely to occur only as a last resort. The prospect of a terrorist-inspired nuclear incident was not given credence.
New potential sources of terrorism were seen to be evolving; for example, the re-emergence of long-standing ethnic and nationalist rivalries in the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe. The threat of politically motivated violence was not believed to be confined to those regions, however, and warnings were expressed about the possible spread of homeland conflicts to expatriate communities abroad.
None of the delegates appeared willing to venture a definitive comment about Middle East terrorism—'the dust has not settled' was the favoured response. It was generally accepted that the situation remains fluid, and movement in the peace process, or a lack thereof, could prompt a return to terrorism. There was agreement, as well, on the likelihood of an increased terrorist threat against Soviets abroad because of the former USSR's reduced support for the Arab world.
Attention was drawn to a relatively new phenomenon in Western Europe and North America: 'single issue' terrorist groups, emerging as off-shoots of broader-based movements such as animal rights, pro- and anti-abortionists and environmentalists. A characteristic of such groups was their restricted focus, usually limited to seeking an alteration of government policy on one specific issue. The point was raised, however, that some seemingly innocuous groups have been infiltrated and taken over by persons having ulterior motives; e.g., anarchists are known to have infiltrated the Animal Rights Movement in the U.K. The emergence of militant extremism in some of these groups serves to underline the fact that illegality and criminality of terrorist actions have to be emphasized regardless of their causes.
Most delegates shared the opinion that the support infrastructure of some terrorist groups had been seriously affected by recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as by the outcome of the Gulf War. While historically, certain countries had provided financial and material assistance and safe havens to a number of groups, especially those in the Middle East, state sponsorship was no longer fashionable or, in some cases, feasible. Delegates were cautioned, however, not to become over-confident about the apparent decreasing influence of state sponsorship.
It was pointed out that incidents of new sponsorship were emerging, including the direct involvement of security forces in terrorist incidents. Effective measures are required to discourage state sponsorship of terrorism. Recommendations included the use of diplomatic persuasion, trade and aid sanctions, the expulsion of diplomats (which proved so effective during the Gulf War), the training of anti-terrorism groups and the provision of technical assistance in potential target countries. The use of force was not ruled out as the ultimate recourse, and it was acknowledged that unilateral warnings that perceived sponsors will be held responsible for acts of terrorism appear to act as a deterrent.
In regard to East-West co-operation, it was evident that progress has been made in Central Europe. Among a number of positive achievements have been:
i) the tracing and apprehension of members of terrorist groups;
ii) the release of information on former safe havens;
iii) restrictions on the export of arms; and,
iv) the tagging of explosives.
In conjunction, meetings of heads of police in European capitals now include representatives from Central European countries—a crucial first step in practical co-operation.
Delegates were reminded that the Single European Act of 1986 committed the EC to the de facto abolition of all police and customs formalities for people and goods crossing international boundaries within the EC. Strengthening controls at external borders was deemed essential, a process which could be facilitated by an EC-wide 'border police' force. Although formal co-operation against terrorism is well-established within the Trevi Group, given the reservations of many European governments and police forces, creation of a 'European police force' was seen as a long-term prospect.
During the past 20 years a consensus has developed in liberal democracies that counter-terrorism should be subject to proper executive control. Further, it is accepted that the democratic rights of citizens should be respected and that security operations should be governed by the rule of law. Governments of liberal democracies have, by and large, remained firm in their commitment to dealing with terrorism under the existing rule of law.
It was agreed, however, that appropriate recognition must be given to the fact that intelligence and law enforcement agencies, of necessity, must operate secretly. An inherent tension exists in democratic societies between the intelligence community's need to conduct operations in secret and the general public's desire for open government and emphasis on the 'right to know'. Achieving the right balance remains a sensitive issue which will continue to bedevil democratic societies. Unfortunately, the differing approaches of national governments will inevitably have a negative impact on international co-operation in matters of security and intelligence.
Caution was expressed that technology not be viewed as a panacea for countering terrorism, but it does provide a useful tool. Regrettably the latter factor has been underestimated, and research and development in this area appears to be seriously under-funded. On the positive side, technology which has been developed, or will be developed in the next five years, offers some hope of a considerable improvement in defence against bombs targeted at commercial airports and airlines. The problem of how to make such technology available worldwide remains.
Some concerns were voiced that terrorist groups will begin to create alliances, given the influence of current global constraints. Reference was made to putative links with narcotics trafficking as a means of financing terrorist operations. In regard to the latter, a strong suggestion was advanced that the narcotics traffickers' success in forcing a change of the Colombian Constitution represented a major success for terrorism.
It was generally agreed that several matters deserved priority:
In early November, academics and researchers from American military institutes and a few foreign academics and officials met in Annapolis, Maryland, the home of the US Naval Academy, under the auspices of the National Security Studies section of the International Studies Association. The conference provided interesting—even surprising—insights on developments in Europe and on the state of mind of the American military and foreign policy establishment.
Surprisingly, in light of the overwhelming American victory in the gulf, uncertainty characterized the presentations by the national security establishment. While the Iraqis were ejected from Kuwait, Hussein is rebuilding his power base. The loss of the Warsaw Pact target, coupled with domestic American economic problems, has left the military and intelligence communities vulnerable to significant budgetary cut-backs.
In response, some voices in Washington are talking about new roles for the military or expanded activity in unconventional areas, like drug interdiction. But others question the capacity and appropriateness of re-directing the military. For instance, stopping drugs is a hopeless battle so long as demand for narcotics remains high. Use the military for disaster relief or bridge construction in developing countries, some advise; but this might have the unintended effect of reinforcing the local military's image and political control, others counter. Besides, the military's mission is to defend the US, not to act as a development agency.
American and European participants painted a changing European security picture in which Europeans will take a greater role in ensuring their own security and dealing with the post-Cold-War issues of ethnic conflict, refugees and environmental concerns. One presenter predicted that the West European Union would field a European military force, either overlapping or complementing NATO. Finnish participants objected to any diminution of America`s role, pointing to the EC's ineffective response to the Yugoslav crisis and history of mutual antagonism.
Yet American speakers leaned towards disengagement from Europe. This reflected both American confidence in Western Europe and a desire to reduce American commitments, especially since the most direct threat to the US emanating from Europe—the Soviet threat—had diminished. One high-level policy-maker even opined that a little European anti-Americanism was likely and natural (even welcome?).
The revolutionary events gripping the Soviet Union by turns pleased and worried participants. The rump Soviet foreign ministry was doing all the right things—signing arms reduction treaties with the US and cancelling the 1948 "friendship treaty" with Finland, thereby freeing its neighbour to pursue an independent foreign policy. But what will follow the breakup of the USSR was anyone's guess.
The emerging Russian military leadership, several presenters argued, shared the doctrine and goals of their Soviet precursors. Analysts pictured Soviet armed forces leaders Shaposhnikov, Lobov and the Russian defence minister Kobets as modernizers who believed that large ground forces formerly used to occupy enemy territory had become an anachronism; and that the future of warfare belonged the high-tech, "aero-space war" whose outcome would be determined in a week or ten days. This group favours arms control agreements and even technology sharing with the US to eliminate outdated weapons and to benefit from American technological innovations. Quality (of troop and weapons) matters more than quantity; research and development more than procurement.
But Russia's ability to be able to fight an aerospace war against the US was seen as a long-term proposition. Currently, the Soviet armed forces are in crisis. Food, clothing and housing for the estimated 300,000 troops scheduled to return from abroad by 1991 is scarce. The Northern fleet, one recent visitor to Russia reported, had not been paid in two months. Officers and enlisted men—who have no social net if demobilized—are angry about the shabby treatment they are receiving. In this context, Soviet army divisions are looking for new protectors. The most logical candidates are the now-powerful republics, and so one sees whole divisions declaring loyalty to Ukraine or other republics.
In pursuit of national goals, the republics are moving quickly to establish their military infrastructures. The Ukrainians authorities have spoken of a 450,000-man army; Russians quip that it took their neighbours months to decide whether they wanted an economic treaty and a week to decide that they wanted an army (and who would be the potential aggressor, if not Russia?). Georgia now has 15,000 troops and the Georgian government wants to increase that to 50,000. Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan are all actively assembling military or paramilitary forces.
The ultimate fate of the USSR's strategic nuclear forces also received attention. One presenter argued that the non-Russian republics would not accept permanent Russian control of these weapons, nor seek totally independent use of them. Rather, they would opt for immediate joint control of the weapons and eventual de-nuclearization. The presenter argued that the financial cost and scientific investment in, say, transforming Soviet nuclear weapons into Ukrainian ones would be higher than Ukrainian public opinion (outraged by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster) was willing to pay.
The Czechoslovakian Ambassador to the US, Rita Klimova, and several presenters on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, noted that they signed an agreement in September to co-ordinate towards NATO and the EC. Ms. Klimova compared the current European political situation to that before World War I. Ethnic strife stalks Europe; from one day to the next she does not know whether even Czechoslovakia will survive. NATO remains the only functioning security organization in Europe, but, for understandable reasons it will not admit Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland (who would like nothing better). Admitting that East Europeans may be over-sensitive to political rumblings (we can hear the grass grow, she quipped), Ms. Klimova expressed worry over Czechoslavakia's neighbour, Ukraine, which, she claimed, was determined to organize a large army and retain nuclear weapons.
Citing the historically peaceful relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Ambassador Klimova predicted that if parting occurred, it would be peaceful. The Czechs are moving towards a market economy more cautiously than the Poles. The road is bumpy. The Soviets owe Czechoslovakia, Ms. Klimova claimed, over $5 billion (US), and the Syrians owed them over $1 billion. On foreign arms sales, she pointed out that efforts to convert large factories from the production of tanks and armoured personnel carriers had been underway since 1986, before the Velvet Revolution, for practical economic reasons (though she did not indicate how far this process had advanced). On the other hand, small arms production (a long-standing Czechoslovak tradition) was continuing unimpeded, and was supplying (she noted wryly) the enthusiastic US market (60% of the world market in small munitions sales).
A speaker on Germany offered a complementary perspective. To safeguard its own economic well being, Germany would become an economic hegemon in central Europe. By providing government-backed loan guarantees, Germany had already begun the process of large-scale investment in central Europe, and might even extend this approach to Russia and Ukraine. Its goals would be purely economic and intended to stabilize its region; no political ambitions lay behind this approach. An academic from Berlin noted the other side of the coin: the arrival in Germany of some 200,000 refugees from East and Central Europe in the past two years and the harsh anti-foreign reaction this has evoked. He referred to a public opinion survey that placed the "silent" support for the new right-wing at 34%. An American analyst predicted German economic and political dominance in Europe, citing the respect German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, as questioning Germany's long-term commitment to the European Community.
The revolution in international affairs has thrown the American international security community "for a loop". Introspection, rather than triumph, prevails. The budgetary pressures to downsize and realize a peace dividend to begin to address long-standing domestic problems could lead to a trimming of analytical and operational capabilities even as the pace of events accelerates and challenges to national security diversify.
The era of politically inspired hijackings has not disappeared completely, and a resurgence could materialize in the near future if the Middle East peace process fizzles. From our current vantage point, however, its heyday seems well behind us. The risk for frequent travellers today is most likely to come from social malcontents or mentally disturbed individuals. It was one of these, and an all-but-invisible accomplice, who took over the flight from Rome to Tunis in mid-trajectory on the afternoon of Thursday September 19. In the process they gave this CSIS colleague and his fellow passengers several moments of excitement and serious reflection.
At home-base airports most national airlines have priority of access for boarding and deplaning. Alitalia's flights from Rome to Tunis don't seem to rate such access; at least this one didn't. We were kept waiting in the open on the ramp leading down from the airport building after receiving the signal to board. The plane finally filled up quickly; the forward cabin, normally reserved for business or club class, was full with economy passengers. A one-class flight.
About 30 minutes after take-off on a flight of 75 minutes' duration, the captain came on the intercom to say that there was a problem with the original flight plan and he hoped we would bear with him until it could be sorted out; in the meantime he asked us to please co-operate fully with the cabin staff in order to minimize the risks. Then silence.
Suddenly the cabin was buzzing with animated conversations as people speculated about what the message meant. It was given only in English. Gradually the word filtered back to the rear of the cabin that a man claiming to have a gun and explosives in his briefcase had entered the cockpit and locked the door, pushing a stewardess aside as he went. No one could get in or out. The purser and stewardesses were as much in the dark as the passengers. All we knew for sure was that the plane kept circling at cruising altitude halfway across the Mediterranean.
My seat-mate was a journalist for a Spanish-language newspaper. After a long and labourious explanation to the effect that we had been hijacked, we switched to French. There were two French journalists in the seat in front of us. Across the way there were more reporters, apparently Italian, but on assignment for the New York Times. Most of the passengers were Italian, presumably tourists or people returning to jobs in Tunisia. Toward the front there was an elderly American couple on holiday. And obviously we had a few Arabs, mostly Tunisians returning home after a vacation in Italy.
The circling movement continued for 30 minutes or more. My seat-mate had taken out a sheaf of paper and was scribbling notes furiously, taking down everything everyone said. At one point he turned to me and asked, again in laboured English, "Are you afraid?" I thought for a second and answered, "No, are you?" To which he responded "No, no, no!" I'd love to see what it was he wrote about that exchange. It seemed to me I caught a glimpse of the term "Americano" as he made his notes afterwards. (The usual cross we all carry when travelling in Europe or the Middle East.) But there was no real cause for fear. There were no hijackers running up and down the aisle carrying weapons and menacing passengers.
The aerial drama was more exciting than scary, despite a potential for mishap; yet there is often a rather fine line between fear and fascination. Like most of my fellow passengers I probably asked myself whether I had left everything in order at home. Except for the captain's comment and our pattern of flight, everything seemed normal. The cabin crew did their best to join in the spirit of things and keep up the pretence of normalcy. Wine and spirits flowed.
After 35-40 minutes, the captain came back on the intercom and said that we would be resuming our normal flight plan and heading for Tunis. There was a visible sigh of relief. So we headed south, landward, with the sun on our right. (We learned afterward that the hijacker had wanted to go to Algiers, but the authorities there had refused to let the plane land. The captain had suggested we land at Palermo, but the hijacker didn't care for that idea.) As we arrived over Tunis, it became clear that we would not go down directly. We assumed there was some re-negotiation going on. No doubt the captain was in constant touch with the tower in Tunis.
We spent another 20 minutes circling overhead before the seat-belt sign suddenly came on with a jolt and we knew then we were going down for a landing. I observed to my seat-mate that of course it was not necessarily over once we were on the ground. At least once more on our descent it seemed to me we went through a circling holding pattern, which implied we were still negotiating the details. After what seemed like the slowest descent ever, the no-smoking sign came on to tell us we were going in to land. Each new stage seemed to give more reason for optimism that the incident would end favourably.
On landing, the plane taxied to the far end of the field and came to an abrupt stop. There were no signs of an armed reception, at least not in our far corner of the airport complex. We sat there silent for quite some time, full of anticipation, before the air conditioning suddenly came back on, not a moment too soon.
From the window we saw a small work van had pulled up opposite the front of the aircraft on the left-hand side. It contained two maintenance workers in overalls who seemed not to know there was any problem. About 20 minutes after landing we saw two passenger buses pull up behind the aircraft. They may not have been visible from the cockpit.
The passengers went out the back door of the aircraft, down the steps onto the tarmac, and into the buses. These buses, once full, drove directly away from the back of the plane to a safe area. There we got out and mingled about for what seemed another half an hour. There was a dawning sense of safety and relative security. Finally the word came that we should get on board the buses again and we would be taken to the terminal. En route we passed in front of the aircraft and could see the open cockpit was deserted.
It transpired that a Tunisian special forces team had talked the young hijacker into dropping his guard and managed to subdue him without incident. It turned out he had no weapons of any kind in his possession. But of course that wasn't known at the time, and professional pilots are trained not to take any chances.
Once back in the terminal we had only a short wait till our passports were processed and the luggage reclaimed. There was no attempt made to detain us for questioning or debriefing. As we passed through the luggage collection area one could see Tunisian TV crews interviewing some passengers, and of course the Tunisian Minister of the Interior, who claimed all the credit for the happy ending to the episode.
After checking in and unpacking my bags I flicked on the TV. Sure enough, there was the whole story being laid out in full on CNN. Then came the official interview with M. Abdallah Kallel, the Minister of the Interior.
"We were informed of the hijacking at 14h30 by the control tower at Tunis-Carthage airport. We immediately put a plan of action in place to allow our special units to take up positions at the airport. This plan had the following objectives: i) to guarantee the safety of the 130 passengers and 7 crew members. ii) to ensure the security of the airplane. iii) to apprehend the hijacker. We were able to accomplish these objectives by distracting the hijacker's attention while pretending to negotiate with him." [La Presse (de Tunisie) 20 Sept. 1991, p.4]
According to the Arabic press in Tunis on the morning after the incident, the hijacker was identified as al-Hadi Bilhasan Bushnaq, 26 years of age, Tunisian nationality, an electrical worker for an Italian construction firm for the last three years. He had an accomplice who was also apprehended, but not immediately identified. The motives for the action were not clear. No special demands were made apart from the desire to reach Algiers.
The same report states that among the passengers on the plane was the PLO representative in Rome, Nimr Hammad (Abu al-Majd). In a telephone conversation with a reporter after the event, he expressed the opinion that there was no doubt the hijacker was demented (majnun). He explained that the young man at one point began to shout "Open the door of the plane, open the door!", and he kept repeating that he had been badly treated in Italy, that he was not concerned with politics and that he was not a criminal. This report claims that the hijacker did not push the stewardess aside but forced her into the cockpit ahead of him. [al-Sabah, 20 September 1991, p. 4.].
We now have the text of the Spanish journalist's report to his newspaper. It was divided into two sections. The second part was a personalized mood piece entitled: "The psychosis didn't come on suddenly, but slowly!" After introducing the incident with appropriate background, he turns to the mood in the plane as it circled over Sardinia. "... and we surmised that we were headed for Libya or Algeria. There were no tragic or dramatic scenes. People continued talking and chatting, telling stories, and most of all, trying to interpret the smallest indications of what was happening; the plane would turn in the direction of Italy, and then change heading again, and then take another direction through the blue skies toward the Tyrrhenian Sea."
There are some interesting points of interpretation in his account. "The fact that the hijacker was alone allowed the passengers to move freely in the cabin meant that fear did not arrive all of a sudden, and there was no immediate anguish. But it increased slowly while the plane flew aimlessly about the skies, with no points of reference available; and gathered strength as there was no word from the pilot. Everyone's thoughts were on the length of the ordeal: hours, days? ... Who was the hijacker? Did he have accomplices? Did the incident have anything to do with the PLO representative who was on board? Questions without answers, brought up because of the fact that the hijacker was alone. An incredible sense of weakness."
I searched eagerly to see if he had in fact referred to our exchange. Toward the end I found the following short sentence. "An American colleague, foreseeing what could happen, hid his passport." Could that be me? Not likely, since I had not removed my passport from its usual place. In any event he concludes on a note of rising anxiety which seems at variance with the reality I experienced. "The stewardesses, with admirable aplomb, administered Valium to some passengers who could stand it no longer. It was only after they left the plane that the panic set in." [Rossend Domenech, Diari di Barcelona, September 20, 1991, pp. 1, 13].
The views expressed herein are those of the author, who may be contacted by writing to :
CSIS P.O.Box 9732 Postal Station T Ottawa, Ontario K1G 4G4 FAX: (613) 842-1312
ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/17
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